Naval Forces' Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats (2004) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
Prologue and Executive Summary
Prologue and Executive Summary
Pages 1-14
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AUM SHINRIKYO · 1994. Members of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo attack a hotel in Matsumoto, Japan, with sarin gas, and succeed in killing a targeted judge (among others)
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· 2002. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet testifies that "al Qaeda was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins."3 Documents recovered from al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan show that bin Laden was pursuing a biological weapons research program.
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2001. Chemical and Biological Defense, Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory Management Are Needed, GAO-01-667, Washington, D.C., September; U.S.
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In response to the terms of reference and the special tasking from the CNO for this study,1 the Committee for an Assessment of Naval Forces' Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats devoted its attention to evaluating the current operational posture of naval forces with regard to defending against chemical and biological weapons across the entirety of its operations and to identifying the opportunities for improvement afforded by operational and technical advances. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax attacks significantly raised awareness of chemical and biological threats, providing additional impetus to this study.
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philosophy of avoiding contamination; · The critical role of naval leadership in ensuring readiness throughout the force and in sustaining improvements in posture; · The need for consistent requirements and supporting systems in training and reporting to ensure readiness; and · The contributions that technology can -- and cannot -- make for both medical and non-medical defense. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS- A REAL AND PRESENT THREAT TO NAVAL FORCES While the committee is convinced that naval forces face a real and present threat, Navy leadership presented a wide range of views about the reality, importance, and practicality of defending against chemical or biological weapons.
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(Chapter 1 provides a simple example, created by the committee, of the comparative risk -- defined as vulnerability × consequences -- to operations in an environment of chemical or biological threat from nations and terrorist enemies with capability and intent to attack.) · Adopt a reasoned view of chemical and biological weapons exposure environments.
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In spite of both the general military and the naval-specific concerns and guidance regarding preparedness for chemical and biological warfare defense articulated for more than a decade, little improvement in the Navy's posture could be found. The Navy's senior leadership should commit to strengthening and integrating chemical and biological defense throughout all Navy functions in order to achieve both near-term and sustained improvements.
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defense guidance in publications on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) , its alignment role and capabilities should be strengthened through realistic experimentation and testing and in promulgating CONOPS and supporting policies for how naval forces will execute their warfighting and base support missions in an environment that may be or has been contaminated with chemical or biological agents.3 The Marine Corps should build on the work already under way at MCCDC, which has been active as a focal point in joint efforts, and on the experiences with the Corps's Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS All of the research, development, and acquisition for chemical and biological warfare defense is carried out through the legislatively mandated Joint CBD Program and is organized around two principal areas -- (1) Non-Medical Science and Technology and (2)
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The committee recommends that the Navy champion a fundamental change in philosophy in this part of the Joint CBD Program -- one that moves toward a risk management approach which assumes that contamination will happen and focuses on managing the response. Such a shift should result in a more balanced investment portfolio, to also include detection capabilities to support decontamination and diagnostics; characterization of agent fate on exposed surfaces; protective equipment in consonance with tactics, techniques, and procedures that better facilitate operating through an exposure; and rapid and "friendly" decontamination techniques and procedures.
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The maritime environment introduces unique factors that should be explicitly considered for accepting equipment from the Joint CBD Program and developing procedures for its use. The Navy's research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E)
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available in the near term to mid-term based on DOD priorities alone.5 In the absence of adequate supplies of effective vaccines, casualties must be anticipated, but observant sailors, corpsmen, clinicians, and commanders, in combination with modern diagnostic tools, will allow early medical interventions to save lives, minimize contamination and further 4Due to their expanded scope of chemical and biological defense associated with the war on terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services, especially in the area of vaccines, may impact the Joint CBD Program. The committee believes, however, that its recommendations remain applicable, although the Department of the Navy should follow closely and leverage these activities as much as possible.
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The committee noted two major shortfalls in the development programs of the Services and the medical defense part of the Joint CBD Program: (1) the certification of critical laboratory reagents and (2)
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The lessons from the post-Gulf War era, during which the Navy's attention to CW and BW defense fell off dramatically, suggest a serious leadership challenge for the long term -- namely, sustaining institutional commitment to improving the operational posture of naval forces with regard to defending against chemical and biological weapons as the threat evolves to ever more capable levels. Guided by sound risk management practices, naval forces can go far toward reducing the dangers -- and therefore, the threat -- of any chemical or biological attack.
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