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4 The Challenges of Integration
Pages 55-74

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From page 55...
... Patssi Valdez Sunflowers with Purple Heart (2002) Copyright by the artist; used with permission.
From page 57...
... While in some respects the Hispanic experience mirrors that of other immigrant groups, there are important differences between the economic and demographic profile of the United States now and a century ago, when previous immigration flows reached their historical peak. In particular, three significant conditions existing today in the United States will color the Hispanic experience in the decades to come: the changing social contract, evolving economic trends, and the aging of the white majority.
From page 58...
... In the last 3 years alone, businesses with fewer than 99 employees have witnessed a decline in health care coverage from 57 to 50 percent.1 This trend is particularly detrimental to Hispanics, who are more highly concentrated in small firms than are non-Hispanics. In 1997, for example, nearly half of Hispanic nonagricultural workers were employed in firms with 99 or fewer employees, compared with 43 percent of nonHispanics.2 In the realm of higher education, waning federal support for lowincome students to attend college has coincided with above-average tuition hikes designed to offset shortfalls in state and local budgets -- just when growing numbers of students, an increasing number of them Hispanic, have been requesting financial aid.
From page 59...
... Both periods were accompanied by the decline of durable manufacturing industries and the expansion of service industries. Although real wages grew a brisk 8.3 percent between 1995 and 2001 after a prolonged stagnation, earnings inequality rose yet again.6 The top 20 percent of male workers earned about 6 times as much as the bottom 20 percent in 1973, as compared with 10 times as much in 2001.7 Young workers with only a high school education or less -- precisely the demographic profile characterizing recent Hispanic immigrants (see Chapter 5)
From page 60...
... Better education is the single resource that in the long run will improve the economic prospects and social integration of the burgeoning Hispanic population. Despite significant improvements in high school and college graduation rates among young Hispanics since 1980, large education gaps remain in comparison with other groups, especially for Hispanic immigrants, but the prospects of the second generation are worrisome as well (see Chapter 5)
From page 61...
... A generation from now -- by 2030 -- about 25 percent of white Americans will have reached retirement age or beyond, compared with only 10 percent of Hispanics, just when the burgeoning Hispanic second generation, with a median age of 21, will have reached its prime working years. But labor market impacts will occur well before this time as a result of Hispanics' younger average age at first employment and growing share of the working-age population (see Figure 4-3)
From page 62...
... 62 Rican Rican Generation Generation 3rd+ Puerto Parentage 2nd Puerto Born Foreign-Born 2.7% 2.1% Hispanic 30.7% 28.2% 36.3% 2030, 3.9% 2030. Hispanic 29.4% 4.1% 22.5% 40.1% and 2000, 2000, 1960, 48.3% 4.5% Hispanic 23.6% 9.8% 13.8% Year 1960, population: U.S.
From page 63...
... . are estimated to contribute as much as $7 billion a year to social security without being entitled to any of the benefits.15 Thus, immigrant labor can help to support the costs of an aging population, but their potential contributions depend on earnings capacity, which in turn depends on educational investments.
From page 64...
... Hence the amount of Hispanic upward mobility that can be expected from future educational investments may be uncertain, but a sustained presence in low-wage jobs in the absence of significant educational improvement is a virtual certainty. HISPANIC DISPERSAL Until recently, the U.S.
From page 65...
... By one account, between 1990 and 2000 Hispanic segregation from whites rose in 124 of 210 metropolitan areas, while it fell in 86-a net increase of 38 areas in which segregation increased. During this same period, black­white segregation declined in 240 of 265 metropolitan areas and remained stable in the remainder.17 Whether and to what extent Hispanic geographic dispersal may have contributed to the decline in black­ white segregation is unclear, but some experts claim that Hispanics are softening color lines because they are more likely than whites to share social space with blacks and Asians.18 Hispanics are generally less segregated in neighborhoods outside their traditional settlement areas, although levels of segregation vary greatly in the new destinations.
From page 66...
