Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks Protecting Buildings and Military Bases (2005) / Chapter Skim
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2 Scenarios, Defensive Concepts, and Detection Architectures
2 Scenarios, Defensive Concepts, and Detection Architectures
Pages 13-22
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From page 13... ...
.' The slow response time of these systems (about 20 minutes plus communication, decision, and response delays) makes them most useful for initiation of medical treatment of exposed personnel following a biological release event.
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From page 14... ...
The first involves outdoor releases designed to threaten distributed target complexes (e.g., military bases, deployed forces, naval task forces) or broad area targets (e.g., cities)
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Facility and distributed target complexes for the military have direct analogs in the civilian sector. In many cases, military responses to detection of a biological agent could be more effective than those open to most civilian responders.
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DEFENSIVE CONCEPTS AGAINST ATTACKS ON FACILITIES Consideration of facility defenses for protection against biological attacks was a central focus for the architecture and analysis work of this committee. There were a number of compelling reasons for this emphasis on facility protection.
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From page 17... ...
If this is the case, attack levels may exceed background enough to enable rapid, nonspecific detection of the attack. This rapid detection could enable significant defensive actions to be taken, particularly in the control of airflows and intake into the site facilities threatened by the agent cloud.
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From page 18... ...
Detectors that are nonspecific, such as those that detect and discriminate only biological versus nonbiological aerosols, can have very high false alamm rates if the alarm threshold is not well above the normal biological background levels. For attacks that result in biological signatures well TABLE 2.1 infectivity Levels for Several Biological Agents Biological Agent Q fever (Coxiella bumetii)
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From page 19... ...
This could enable more rapid response and reduce flhe false alarm rate for even simple detectors. This concept of wide deployment of inexpensive detectors is motivating some developers to come up with flhe equivalent of a smoke detector for biological agents.
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From page 20... ...
Multistage Detection Architectures The concept of multistage detection to provide increasingly stringent examination of initial alarms is not new. Such architectures are employed in military detection systems (e.g., the Biological integrated Detection System, Portal Shield, and the Joint Biological Point Detection System)
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From page 21... ...
The discussions in subsequent chapters that address promising detection technologies will highlight evolutionary technologies that could significantly impact the generic multistage architecture presented here. The rationale underlying the multistage detection approach can be illustrated by consideration of facility protection architectures.
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From page 22... ...
These might include evacuations, temporary personal protection measures, movement nastrictons, and other actions that will disnupt or halt normal facility openabons. Final confirmation of the attack by the most specific detection system will open the door to a full complement of responses, induding medical measures and evaluation of the overall scope of the attack beyond the bounds of the facility.
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