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4 Non-Medical Science and Technology: Specific Findings and Recommendations
Pages 67-104

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From page 67...
... The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the significantly increased investment by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in medical countermeasures and vaccines are leading to increased activities in these areas, which should in turn impact the Joint CBD Program.
From page 68...
... Two aspects of the Joint CBD Program appear not to serve naval needs well and can be ameliorated with appropriate attention by the Navy: 1. The Non-Medical Science and Technology Program has been and remains dominated by a philosophy of "contamination avoidance," a laudable goal indeed, but one that the committee believes is unrealistic as the driving force, considering the broad range of possible asymmetric attacks (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3)
From page 69...
... 69 t Equipmen Phase Restoration Decontamination Decontamination Sensitive Solid Solution Purification Collective Protection Collective Protection Collective Protection Air Shelters Program. Areas Clothing Masks Technology Research Individual Protection Individual Protection Individual Protection Standoff Thrust and CB Basic All Science Biological Interim Standoff Detection CB CB Toxicology Point Detection Monitoring Non-Medical Avoidance Avoidance CB Detection Contamination Contamination Biological Identification Interim Point Water Agents Operational Technology Program's Acquisition S&T Threat level CBD Supporting Aerosol Systems -based CB Low Management Joint Battle Battle the Battle Environment Plan/Training Technology of Management Management CB CB CB Simulation Information Taxonomy 4.1 Areas S&T Areas S&T Areas Functional Capability Business Thrusts Commodity Foundation Business FIGURE
From page 70...
... to assign the Navy Warfare Development Command responsibility for developing and promulgating a carefully analyzed and gamed concept of operations would go a long way toward addressing this issue. Here the knowledgeable personnel at NWDC could also provide to naval personnel involved in the Joint CBD Program sorely needed support and expertise for ensuring that naval needs are met.
From page 71...
... More comprehensive overviews and details of specific systems and detection requirements are available from other sources.2 THE NON-MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Non-Medical S&T Finding: Contamination Avoidance -- A Limiting Philosophy Against Asymmetric Threats In order to evaluate the utility to naval forces of non-medical science and technology that is current, in development, and proposed, the committee assessed naval issues from the five operational perspectives described in Chapter 3: (1) ships at sea, (2)
From page 72...
... ," of the "DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Overview" presentation to the committee on September 18, 2001, by Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense. and long term.3 The cornerstone of contamination avoidance is the detection and identification of a threat agent as early as possible.
From page 73...
... This close coupling of operational considerations with S&T capabilities should guide the priorities for investment in S&T and training. Non-Medical S&T Finding: An Opportunity for Change The Joint CBD Program's committee processes -- both for setting requirements and for prioritizing research, development, and acquisition (RDA)
From page 74...
... the Joint Staff's Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense will be responsible defining requirements to meet operational needs.5 Non-Medical S&T Recommendation: Promulgating a Risk Management Approach The Navy, and with it the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program, should shift from a philosophy dominated by contamination avoidance toward an approach based on risk management which assumes that contamination will happen and focuses on managing the response. The foundation for a risk management approach should come from the doctrine development efforts at the Navy Warfare Development Command (as recommended in Chapter 3 of this report)
From page 75...
... NAVY INVOLVEMENT Non-Medical S&T Finding: Limited Navy Participation in the Joint CBD Program It appears to the committee that in the years before the Joint CBD Program was established, naval investments in chemical and biological defense S&T at the NRL had led to substantial progress, and that the work had coupled into a commitment in the operational Navy for improving its posture at sea. One of the best examples of that commitment was the move to collective protection systems as a requirement on new destroyers, as a result of recommendations made by one of this study's committee members in the early 1980s.6 Since the advent of the Joint CBD Program, however, it has been difficult for NRL to sustain continuity and cohesion of effort, given the "decision by committee" process of the program and the tendency toward proposal-by-proposal awards instead of the creation and sustainment of centers of excellence.
From page 76...
... in its role of developing -- through analysis, experimentation, and testing -- and promulgating a concept of operations and the supporting policies for describing how naval forces will execute their warfighting and force protection missions in an environment that has been or may be contaminated with chemical or biological agents. In this role, NWDC should also provide consultation to Navy participants in the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
From page 77...
... operational testing of potential fleet systems in environments contaminated by chemical or biological agents is very difficult to achieve. A common example of a system development path that bypasses the normal T&E requirements is the advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs)
From page 78...
... Modeling and simulation efforts should be assigned to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, as an adjunct to the role it is already serving for the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The provision of realistic test environments is the responsibility of the Director of Navy Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N91)
From page 79...
... Contamination Avoidance Consistent with the Joint CBD Program's organization of the science and technology associated with contamination avoidance, the following is divided into a discussion of point detection and standoff detection. Within those divisions, sensors for chemical and biological agents are discussed separately, because each almost always requires different science and technology.
From page 80...
... The chemical and biological defense community has long viewed chemical and biological agents, not unreasonably, as best avoided and has tacitly assumed that this is the primary function of sensors, that is, to warn so that the threat can be avoided. The fact that the Joint CBD Program, under the title of "Contamination Avoidance," groups all chemical and biological sensors together strongly emphasizes this point.
From page 81...
... Biological Point Detection At least six approaches are being used for the detection and identification of biological agents: 7Meeting of the Non-Medical S&T Panel of the Committee for an Assessment of Naval Forces' Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats, Naval Studies Board, at the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., on January 17-18, 2001.
From page 82...
... Concentrating the target molecules into a much smaller volume without adversely affecting detection and identification is also difficult. In the near term, a single instrument will not be able to adequately detect and identify both chemical and biological agents.
From page 83...
