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1 Introduction
Pages 11-32

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From page 11...
... to assist OPS and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in developing guidance for use by states, counties, cities, and towns that have existing or proposed transmission pipelines.
From page 12...
... Although relatively few fatalities and injuries are due to pipeline incidents in the United States each year, such incidents occur almost daily. Most state and local governments do not perceive transmission pipelines to be a significant hazard unless pipeline incidents resulting in death, injury, or extensive property damage have occurred in their communities.
From page 13...
... Thirteen days after the train derailment and after train service had been restored, the pipeline exploded in the same location, killing two people, destroying 10 homes, and injuring dozens of people. Fredericksburg, Virginia Colonial Pipeline Company operates more than 5,317 miles of petroleum pipeline in 13 states and the District of Columbia, with its major lines running from Texas to New York.
From page 14...
... Again, fish and game were killed, and Fredericksburg's water supply was contami nated; drinking water had to be hauled in from Stafford County for 7 days. Edison, New Jersey On March 23, 1994, a 36-inch-diameter pipeline owned and operated by Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation ruptured catastrophically in Edison Township, New Jersey, within the property of Quality Materials, Inc., an asphalt plant.
From page 15...
... Reston, Virginia On March 28, 1993, Colonial Pipeline Company's 36-inch pipeline ruptured in Reston, Virginia, causing the release of about 407,700 gallons of diesel fuel into Sugarland Run, a tributary of the Potomac River. The release caused significant environmental damage and threatened water supplies in parts of Northern Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia.
From page 16...
... According to NTSB, the rupture was probably caused by excavation-related damage done to the pipeline by IMCO General Construction, Inc., during the 1994 Dakin-Yew water treatment plant modification project; and Olympic Pipe Line Company's (a) inaccurate evaluation of inline pipeline inspection results, (b)
From page 17...
... SAFETY RECORD OF THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY Pipeline incidents can result in loss of life, serious injury, property damage, and environmental damage, although major incidents are infrequent. For the 3-year period 1999 through 2001, hazardous liquids pipeline incidents resulted in an annual average of 2 deaths, 11 injuries, and $97 million in property damage.
From page 18...
... From 1989 through 2000, the total number of incidents in the United States per 10,000 miles of pipeline decreased by 2.9 percent annually, while the number of reportable pipeline incidents (those resulting in a fatality, an injury, or property damage of $50,000 or more) per 10,000 miles of pipeline increased by 2.2 percent annually (GAO 2002)
From page 19...
... Including operator excavation, thirdparty excavation, vandalism, and other outside forces, such failures in 2003 were estimated by USDOT to contribute 22 and 24 percent of hazardous liquids and natural gas transmission pipeline incidents, respectively. With increasing urbanization, land development activity near transmission pipelines, and the addition of new facilities to serve growing populations, the likelihood of construction-related pipeline damage may increase, and more people and property may be exposed to pipeline failures.
From page 20...
... In addition, the existing infrastructure must be maintained, and sections of existing pipelines will need to be upgraded or replaced. Land Development The primary areas of concern for this study are land use, land development, and population growth around existing transmission pipelines and the need to locate new transmission lines to serve growing metropolitan centers.
From page 21...
... The fastest-growing metropolitan areas, which now often incorporate their formerly outlying counties, are concentrated in the southern and western states where most transmission pipelines are located (U.S. Census Bureau 2002, Table 30)
From page 22...
... . These trends in population growth and the location of this growth imply the need to manage the increasing number of people near transmission pipelines.
From page 23...
... The first major congressional action aimed at dealing with pipeline safety was the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968. This act gave the Federal Power Commission7 jurisdiction over the siting of new interstate natural gas pipelines and required USDOT to establish minimum federal safety standards for interstate natural gas transmission and distribution lines.
From page 24...
... 24 Transmission Pipelines and Land Use: A Risk-Informed Approach FIGURE 1-1 Regulation of various parts of natural gas pipeline systems. (SOURCE: INGAA 2003; personal communication, Herb Wilhite, Cycla Corporation, July 12, 2004.)
From page 25...
... (e.g., FWS, FWS, = = G FWS NOAA, NOAA, USC Transportat USACE Security commissions USCG, USCG, USACE Security Security OSHA, Commission, utility National Engineers, Homeland utilities, local = of States utilities, BLM, OSHA, or public EPA, Homeland Homeland NTSB Corps EPA, or public EPA, state public Regulatory United Commission) Others OPS, State OSHA, State FERC BLM, EPA, OSHA, State OSHA, FERC Army the Energy U.S.
From page 26...
... The Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 extended USDOT's authority over natural gas and hazardous liquids pipelines to include protection of the environment as part of its mission and identified specific issues that were to be addressed. This act provided OPS, whose mission is "to ensure the safe, reliable, and environmentally sound operation of the nation's pipeline transportation system," an opportunity to establish more stringent safety standards and environmental protection measures for high-risk areas.
From page 27...
... Neither state nor local regulation of interstate pipeline operations can supersede that of the federal government. A RISK-INFORMED APPROACH The local government approach to pipeline safety is currently either nonexistent or developed in response to specific incidents.
From page 28...
... For gas transmission lines, in contrast, it recommends setback distances "consistent with the hazard area radius" for pipelines of various diameters and pressurization that were developed in a report for the Gas Research Institute (Stephens 2000)
From page 29...
... Both organizations have developed websites that include technical reports, press releases, letters, testimony, links, and other materials of interest to concerned citizens and public officials. Austin, Texas, Example The city of Austin developed a new, more aggressive ordinance concerning transmission pipelines in response to a proposal in 2000 by Longhorn Partners Pipeline LP to convert a crude oil pipeline traversing the city to one for shipping refined petroleum products.
From page 30...
... Managing the risks associated with pipeline siting and operations may be more effective when there is involvement and a shared commitment among interested parties-policy makers, planners and system design experts, public works officials, pipeline companies, property owners, and trade associations -- as well as effective communication, training, and procedures. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT An overview of approaches that are being used to manage land use near transmission pipelines at the state and local levels is contained in Chap
From page 31...
... In Chapter 4, the committee's findings, conclusions, and recommendations addressing the feasibility of developing risk-informed guidance that could be used in making land use­related decisions to manage risks to the public, pipeline workers, and the environment near existing as well as future transmission pipelines are given. Pipeline safety data and trends and information about the pipeline industries in the United States can be found in Appendices B and C, respectively.
From page 32...
... n.d. Model Setback and Depth Requirements Ordinance for Transmission Pipelines.


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