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11 Safe Reoccupation of a Facility
Pages 157-169

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From page 157...
... Without the involvement of the wider community, a technically perfect cleanup will be just that, and the building could remain unoccupied if public standards and cntena for assessing cleanup effectiveness differ from those accepted by the scientific community. Conversely, the expert appraisal of a building as not yet safe for occupation may be out of step with the ideas of building owners and users who are eager to reoccupy a structure.
From page 160...
... PLANNING FOR BIOLOGICAL AGENT ATTACK Decision making on the safe reoccupation of a building will be a simpler process if adequate contingency planning takes place before an attack. This sechon describes prudent steps that building managers should consider beforehand so that they will be prepared in the event of an act of bioterronsm.
From page 161...
... Department of Homeland Secunty, describes incident management approaches and how responsibilities would be distributed among federal agencies, state and local govemments, and private citizens in a given set of scenanos This plan is available online: http:llwww dhs gov/dhspublicinterapp/editonal/editonal 0566 xml communication and health and safety would likely he useful additions to the group. The OWG would be charged with preparedness in the following areas: · Building security and threat vulnerability assessment · Building operations and systems and protocols for event response · Occupant information and practice response · Integration with local emergency and medical response services The OWG has several purposes: · Gather relevant information and documentation about building design and operation that Can be used for initial contaimment and subsequent decontamination.
From page 162...
... and it would have the latest information on detection, sampling, and decontaniLnahon of biological weapons. That relevant information would be collected by those with access to the appropriate government agencies and it would include data on different potential approaches to detection and sampling (Chapter 8)
From page 163...
... The biological attack response plan should be communicated to all stakeholders. While the creation of a coordinated solution is pending, the OWG should identify the medical, public health, and law enforcement of ficials who should be notified m the event of an attack and compile contact information for the appropnate government agencies (the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Envirommental Protection Agency)
From page 164...
... 164 oo e ~ o @ E c.
From page 166...
... From a public health perspechve, a transmissible agent with low persistence in the environment would represent a higher-order hazard to the community than would a nontransmissible agent. Each infected individual could spread the disease, potentially jeopardizing the community at large long after the original agent source is contained or removed.
From page 167...
... How sensible is the technology for detecting viable agents and how confident are we that the approach used is representative of the overall contamination situation? As discussed extensively in Chapter 9, a sampling protocol with a high detection limit and high efficiency increases the confidence that the results are representative of the overall contamination situation.
From page 168...
... FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Finding 11-1 Effective response to and recovery from a biological attack requires expertise and input from scientists, public health experts, building engineers, and stakeholders. The response and recovery could be expedited substantially with adequate planning that involves the appropriate scientific expertise and all stakeholders.
From page 169...
... The federal government should devise a mechanism by which it, and other relevant actors, would be kept abreast of developments and new technologies in surveillance, sampling, and decontamination and iteratively revise standards and policies for decontamination. That mechanism should ensure that updates would get to building managers and owners REFEREE CES LBNLn D (Lawrence Berkeley National Labmatmy indoor Envimmment Deputment)


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