... The best path for achieving this evaluation is for ONR to undertake an analysis relevant to naval operational environments and then work with the Joint CBD Program to define an appropriate experimental program to address the key shortcomings in sensitivity, selectivity, and timeliness in order to meet naval operational needs. Providing science and technology that helps the commanding officer make risk-based decisions is the priority.
From page 84...
... spectrometry, forms the basis for the Joint CBD Program passive sensor in development known as the joint service lightweight standoff chemical agent detector (JSLSCAD)
From page 85...
... The committee nonetheless recommends that the Navy assess the JSLSCAD in marine environments before accepting it for fleet operation. In the area of active standoff systems, the Navy currently has the lead in the development of a standoff chemical weapons agent detection system known as Artemis, a project in the Joint CBD Program started in FY 2001.
From page 86...
... As a practical matter, however, fluorescence of biological materials tends to decrease as the exciting wavelength approaches the visible region of the spectrum, so the design of such a UV LIDAR fluorescence system involves difficult trade-offs between laser wavelength availability, range of propagation, and strength of the resulting fluorescence signals. The committee uncovered no evidence that the Navy had conducted any R&D appropriate to airborne biological weapons standoff detection prior to the establishment of the Joint CBD Program.
From page 87...
... . The Joint CBD Program currently funds research, development, and testing for both individual and collective protection.
From page 88...
... · The availability of individual protective equipment within the Navy is limited if one considers the expanding needs associated with protecting not only deployed forces, but also personnel at bases and shore installations, OCONUS ports, and civilian and logistics support. · Adequate protection against the broad spectrum of toxic industrial chemicals and materials that might be employed in asymmetric warfare is currently lacking.
From page 89...
... In the committee's opinion -- and as stated many times throughout this report -- this thinking is inappropriate for the asymmetric threat environment. Attacks with chemical or biological agents or toxic industrial chemicals will occur -- and some of them will be successful.
From page 90...
... At the same time, timescales for getting a measurement are more relaxed, compared with contamination avoidance requirements. It is crucial that the R&D community develop instruments and procedures capable of making these measurements for both chemical and biological agents in order to facilitate a rapid return to normal operations.
From page 91...
... This problem becomes even more difficult when one considers the possible use of toxic industrial chemicals as chemical warfare agents. Finally, when one considers the environmental requirements and long-term safe exposure levels necessary to restore activity at a base or a harbor, it becomes clear that many of the materials that were designed for battlefield decontamination (such as DS2)
From page 92...
... Other work is under way to identify decontamination materials that would be safe and approved for use on aircraft surfaces. The Navy has seawater washdown capability on its ships (not a part of the Joint CBD Program)
From page 93...
... The Navy is urged to consider spearheading similar agent fate studies focused on Navy-centric restoration issues, employing materials of utmost importance to Navy operations (e.g., carrier deck surfaces)
From page 94...
... A balance should be struck. Developing Operational Guidelines for Decontamination The Navy should develop operational guidelines for the effective decontamination of its ships, bases, ports, airfields, and logistical chains -- that is, make specific the joint doctrine expected as a product of the new Joint CBD Program requirements office in Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff/Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (OJCS/J8)
From page 95...
... With the doctrine in hand, the investments in effective decontamination technology and procedures then can be clearly linked to Navy-specific needs. Summary of Findings Related to Decontamination The decontamination story is multifaceted, as evident in the preceding discussion, but capabilities sorely lag those in the areas of contamination avoidance and individual and collective protection.
From page 96...
... The program is scheduled to deliver nontoxic and noncorrosive decontamination materials and application equipment. · Toxins, new-generation nerve agents, and toxic industrial chemicals have chemical properties different from those of traditional chemical agents.
From page 97...
... In summary, the committee believes that the perception that chemical and biological incidents can be largely avoided by better vigilance and greatly improved sensors is flawed. The risk to the Navy of an asymmetric attack with chemical or biological agents or toxic industrial chemicals is serious.
From page 98...
... · Threats from industrial manufacturing sites or those using industrial chemicals are viable and potentially crippling to operations. Relatively smallscale releases involving toxic industrial chemicals could have a major impact on operational capability if executed with precision.
From page 99...
... This example is offered not for completeness, but to illustrate the methodology and basic concepts. At another level, operationally focused simulations could also be used as a guide in determining how to allocate resources to the various aspects of the Joint CBD Program itself (e.g., sensors, models, protective equipment, decontamination techniques, vaccines, medical treatment, and so on)
From page 100...
... Recommendations are directed to the Navy's technical community, principally at the Office of Naval Research and the Naval Sea Systems Command, involved in the Joint CBD Program.
From page 101...
... · The Joint CBD Program focus on CA fails to address risks and responses end to end, and as a result, science and technology investments in biodetection do not provide a balance among CA, exposure diagnosis, and contamination assess ment/decontamination. Recommendations for the Navy · Undertake a combined analytic and experimental evaluation to prioritize additional investments in biological point detection science and technology.
From page 102...
... Recommendation for the Navy · Fully support the current development programs in the Joint CBD Program, paying particular attention to naval operating environment and false-positive is sues. Biological Standoff Detection Findings · Biological weapons standoff detection is difficult because of the characteris tically broad and generally featureless spectral signals of biological molecules, coupled to the low concentration of agent needed for an effective attack and its presence among higher concentrations of naturally occurring background.
From page 103...
... for both chemical and biological agents. In particular, the Joint Services Fixed Site Decontamination Program is addressing the critical Navy need for a low-toxicity decontamination system for airbases, ports, and fixed base logistics nodes.
From page 104...
... -- Undertake agent fate studies to understand the consequences of the in teractions of agents with surfaces, coatings, and subsurfaces common to Navy ships and shore facilities before and after washdown. · Explore the options for decontaminants emerging from other agencies and the commercial sector in addition to participation in the Joint CBD Program.


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