... institutions and acquire proficiency in English largely explains their higher levels of social isolation. In 2000, Hispanic immigrants typically resided in neighborhoods where more than one-third of their neighbors were also foreign born and where fewer than half of their neighbors spoke English at home.20 Although the residential concentration of newcomers with limited English proficiency may retard their cultural assimilation, their economic integration is not necessarily hampered because many new arrivals use their social ties with established Hispanic residents to find housing and work.
From page 67...
... While the occupational share of native-born Hispanics working as dwelling maintenance workers in the new destination areas inched up from 2 to 3 percent between 1980 and 2000, the share of foreign-born Hispanics in the same industry skyrocketed from less than 1 percent to 18 percent. The construction and private household industries in the new destination areas witnessed a similar evolution in the composition of their workforce after 1980.24 From 1980 to 2000, the proportion of native-born Hispanics among all construction workers in the new destination labor markets rose from 1 to 2 percent, while that of foreign-born Hispanics rose from under 1 percent to over 10 percent.
From page 68...
... Hispanic dropout rates are disturbingly high in some of the new settlement areas.26 In new destinations such as the south where Hispanic workers are typically illegal, have little education, and speak limited English, the educational challenges for their children are profound but not unsurmountable.27 To the extent that dispersal shifts Hispanics from high- to low-cost areas, home ownership rates should increase; however, the change will be gradual because lower-income immigrants, who are driving the geographic dispersal, are less likely than natives to own their homes.28 Nevertheless, Hispanic home ownership rates have risen appreciably since 1980 -- from about 33 percent in 1983 to 44 percent in 2001 -- even as the share of immigrant Hispanic households has risen appreciably.29 By one estimate, the home ownership rates of Hispanic immigrants approach those of nativeborn Hispanics after 20 years of U.S. residence.30 This, too, may change, however, depending on whether and how integration unfolds in the new destinations.
From page 69...
... Although seemingly contradictory, Hispanics' opposition to such practices as same-sex unions and abortion and their support for civil rights, higher taxation, and government-provided social benefits are both consistent with views that value collective over individual goals.31 Yet Hispanics' weak political infrastructure at the national level undermines their opportunities for political cohesion even when such a disposition exists.32 Driving Hispanics' social policy agenda are the growing numbers-U.S.- and foreign-born alike -- who recognize that their own and their children's socioeconomic progress depends on both civil rights protections and publicly funded social services, particularly education. Virtually all public opinion polls reveal that Hispanics consider education the single most important issue facing the nation, and themselves in particular.
From page 70...
... And fewer Hispanics assume leadership roles in civic organizations than do whites or blacks.35 Some preliminary evidence suggests that Hispanics' involvement in the politics of their home countries or communities serves as a precursor to their civic involvement in the United States. Hispanic immigrants are increasingly participating in transnational civic activities; the best estimate suggests that approximately 20 percent of Hispanic immigrants engage in such activities.
From page 71...
... Over the last three decades, as immigration has fueled Hispanic population growth, each new Hispanic voter has essentially been matched by one nonvoter and nearly two adult noncitizens. For political activities that require citizenship for participation, therefore, the immigrant-heavy population composition of Hispanics not only tempers their political influence at the ballot box, but also renders predictions about their future political behavior highly uncertain.
From page 72...
... The most plausible scenario, however, is that the Hispanic electorate will continue to grow incrementally over successive election cycles and will maintain some distinctive features relative to the non-Hispanic electorate. Even slow incremental growth in the Hispanic electorate raises the possibility that Hispanics will become a critical swing constituency that decides future electoral outcomes, as was the case in Los Angeles in 2005.
From page 73...
... Economic trends that reduce the demand for less-skilled workers pose formidable risks, especially for prospective workers. The Hispanic age boomlet poses a potential demographic dividend that can partially offset the rising burden of dependency of the aging white majority.
From page 74...
... Fehr et al., 2004, argue that immigration by itself does little to mitigate the fiscal stresses associated with the aging of industrialized societies, but the potential benefits will be even less in the absence of human capital investment in either immigrants or their second-generation offspring. 15 Porter, 2005.


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