Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities (2005) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
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From page 1... ...
The study has also focused on potential applications to the continuing challenges of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of proliferant states and terrorists; for example, the United States has emphasized the need for verification in the complete elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Likewise, as the United States continues to work with Russia to ensure that nuclear materials are adequately protected and accounted for, the partners will continue to require transparency measures to facilitate the process, as has been the case in the implementation of the 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement.
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From page 2... ...
The risks posed by nuclear weapons are exacerbated in many respects by the size of the current arsenals and by the magnitude of the worldwide stockpiles of NEM. The United States and Russia possess about 95 percent of the approximately 30,000 existing nuclear weapons, with the remainder held by the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea.
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From page 3... ...
Countries with small nuclear arsenals have particularly acute concerns about sharing information regarding the locations of their nuclear weapons. Most of the measures and technologies for transparency and monitoring assessed in this study were developed in the course of continuing efforts to find ways to limit the risks from existing nuclear arsenals and their proliferation to additional countries and groups.
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. Our assessments in this study support the conclusion that the necessary technical tools are either available today, or could be in hand with some additional development, to support significantly enhanced transparency and monitoring for declared stocks at declared sites throughout the nuclear weapon life cycle; · Developments in cryptography now widely used in banking and other commercial transactions offer a way to exchange, in a limited and controlled but still very useful way, sensitive information about nuclear weap ons that countries would not be willing to share more
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From page 5... ...
· Facilities and areas within facilities can be equipped with appropriate sensors and accountability systems to monitor declared activity and detect undeclared activ ity, the recordings from which can either be examined during periodic inspections or uploaded via the Internet or satellites for transmission to a monitoring center. This array of tools makes it possible to contemplate a set of transparency and monitoring measures that would cover declared stocks at declared sites during all stages of the nuclear weapon life cycle, which might include: · Declarations of nuclear weapon stocks at progressively increased levels of detail, ranging from total numbers of weapons; to specification of numbers of different types, including their operational status and associated deliv ery vehicle; to declarations for each weapon by serial number, weapon type, status, and current location.
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From page 6... ...
Similar measures could be applied to nuclear weapon components. Depending on the design of the system, cooperative application of such measures would make it possible to confirm the accuracy of declarations of weapon stocks and to monitor weapon storage, assembly, and disassembly at declared facilities while protecting sensitive weapon design information.
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From page 7... ...
The United States and Russia have also acquired substantial bilateral experience through their cooperation to improve the security of Russian stocks of NEM, including joint work on technologies and methods for enhanced transparency and monitoring. Transparency and monitoring measures for declared stocks of NEM at declared sites, comparable with those for nuclear weapons, could include: · Comprehensive declarations describing the quantities and locations of all existing inventories of NEM, to gether with information on chemical forms and isotopic composition on the material; · Declarations of inventories of NEM surplus to military and civilian needs; and · Provisions for inspections of all declared facilities as well as of any undeclared suspicious activities.
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From page 8... ...
The possibilities include: · Accelerated disposition of excess Highly Enriched Ura nium (HEU) inventories through down blending and eventual use in reactor fuel; · Replacement of HEU fuels in research reactors with high-density low enriched uranium fuels, where feasi ble, and decommissioning of nuclear reactors using HEU fuels when replacement is not possible; · Disposition of excess separated plutonium either by conversion to fuel for use in civil reactors or by immo bilizing with fission products in a glass or ceramic ma trix; · A comprehensive cutoff of production of NEM for weapons; · A serious international effort to develop nuclear fuel cycles for civil reactors that minimize or eliminate the exposure of NEM; and · Centralization under multinational control of all facili ties capable of enriching uranium or reprocessing plu tonium.
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From page 9... ...
Clandestine Stocks and Covert Production We have concluded that procedures and technology are available to verify with high confidence the declarations of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and NEM at declared sites. But undeclared nuclear weapons and NEM could exist as a consequence of retention of undeclared existing nuclear weapons and NEM or could come into existence by the clandestine production of nuclear weapons from existing NEM.
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From page 10... ...
A similar situation exists with respect to the nuclear stockpiles of other nuclear weapon states with much smaller programs, where the absolute size of the uncertainty would be proportionately smaller. The declared NEM
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From page 11... ...
Similarly, with effective approaches and adequate resources applied to the task, the peaceful nuclear energy programs of nuclear weapon states could be adequately monitored to reduce to a very low level the risk of undetected diversions by those states and by unauthorized personnel for transfer to proliferating states or terrorist groups. Given the extensive knowledge of existing nuclear programs, the significant amounts of additional information that would result from the process of verifying declarations, the new inspection capabilities provided by the Additional Protocol, and above all the demonstrated capabilities of NTM, it is very unlikely that any state, including Russia, participating in a cooperative fashion involving detailed declarations could develop a complete, standalone covert nuclear weapon production program that would not be discovered over time.
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From page 12... ...
Where concerns about compliance exist, the synergistic effect of multiple technical and management measures, supported by increased transparency and robust national technical means of intelligence collection, could reduce the risk that significant clandestine activities would go undetected and over time could build confidence that verification was effective.
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From page 13... ...
, Russia probably could conceal undeclared stocks equivalent to several hundred weapons. In the case of other countries with much smaller programs, absolute uncertainties would be much less, leading to the possibility that these countries could conceal undeclared stocks equivalent to one or two dozen weapons in the case of China, and at most one or two weapons in the cases of Israel, India, and Pakistan.
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