Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack A Decision Making Framework (2005) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix C: All Findings and Recommendations
Appendix C: All Findings and Recommendations
Pages 182-192
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From page 182... ...
is unlikely in indoor public facilities. Given the uncertainhes in the charactenshcs of the weaponized agents, it is impossible to establish acceptable thresholds below which exposure to such weaponized agents would pose zero risk.
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From page 183... ...
Lack of transparency for policy decisions that directly affect public health even m the context of a proclaimed national security Interest can severely erode public confidence. The establishment of a formal planning procedure that involves relevant stakeholders before an event should expedite the response and confer legitimacy for decisions made dunug and after decontarninahon.
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From page 184... ...
Following the lead of previous work by the National Academies, the committee recommends that an analytical deliberative process be used to detenmine appropriate approaches for cleanup. Finding 4-2 Relevant data from the sites contaminated in 2001 were not shared with all necessary parties, partly because of the diffenug goals and objectives of law enforcement and public health agencies.
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From page 185... ...
Finding 6-1 Detailed characterizahon (including screening for known threat agents, genehcally modified and emerging threat organisms) of a suspected biological pathogen is required for proper analysis and to infonm decision making, Recon~rnendation 6-1 Research should be conducted to develop a characterizahon system that can inexpensively identify, or approximately characterize, all potential threat agents including genetically modified and emerging threat agents.
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From page 186... ...
Recommendation 7-2 Building operators should act now to gain a thorough understanding of how air flow occurs in their buildings under nonmal operating conditions. They also should examine the potential adverse or beneficial effects of a shutdown on the spread of airbonne contaminants so that appropriate actions could be taken to minimize the dispersal of contaminants if the release of a biological agent is identified.
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From page 187... ...
Recommendation 8-1 Available dose response data for pathogens of concern should be analyzed by non-threshold dose response models. Finding 8-2 Because minimal publicly available data exist on which to base human dose response relationships for the critical pathogens, animal data must be used.
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From page 188... ...
Finding 9-2 Surface sampling with dry wipes led to false negatives at the Wallingford postal facility and to inconlcusive results at the Brentwood postal facility. Recommendation 9~2 Dry-wipe and dry-swab surface sampling should be abandoned in favor of wetsurface swipe techniques.
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From page 189... ...
Recommendation 10-1 The committee recommends that the National Cancer institute lead an mteragency task force to reevaluate the possible carcinogenic effects of paraformaldehyde. Finding 10-2 CIO2 has been used successfully for decontamination of several buildings: the Hart Senate Office Building, the Brentwood postal facility, and American Media Inc., building.
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From page 190... ...
Finding 11-1 Effective response to and recovery from a biological attack requires expertise and input from scientists, public health experts, building engineers, and stakeholders. The response and recovery could be expedited substantially with adequate planning that involves the appropriate scientific expertise and all stakeholders.
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From page 191... ...
Finding 12-1 Airports, particularly passenger terminals at airports, are vulnerable to biological attacks, because of the high-profile nature of aviation and because of the densely populated, large, often interconnected interior spaces that such terminal facilities compose. Aircraft often are comnected to tenninals so departing aircraft could spread a pathogen to distant points if a biological attack on the tenminal were not immediately recognized.
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From page 192... ...
192 REOPENING PUBLIC FACILITIES AFTER A BIOLOGICAL ATTACK Finding 12-3 Acceptance of the decision to reoccupy a facility will be more successful if an Operations Working Group is formed before an event occurs, and if that group includes people with scientific, technical, and medical expertise and those whose daily lives would be affected by contamination of the airport. Recommendation 12-3 Planning should identify the interested parties, form them into a working group, and have them interact regularly in anticipation of coming together to guide an actual recovery effort.
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