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Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation Recommendations for Action (2005) / Chapter Skim
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Legal Obstacles and Opportunities
Pages 15-21

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From page 15...
... and Russian governmental United States of America concerning the Safe and Secure agencies, as well as from some nongovernmental sources, Transportation, Storage, and Destruction of Weapons and such as the MacArthur Foundation. CRDF is registered as a the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, commonly known not-for-profit foundation in the Russian Federation and opas the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
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From page 16...
... This section suggests ways of making progress on sev- domestic nuclear liability law that is consistent with CSC eral legal issues of particular importance to cooperation and that covers both civilian and defense nuclear sites between the United States and Russia in the nuclear non- (which the Price-Anderson Act in the United States does)
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From page 17...
... and Russian monitors under the Plutonium Pro tificates, including by simplifying the VAT exemption duction Reactor Agreement and HEU Purchase Agreement) reporting procedures.
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From page 18...
... government's need for data on how U.S. tax dollars are spent in Russia.6 The joint committee recommends that the governments of the Funding Flexibility United States and Russia increase their joint work on Just as some certification requirements can weaken the remote monitoring and verification technologies and sys financial stability of CTR and other nonproliferation protems for this purpose.
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From page 19...
... Nevertheless, cooperation between the United States and Russia against radiological terrorism threats could potentially also be enhanced by an appropriate LAW AS TOOL FOR ADDRESSING SPECIFIC JOINT government-to-government agreement reflecting new develCHALLENGES opments in this arena, especially if significant science and technology interactions are to develop, as discussed below Combating Radiological Terrorism in the section on scientific and technical cooperation. The Radiological terrorism -- the use of "dirty bombs" -- has joint committee recommends that the governments of the the potential to cause casualties and effect severe dislocation United States and Russia enter into negotiation of an and massive economic damage through the use of relatively agreement that will facilitate science and technology cosimple devices.10 One of the most significant recent devel- operation between the two countries against the threats opments in combating radiological terrorism is the approval of radiological terrorism.
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From page 20...
... The joint committee urges the United States and Russia and the recent revelations regarding the existence of an in- to continue to support amendment of the CPPNM to expand ternational network that for several years has been engaged its scope to include the physical protection of nuclear matein the illicit trade of nuclear materials and technologies, rial during domestic use, storage, and transport.14 have revealed the fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation The joint committee also applauds the April 2005 pasregime and the critical relationship between nuclear weap- sage of the International Convention on the Suppression of ons proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.15 Today, the world faces a "crisis of compliance" because of North Korea's announced withdrawal from the NPT, rev NEED FOR IMPROVED LAWYER-TO-LAWYER elations that Libya was engaged in programs for the devel DIALOGUE opment of weapons of mass destruction, the undeclared nuclear experiments in South Korea, and the possibility of a Dialogue Between U.S.
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From page 21...
... Impasses are complete, nuanced, and contextual understanding of each prolonged by the current state of affairs, in which lawyers side's legal requirements and the development of creative for both sides operate with insufficient understanding of each solutions. Once progress in addressing the existing legal other's legal requirements, and complicated legal issues are problems has been made, attention could profitably be given too often negotiated in the absence of lawyers by policy to, for example, those legal mechanisms -- perhaps borrowed makers who have only a limited grasp of the legal issues.
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Key Terms

  • nuclear nonproliferation
  • legal issues
  • spent fuel
  • threat reduction
  • radiological terrorism

  • cooperative threat
  • vat exemption
  • physical protection
  • russian government
  • russian federation

  • reduction act
  • russian legal
  • undeclared nuclear
  • nuclear terrorism
  • legal regime

  • nonproliferation regime
  • legal experts
  • uranium fuel
  • certification requirements
  • fuel management

  • spent nuclear
  • nuclear threat
  • nuclear materials
  • nuclear fuel
  • nuclear damage

  • russian tax
  • russian laws
  • joint efforts
  • existing legal
  • legal requirements


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