Avoiding Surprise in an Era of Global Technology Advances (2005) / Chapter Skim
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3 Challenges to Information Superiority
3 Challenges to Information Superiority
Pages 28-44
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From page 28... ...
military leadership, is critically dependent on the ability of BLUE forces to obtain and rapidly act on a highly accurate, detailed, and timely picture of the battlespace, and to deny RED forces the ability to do so. In Joint Vision 2020, "Information Superiority" is identified as a key enabler that cuts across all four of the 28
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. That is, achieving information superiority enables BLUE forces to outmaneuver RED forces (the Dominant Maneuver operational concept)
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With this background, Chapter 3 focuses on providing the beginnings of a roadmap to help the technology warning community identify, analyze, and prioritize developments in the international exploitation of C&C technologies in several key areas. These areas are trusted software; trusted hardware and foundries; supercomputing; ubiquitous sensing, computing, and communications systems; and the fusion of C&C with other novel technologies.
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The huge market created by the expanding use of wireless embedded systems in physical infrastructures, and the associated commercial requirements for the trustworthiness of those systems, afford the possibility of generating a cyber infrastructure that is secure and trusted -- and available worldwide to allies and adversaries alike. Trusted Hardware and Foundries BLUE force technological superiority relies on the development and manufacturing of trusted and, it is hoped, tamperproof hardware components.
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An example of how C&C technologies in ubiquitous sensing and communications systems can be combined with other technologies addressed in this report is the use of video-enabled disposable cellular phones in microair vehicles to provide networked monitoring and surveillance.3 Another example is the use of C&C technologies with DNA computing methods to produce synthetic biological systems.4 POTENTIAL OBSERVABLES THAT MAY INDICATE EMERGING THREATS Many of the technologies that pose potential threats to the communications capabilities of BLUE forces are readily available in the global marketplace. Thus, it is possible to postulate a variety of other observables that may be of value.
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publications http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/index.html Workforce migration OECD Science and Technology Working Papers and mobility http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,2350,en_2649_33703_1_119684_1_1_1,00.html Labor productivity trends OECD Productivity Statistics http://www.oecd.org/topicstatsportal/0,2647,en_2825_30453906_1_1_1_1_1,00.html Global diffusion of OECD Information and Communication Technologies information technologies http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_37409_1_1_1_1_37409,00.html Foreign industrial OECD Measuring Industrial Performance performance http://www.oecd.org/document/15/0,2340,en_2649_34445_1895503_1_1_1_1,00.html aAll sites were last accessed on April 1, 2005. clear that Middle Eastern interest in studying certain areas of engineering, particularly nuclear engineering, was an indicator of a desire to develop a nuclear capability.
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BASIC WAYS TO DEGRADE OR NEUTRALIZE INFORMATION SUPERIORITY An adversary could impact BLUE force information superiority in a number of ways, including exploitation, corruption, disruption, or destruction of U.S. information systems.
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Exploitation If an adversary gains access to protected information, the system has been exploited. Intercepting battle plans and moving assets out of harm's way are perhaps the most classic examples of battlefield information exploitation.
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However, lesser state actors and insurgents might, with a lucky hit, be able to destroy a major command center and significantly interfere with the U.S. ability to conduct operations.
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These pathways include the following: · Causing physical damage to wireless handheld appliances and using embedded wireless sub systems to destroy or degrade the ability of BLUE forces to communicate (e.g., using EMP generators to destroy electronic components or to cause significant changes in stored data) ; · Jamming of communications capabilities (e.g., using strong radio signals to overload the wireless receivers in wireless systems and subsystems)
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. IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT STEPS OF THE COMMITTEE METHODOLOGY A variety of technologies and tactics may be employed to degrade the information superiority of BLUE forces.
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. CHART 3-2 Technology Assessment: Electromagnetic Pulse Generators Technology Observables EMP Generators Covert or overt research and development activities to develop adaptations of commercial off-the-shelf electronic components that operate at higher voltages, or that employ higher band-gap materials (i.e., so that the adversary can disable BLUE force equipment, without disabling RED force equipment)
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While jamming can deny the BLUE forces the use of their sensors, it leaves no doubt that the RED forces are making an assault on the sensor suite, and tracing the source of the jamming leaves RED forces vulnerable to counterattack. Signature-reduction strategies degrade situational awareness without providing an obvious indication of enemy presence or providing any directions for response.
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Here the committee has not provided a complete assessment, instead discussing only general approaches that may threaten BLUE sensor suites, together with potential observables. A discussion of a few specific technologies is provided in subsequent chapters (e.g., see the subsection entitled "Sensor Spoofing" in Chapter 5)
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the following: · Causing physical damage to wireless handheld appliances and embedded wireless subsystems; · Jamming of communications capabilities; · Performing a denial-of-service attack on communications capabilities by overloading networks with bogus communications; · Performing a denial-of-service attack by revoking the access privileges of legitimate users and systems; · Spoofing sensors (i.e., causing false readings that result in the dissemination of misinformation) ; · Evading sensor detection (stealth)
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Monitoring the commercial development of these technologies will be especially important because of the strong efforts in Europe and Asia-Pacific. CHART 3-8 Capability Identification: Sensor Spoofing Capability Potential Observables Sensor spoofing particularly relating to Development of simulants for toxic agents.
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2004. Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
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