Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials International Challenges and National Programs: Workshop Summary (2006) / Chapter Skim
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IAEA Nonproliferation and MPC&A programs
IAEA Nonproliferation and MPC&A programs
Pages 27-38
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From page 27... ...
He began by noting that the terrorist attacks of September 2001 have significantly increased international awareness of the threat that, if nuclear or other radioactive materials fall into the wrong hands, they may be used in terrorist attacks. "The effective and timely accountancy and control of nuclear material," he argued, "is at the core of the multitude of measures that are aimed at protecting against nuclear terrorism." In November 2001, the IAEA Board of Governors identified four threats of nuclear terrorism, and asked the agency to increase efforts to mitigate these threats: 1.
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From page 28... ...
These include · physical protection of nuclear material and facilities · detecting malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials · strengthening state systems for nuclear material accountancy and control · improving the security of radioactive material other than nuclear material · assessing safety and security vulnerabilities of nuclear facilities · responding to malicious acts or threats thereof · supporting adherence to and implementation of international agreements, guidelines and recommendations · coordinating nuclear security and information management Taniguchi then discussed the IAEA's efforts to strengthen state systems for nuclear material accountancy and control, the third activity area (listed above) in the agency's "Comprehensive Nuclear Security Approach." He pointed out that the plan underscores the multiple purposes of nuclear material accountancy.
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From page 29... ...
Topics in cluded the physical protection of nuclear material, combating illicit trafficking, state systems of accounting and control, methodology for developing a Design Basis Threat analysis, the safety and security of radioactive sources, and re sponses to incidents related to security or to radiological events. Taniguchi also described several of the advisory services provided by the agency.
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From page 30... ...
Noting that SSACs are national responsibilities, he suggested that SSACs should cover all aspects of nuclear material control. Murakami then discussed several elements of an integrated approach to nuclear material accounting and control: Legislation: this includes the core nuclear law; nuclear regulation of account ing, control, physical protection, and exports and imports; nuclear guidelines; and nuclear licensing systems.
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From page 31... ...
At the Chernobyl nuclear reactor complex, a coordinated effort has transferred 20,000 spent fuel assemblies to dry storage. And, at the Ulba Fuel Fabrication Plant in Kazakhstan, a multinational effort has reduced inventory discrepancies resulting from small amounts of nuclear material left in pipes and other equipment.
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From page 32... ...
Anita Nilsson, Head of the Office of Nuclear Security in the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, further described that department's activities in support of improving nuclear security. She argued that an effective approach to MPC&A will acknowledge the interdependence among physical protection, con trol, and accounting of nuclear materials.
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From page 33... ...
In the process, the agency develops an under standing of a state's nuclear complex as a whole, rather than focusing only on individual facilities, as was done in the past. Once the agency is confident that it has a complete picture of the state's nuclear facilities, activities, and materials and that no materials have been diverted to military uses, it has reached its goal of "integrated safeguards" for that state.2 Integrated safeguards will provide the agency with the most potent set of tools yet available for ensuring that nuclear material is being used in accordance with treaty stipulations.
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From page 34... ...
The agency is participating in research into ways to build "proliferation resistance" into new nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies by making them unattractive as sources of material for nuclear weapons. Goldschmidt also expressed support for multinational approaches to managing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
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From page 35... ...
Khlebnikov said that there was a need for more sensitive devices for detecting nuclear material and for systems that could monitor environmental and other parameters that might indicate the presence of undeclared facilities and activities. He discussed several specific examples of equipment, including · a hand-held monitor and a "suitcase" neutron detector with improved sensitivity to gamma and neutron radiation · detection of Trace UF6 concentrations using laser spectroscopy · anti-neutrino measurements for the detection of undeclared plutonium · ground penetrating radar to verify facility design information and detect undeclared activities · monitoring of Krypton 85 levels for detecting undeclared reprocessing facilities · wide area monitoring to facilitate implementation of the Additional Protocol · use of satellite imagery to detect undeclared material or facilities Next, Khlebnikov described some possible features of the next generation of safeguards verification technology.
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From page 36... ...
One of these support functions is to develop new technical measures to detect and respond to illicit nuclear trafficking. This includes developing, testing, and publishing specifications for border monitoring equipment; improving hand-held isotope identification equipment; and improving verification of legal shipments of nuclear and radioactive materials.
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From page 37... ...
IAEA NONPROLIFERATION AND MPC&A PROGRAMS 37 development activities with the IAEA, in order to increase IAEA detection capabilities, particularly for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities. Khlebnikov ended his presentation by concluding that the IAEA is facing a number of challenges in the area of safeguards equipment, but that a systematic equipment development program is under way.
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