Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

1 Introduction
Pages 11-22

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 11...
... . Before the anthrax attacks, the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense had made several recommendations for medical and public health management after exposure to the highest priority biological weapons (Arnon et al., 2001; Bono et al., 2002; Dennis et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 1999; Inglesby et al., 1999, 2000)
From page 12...
... Although the lack of dose inf omm ation, cle anu p crite n a, an d decontam ination p rotocols presents challenges to effective planning, several decontamination approaches are available. Such approaches should be combined with risk-informed decision making to establish reasonable cleanup goals for the protection of health, properly, and resources Efforts in risk assessment should determine what constitutes a safety hazard and whether decontamination is necessary Modeling exercises are needed that take into consideration the characteristics of a particular pathogen, public pe rceptions of the risk that the pathogen poses to their health, the level of public acceptance of recommendations based on scientific cntena, levels of political support, time constraints in responding to the threat posed by a pathogen, and economic concerns (Raber et al., 2001)
From page 13...
... Effective and efficient decontamination and restoration of such a facility would be imperative to minimize social and economic harm, At the initial meeting, the Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents heard from representatives of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Representatives from the sponsonug agency explained that additional information was needed for the demonstration project.
From page 14...
... The report was to discuss relevant representative organisms among the infectious nontransmissible and infectious transmissible gram positive and gram negative bacteria and viral pathogen classes to identify areas in which additional research is required. Natural Background The committee was asked to examine what is known about natural environmental background concentrations of various microorganisms and their potential effects on surrounding populations.
From page 15...
... The committee examined the existing dose response models for each selected organism and attempted to detenmine whether there is a threshold dose below which there is no effect (infectious dose zero, IDO) , · Risk characterization combines exposure and dose-response assessment to quantify, for a defined population (considenug age, sex, ethr,icity, and overall health)
From page 16...
... When conducted for a particular place such as a watershed, the ecological nsk assessment process can be use d to ide ntify vulne rab le an d valued resou roes, p riontize data collection activity, and link human activities with their potential effects. Risk assessments can also provide a focal point for cooperation among local communities and state and federal government agencies Risk assessment results provide a basis for comparing different management options, enabling decision makers and the public to make better informed decisions about the management of ecological resources." (EPA National Centerfor Environmental Assessment.
From page 17...
... development of a mathematical model describing that exposure-response relationship. Risk assessments based on experimental animal and molecular biologic data provide detailed information on the exposure-response relationships However, there is often substantial concern about the validity of using risk assessments based on susceptible animal species tested at high constant doses to estimate the risks to workers who may have much lower and more variable workplace exposures.
From page 18...
... CONTENT AND STRUCTURE In the context of an incomplete scientific record, controversy has arisen over the response to the anthrax letter attacks and the extent to which the United States is prepared for the possibility of future terrorist attacks. This report provides a decision-making framework with which to approach the safe return of the public to a building that has been decontaminated after a biological attack.
From page 19...
... The committee hopes that it serves as a resource to help decision makers better understand the relevant concerns. In addressing its charge, the committee reached specific conclusions for each of the areas described above: infectious dose, natural background, nsk assessment, past cleanup efforts, and residual contamination.
From page 20...
... A complete nsk assessment of the most thorough type described there would exceed the charge to this committee. However, aspects of such models could be useful for assessing risks of exposure to harmful biological agents after cleanup, even though the essential data to support thorough analysis by quantitative risk assessment are cunrently lacking for some agents that might be used as biological weapons.
From page 21...
... Therefore, the issues related to decision making raised in this report will contunue to be relevant. The report considers lessons from the response to the 2001 anthrax attacks and from other situations involving chemical or radiological decontarninahon; the idea of a risk assessment framework, including current knowledge of dose response relationships; the role of indoor air movement; the various approaches to sampling for biological agents; and the techmologies avatlable for decontamination.
From page 22...
... Medical and public health management. Joumal of American Medical Association 283: 2281-2290.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.