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Appendix C Cooperative Threat Reduction Negotiations: Lessons Learned, Susan Koch
Pages 42-46

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From page 42... ... That factor was in turn closely related to the sides' shared concern about the danger that the breakdown of the Soviet state would lead to widespread proliferation of weapons of UMBRELLA AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS: mass destruction and related material and expertise. PreventJANUARY TO JUNE 1992 ing a "brain drain" of newly unemployed, underemployed, The negotiations between the United States and Russia of and/or underpaid weapons scientists and engineers was a the original CTR Umbrella Agreement may carry few, if any, major initial concern, joined shortly by the need to provide lessons for contemporary agreements. Read the entire page →
From page 43... ... . Long-standing CTR projects like strategic arms elimination and chemical weapons destruction had grown significantly EXTENSION PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS: and had been joined by new efforts like nuclear warhead JANUARY TO JUNE 1999 storage and transport security. Read the entire page →
From page 44... ... The Minissome CTR Umbrella Agreement provisions -- again, liabil- try for Foreign Affairs led an effective interagency team, ity protections are a prime example -- now conflicted with including Ministries of Defense and Atomic Energy officials Russian domestic law. closely engaged in CTR projects, that was able to overcome Finally, the Russian government likely viewed many parts resistance in nonstakeholder ministries. Read the entire page →
From page 45... ... For its tion" solution had the greatest impact leading to the success- part, the United States long insisted on those provisions, parful negotiations, the United States also was willing to use its ticularly in light of the pending ratification of the CTR Umlimited flexibility. The United States viewed the changes that brella Agreement and of the Russian government's use of it accepted in the Extension Protocol as clarifications of the other precedents in the Extension Protocol negotiations. Read the entire page →
From page 46... ... tivities was at stake, including strategic arms elimination, In addition, the Russian government, and likely especially chemical weapons destruction, nuclear warhead and mate- the Foreign Ministry, had an overall political interest in the rial storage and transport security, defense and military con- continuation of the cooperation. Although the general polititacts, and other efforts. Read the entire page →

From page 42...

... That factor was in turn closely related to the sides' shared concern about the danger that the breakdown of the Soviet state would lead to widespread proliferation of weapons of UMBRELLA AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS: mass destruction and related material and expertise. PreventJANUARY TO JUNE 1992 ing a "brain drain" of newly unemployed, underemployed, The negotiations between the United States and Russia of and/or underpaid weapons scientists and engineers was a the original CTR Umbrella Agreement may carry few, if any, major initial concern, joined shortly by the need to provide lessons for contemporary agreements.

Read the entire page →

From page 43...

... . Long-standing CTR projects like strategic arms elimination and chemical weapons destruction had grown significantly EXTENSION PROTOCOL NEGOTIATIONS: and had been joined by new efforts like nuclear warhead JANUARY TO JUNE 1999 storage and transport security.

Read the entire page →

From page 44...

... The Minissome CTR Umbrella Agreement provisions -- again, liabil- try for Foreign Affairs led an effective interagency team, ity protections are a prime example -- now conflicted with including Ministries of Defense and Atomic Energy officials Russian domestic law. closely engaged in CTR projects, that was able to overcome Finally, the Russian government likely viewed many parts resistance in nonstakeholder ministries.

Read the entire page →

From page 45...

... For its tion" solution had the greatest impact leading to the success- part, the United States long insisted on those provisions, parful negotiations, the United States also was willing to use its ticularly in light of the pending ratification of the CTR Umlimited flexibility. The United States viewed the changes that brella Agreement and of the Russian government's use of it accepted in the Extension Protocol as clarifications of the other precedents in the Extension Protocol negotiations.

Read the entire page →

From page 46...

... tivities was at stake, including strategic arms elimination, In addition, the Russian government, and likely especially chemical weapons destruction, nuclear warhead and mate- the Foreign Ministry, had an overall political interest in the rial storage and transport security, defense and military con- continuation of the cooperation. Although the general polititacts, and other efforts.

Read the entire page →

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Appendix C Cooperative Threat Reduction Negotiations: Lessons Learned, Susan Koch Pages 42-46

Appendix C Cooperative Threat Reduction Negotiations: Lessons Learned, Susan Koch
Pages 42-46