Sensor Systems for Biological Agent Attacks Protecting Buildings and Military Bases (2005) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
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Attainable detection levels and false alarm rates are also strongly influenced by the nature and variability of naturally occurring outdoor and indoor aerosols. The role that rapid, nonspecific standoff and spectroscopic point detectors might play must be considered along with the role of more specific technologies that offer a means of identifying biological agents used in an attack.
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Importantly, even though the bioaerosol concentrations are high in the vicinity of the detector—making detection feasible—subsequent transport losses and filtration will reduce these concentrations by several orders of magnitude prior to the circulation of contaminated air to adjacent rooms or air handling zones. Over the next 5 years, one can increase the capabilities of this system so as to detect even lower levels of attack (Figure ES.2)
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Protection of Extended Military Installations The concept of using a nonspecific detector for biological agent attacks backed up by a rapid identifier can also be applied to a perimeter monitoring system to detect outdoor attacks on military bases. The agent concentrations will likely be lower in an outdoor attack than in an interior release in confined spaces—how much lower depends on whether the attack is aimed only at personnel who are outdoors or if it is also aimed at personnel within buildings, in which case it must be sized to overcome the passive building defenses (e.g., dilution and filtering)
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The combination of the lower agent concentration levels and the higher backgrounds associated with an outdoor release means that an array of nonspecific, spectroscopic point detectors at the base perimeter will cover a smaller portion of the threat space than it would in the building defense architectures. It may be that a standoff detection system using a rombinabon of I R and ultraviolet lasers to interrogate an incoming bioaerosol cloud from a distance of several kilometers could address this deficiency.
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Most Probable Path The committee finds that protection of buildings and military installations from biological attack requires the careful integration of detection capabilities with response options and procedures. Therefore, the committee recommends that military planners take a systems approach to facilities protection.
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These longer response times for bacteria and vinuses make it unlikely that functon-based sensors will play a significant role in detect-to-wam applications for these agents, but they could nevertheless play a valuable detect-to-treat role in the overall biodetection architecture. Therefore, the committee recommends that studies be conducted to better understand the role of functionbased sensors in overall biodetection architectures and to provide goals to focus research and development activities on those areas for which function-based sensors have the highest leverage.
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