Naval Forces' Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats (2004) / Chapter Skim
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3 Operations: Specific Findings and Recommendations
3 Operations: Specific Findings and Recommendations
Pages 45-66
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From page 45... ...
Operational requirements. The committee found that the Navy -- and in some respects the Marines -- have not defined the chemical or biological warfare defense operational requirements for mission success.
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From page 46... ...
The Navy appears to lack a focal point for the development of policy, concepts of operations, and doctrine for chemical or biological warfare defense; the Marine Corps appears to place greater emphasis on the problem. The committee recommends that the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
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From page 47... ...
They are both operational and symbolic targets, offering an adversary the opportunity to disrupt power projection operations while also punishing nations which host that presence and tarnishing the image of American power. In general, the committee found in its review no TTPs for shore installations that effectively address these vulnerabilities outside the recent Joint Staff guidance.2 Navy shore installations appear better equipped to deal with chemical attacks than with biological attacks, but their emphasis has been on consequence management from a hazardous material (HAZMAT)
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From page 48... ...
Today's naval forces are dependent on continuing access to and use of a wide range of commercial capabilities and facilities. Despite this dependence and the attendant vulnerability -- and despite the hard lessons learned from the USS Cole attack -- the committee found in its review little more than sporadic evidence that the Navy's TTPs effectively address defense against chemical or biological attack while ships are in port.
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From page 49... ...
As this review of TTPs suggests, the Navy's current efforts at dealing with these issues address only a small part of the problem. The committee believes that, as a more focused aspect of the operational net assessment recommended in Chapter 2, defining the operational requirements for mission success is essential before the Navy and Marine Corps can take further steps for achieving significant improvements in chemical and biological warfare defense.
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From page 50... ...
Operational Recommendation: Roles for NWDC and MCCDC The Navy should recognize and strengthen the Navy Warfare Development Command in its role of developing and promulgating a concept of operations and the supporting policies describing how naval forces will execute their warfighting and base support missions in an environment that has been or may be contaminated with chemical or biological agents. The Marine Corps should build on the work already under way at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and with its Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force -- and the Navy should leverage that work.
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From page 51... ...
The Marine Corps focuses its concept development and center of warfighting expertise in the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Fortuitously, it has already expanded MCCDC's scope to include concept development for chemical and biological threats.
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From page 52... ...
There are a number of valuable assets for NWDC to enlist as it moves to define the operational requirements of mission success. These include the following: · Commander, Fifth Fleet, has been working these issues in his area of responsibility because the threat of chemical or biological attack is acknowledged as real and urgent.
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From page 53... ...
USMC, Commanding Officer, Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade, "United States Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force," presentation to the committee on December 18, 2001.
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It is recommended that the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, direct the utilization of this valuable resource, particularly for or by shore establishments. · The Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-terrorism)
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From page 55... ...
Some increase in personnel injury or death from chemical and/or biological attack may be experienced, but the resulting warfighting capability could be significantly greater than that of a similar force that is fully protected in IPE. More importantly, the net threat to the force may, in fact, be reduced more in partial IPE gear than if the naval forces were fully outfitted.
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From page 56... ...
An important policy concern relates to the design standards appropriate for personal protection gear for naval personnel. Recall the Air Force experience: it came to understand that the operational requirements of sustained air operations in a CW or BW environment were different from operational requirements from a ground combat perspective (as seen by the Army as the lead agency)
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From page 57... ...
In the Fifth Fleet AOR, an acceptable degree of near-term readiness has been achieved -- and is being maintained -- through rigorous maintenance of legacy systems, aggressive training and exercise programs, training visits by CBIRF, use of CNAC to support ongoing operational net assessments, and most importantly, a command climate which accepts the threat as real and appreciates that the potential consequences are grave. This commendable degree of readiness to confront CW and BW threats was reportedly achieved at reasonable cost.
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From page 58... ...
The assistance of the president of the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey should be solicited in this effort. Of most concern to the committee is that there appear to be no chemical or biological warfare defense readiness standards in place for the shore establish
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From page 59... ...
Reporting The standard operational readiness reporting system is largely silent on chemical and biological warfare defense readiness reporting. It is recommended that the Chief of Naval Operations include CW and BW defense readiness reporting in the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)
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From page 60... ...
Operational Recommendation: Shore Establishment Special urgency should be attached to the readiness of shore installations and bases. The Chief of Naval Operations should direct his regional commanders to develop and exercise cooperative safety, security, and emergency response capabilities with their local communities.
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From page 61... ...
The committee also believes that such exercises would be of benefit to the Navy as it develops its own procedures. Specialized Response Capabilities Besides the Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, there are two other specialized response capabilities of note -- the National Guard's civil support teams (CSTs)
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From page 62... ...
The task force is designed to provide life saving, protection, populace care, logistics, engineering, and medical support to civil authorities during emergencies in which state and local authorities need more help. The committee observes that the JTF/CS, CSTs, and CBIRF contain complementary capabilities and that they are chartered to support different missions.
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From page 63... ...
should continue to assess biological and chemical threats to their logistics chain and take action to defend essential support as well as to mitigate the consequences in case of an attack. Logistical support for Navy and Marine forces, whether they are in or near CONUS or thousands of miles from their home ports and bases, is highly dependent on continuing access to and use of a wide range of commercial capabilities and facilities such as these: · Container ships (including Marine Corps pre-positioning ships)
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From page 64... ...
In the committee's relative assessment of chemical or biological weapons attack options available to adversaries (illustrated in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1) , the most serious vulnerability/ consequence scenarios appear to be chemical or biological weapons attacks on commercial ports and airfields and/or on other elements of the logistics chain.
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From page 65... ...
defense operational requirements for mission success across its full mission space, most especially with the shift from Cold War to asymmetric threat environments. Recommendation for the Navy · Define the chemical and biological warfare defense operational require ments for mission success across the entire naval force through a comprehensive concept of operations, with supporting policies and practices.
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From page 66... ...
Central to its effort is the requirement to define appropriate stan dards of readiness in each of its mission areas; these standards should be derived from the operational requirements generated by the recommended operational net assessments. Specific actions should include the following: -- The Commander, Fleet Forces Command, should coordinate the estab lishment, validation, and promulgation of readiness standards for CW and BW defense.
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