The National Academies Press

Currently Skimming:

1 Introduction
Pages 8-10

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.

From page 8... ... , created to determine the cause of the Columbia accident and to advise NASA about steps to prevent future accidents, noted the inherent risk in any form of human spaceflight and made 29 recommendations, 15 of which it regarded as requirements to be completed before the space shuttle could return to flight.1 The report made specific recommendations about on-orbit shuttle inspections and repairs, and it noted differences between future flights to the International Space Station (ISS) , which could be used as a safe haven, and other possible destinations. Read the entire page →
From page 9... ... . The advisory panel convened by NASA in 2003 to advise it on the transition from HST to the JWST concurred with the decadal survey on the need for the SM-4 servicing mission and noted the work that had already been done, and was currently in progress, toward this servicing.4 The advisory panel recommended that a servicing mission SM-5 also be pursued, but only "in a peer-reviewed competition with other new space astrophysics proposals." 2 See Appendix C, National Research Council, "Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope," letter from Louis J Read the entire page →
From page 10... ... Two key documents to which the committee referred frequently were the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and a NASA document titled NASA's Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond.5 In addition, the committee had access to numerous additional reports and technical documents on topics ranging from the test data on Hubble battery recharging cycles to industry proposals for the development of robotic missions.6 The committee's work also benefited from the input of many experts at NASA and in academia and industry, who gave extensive briefings (listed in Appendix B) , and from information received from many other individuals who made themselves available by telephone and e-mail to answer specific questions posed by committee members. Read the entire page →

From page 8...

... , created to determine the cause of the Columbia accident and to advise NASA about steps to prevent future accidents, noted the inherent risk in any form of human spaceflight and made 29 recommendations, 15 of which it regarded as requirements to be completed before the space shuttle could return to flight.1 The report made specific recommendations about on-orbit shuttle inspections and repairs, and it noted differences between future flights to the International Space Station (ISS) , which could be used as a safe haven, and other possible destinations.

Read the entire page →

From page 9...

... . The advisory panel convened by NASA in 2003 to advise it on the transition from HST to the JWST concurred with the decadal survey on the need for the SM-4 servicing mission and noted the work that had already been done, and was currently in progress, toward this servicing.4 The advisory panel recommended that a servicing mission SM-5 also be pursued, but only "in a peer-reviewed competition with other new space astrophysics proposals." 2 See Appendix C, National Research Council, "Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope," letter from Louis J

Read the entire page →

From page 10...

... Two key documents to which the committee referred frequently were the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and a NASA document titled NASA's Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond.5 In addition, the committee had access to numerous additional reports and technical documents on topics ranging from the test data on Hubble battery recharging cycles to industry proposals for the development of robotic missions.6 The committee's work also benefited from the input of many experts at NASA and in academia and industry, who gave extensive briefings (listed in Appendix B) , and from information received from many other individuals who made themselves available by telephone and e-mail to answer specific questions posed by committee members.

Read the entire page →

← Previous Chapter Skim

Next Chapter Skim →

This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.

1 Introduction Pages 8-10

1 Introduction
Pages 8-10