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Pages 36-37

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From page 36...
... and the risk these materials might be used to construct a radiological dispersal device," the committee offers the following findings and recommendations: FINDING 2A: The probability of terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage cannot be assessed quantitatively or comparatively. Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets for such attacks because it is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations of terrorists, and because of the attractiveness of spent fuel as a terrorist target given the well-known public dread of radiation.
From page 37...
... Please use the TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SPENT FUEL STORAGE 37 Surveillance and security procedures are just as important as physical barriers in preventing and mitigating terrorist attacks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission declined to provide the committee with detailed briefings on the surveillance and security procedures that are now in place to protect spent fuel facilities at commercial nuclear power plants against terrorist attacks.


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