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2 General Findings and Recommendations
Pages 30-44

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From page 30...
... Naval leadership for chemical and biological warfare defense. In spite of both the general military and the naval-specific concerns and guidance regarding preparedness for chemical and biological warfare defense articulated for more than a decade, little improvement in the Navy's posture could be found.
From page 31...
... As the Navy undertook a major force buildup in the early 1980s, a memorandum from committee member Joshua Lederberg to the CNO, Admiral James Watkins, USN, was instrumental in precipitating the decision to equip some new vessels with collective protection capabilities and improved chemical weapons detectors.1 Following the experiences of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, including the preparations for chemical and biological warfare and controversies about possible exposure to chemical warfare agents during the war, considerable concern existed at senior levels in the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and U.S. Navy about the ability of U.S.
From page 32...
... Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre creates the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to encourage improved focus and effectiveness in coming to terms with the threat of WMD.
From page 33...
... Congressional support agencies, including both the Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office, were tasked over the decade after the Persian Gulf War with providing numerous studies and analyses to inform the oversight process. Concerned about the seemingly ineffectual and redundant technology investment efforts of the individual Services, in 1994 Congress legislated a joint approach for research, development, and acquisition.
From page 34...
... The 1997 DSB study on the transnational threat highlighted the emerging asymmetric challenge posed by new forms of terrorist organizations and, specifically in the chemical and biological weapons domain, recommended strategies for reducing vulnerabilities while "getting smarter" about the problem.9 The 2001 DSB study on biological defense, cosponsored by the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) , characterized the threat to U.S.
From page 35...
... undertook a variety of studies, some with Navy sponsorship and others with sponsorship by DTRA, to assess and recommend improvements in the defense against chemical and biological weapons. A number of consistent themes run through these studies: -- "The Navy does not fully understand if its forces can operate effectively in a CBW [chemical and biological warfare]
From page 36...
... 1999. Report on CNA Tasks for the Project on Integrated NBC Defense for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Annual Conference, CME 0599061900, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., June.
From page 37...
... Like the Navy, the Air Force was left with concerns following the near brush with chemical and biological weapons in the Persian Gulf War. Although the Air Force had established passive defense capabilities and a program to bring new technologies into the field, it took a series of discussions in Deputy Secretary of Defense John White's Counterproliferation Council, backed by associated critical analyses, for Air Force leadership to admit that having some capabilities in hand and some better ones in the technology pipeline does not necessarily equate with an operational ability to fight and survive in a CW or BW environment.
From page 38...
... That plan consolidated existing counterproliferation guidance to provide overarching guidance for coordinating Air Force assets and efforts for counterproliferation, instituted an investment strategy process, and directed the major commands to develop implementation plans to organize, train, and equip forces. It is important to note that the Air Force has addressed chemical and biological passive defense in the context of the broader mission space of counterproliferation to understand the trade-offs and synergies with active defense, counterforce, and consequence management.
From page 39...
... Against a state adversary willing and able to use chemical and biological weapons in battlefield and theater-wide attacks, effective defense requires not only passive defense, but the development of a more comprehensive architecture that would include the following: counterforce attack capabilities to diminish the adversary's attack capability, active defenses to reduce any attacks launched by air, passive defenses to diminish the impact of those attacks on forces in theater, decontamination capabilities to restore contaminated facilities and personnel to service, consequence management capabilities to cope with broader base and public demands, medical therapeutics both pre- and post-attack, and so on.24 The existence of robust active and passive chemical and biological defense capabilities would positively influence overall counterproliferation capabilities. Against a state or nonstate adversary employing chemical or biological weapons in covert and limited attacks on U.S.
From page 40...
... 2001. Report of the Defense Science Board/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Task Force on Biological Defense, Washington, D.C., June, p.
From page 41...
... Air Force has used risk-based analyses to develop innovative approaches to sustaining air operations in a chemical or biological threat environment, offering another useful model, as presented above. Of special note is the Air Force's ability to quantify the relationship between sortie generation rates and improved technical chemical and biological defense capabilities and CONOPS for contaminated battle environments.
From page 42...
... The basis for focusing energies and investments should be an operational net assessment by each operational fleet commander. Such an assessment would elucidate the consequences of adversaries' use of chemical or biological weapons, examining not just impacts on individual ships but on missions more broadly, including the combatant commander's operational theater and strategic goals.
From page 43...
... · Finding the Air Force in a similar situation in the mid-1990s, Air Force leader ship undertook internal initiatives to innovate and find practical operational solutions. Recommendation for the Navy · Naval leadership, building on the policies recently established by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, should commit to the integration of chemical and biological defense considerations into all naval functions.
From page 44...
... Recommendation for the Navy · Following the example set by the Fifth Fleet, each operational fleet com mander should get started with an operational net assessment that provides a vision of both mission failure -- at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels- and the essential ingredients of mission sustainment and success.


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