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Appendix L Radiological Terrorism in the Context of Nonproliferation, R. V. Arutyunyan and V. P. Bilashenko
Pages 91-94

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From page 91...
... Studies of ways in which contemporary societies react to For example, our evaluations and assessments of the posthe "radioactivity factor" demonstrate that considerable sible damage that an aircraft ram attack against one of the negative effects on socioeconomics, public psychology, and spent nuclear fuel storage facilities at Andreeva Bay, where social stability (in particular, in large cities) begin in the pres- spent fuel from disposed nuclear submarines is kept, showed ence of much lower levels of radioactive contamination than that the attack could lead to radioactive contamination of a those at which real (material)
From page 92...
... One could forecast ioral patterns, and that they can provide mental counseling that after an act of radiological terrorism, decision making to those who were exposed, as well as to those who were not by various authorities will be dictated by enormous political directly exposed but who are anxious. and popular pressures, as well as by the desire to avoid drawing parallels between the actual event and past nuclear power plant accidents.
From page 93...
... REGULATORY IMMPROVEMENTS AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL WORK Applicable legal acts, rules, and regulations in the area of Work on countering radiological terrorism needs to con- inventory control and the physical protection of radioactive tinue in two directions: (1) strengthening control over the substances, as well as working on special documents that possible movements of radioactive sources, particularly in discuss issues of possible external threats and their repercusplaces for the mass assembly of people and critical city sites, sions in handling radioactive substances, need to be imand (2)
From page 94...
... It would be helpful if there were prepared and signed gov The system of evaluating radiological hazards is contro ernment agreements similar to the 1999 agreement between versial, overly tight, and, in many cases, scientifically un the governments of Russia and the United States on cooperasound. The system in some instances may become an objec tion in the area of inventory control and physical protection tive basis for an inadequate response to radiation factors.


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