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Overviews of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Context
Pages 9-14

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From page 9...
... Curtis noted that he did not want to deny that progress had been made; it had. A substantial amount of money had been pledged to the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
From page 10...
... To help accomplish this goal, the United States and Russia, as well as other states with nuclear energy capabilities, should actively share their expertise and the benefits of their experience -- share "best practices" -- with each other. In particular, the United States and Russia should organize a joint team of scientific, technical, and military experts to compile a list of best practices that will be shared with any other state that has nuclear weapons or weapon-usable fissile 1The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM)
From page 11...
... Instead, the range of materials covered by protective measures has broadened in response to the threat from radiological dispersal devices.6 Further, the array of possible actions taken in the name of safeguards has grown to include export 5The nuclear fuel cycle is the several-step process through which nuclear material is used to fuel nuclear reactors. In what is termed the "front end" of the most common nuclear fuel cycles, uranium is mined from the earth, milled, converted to uranium hexafluoride, enriched to an appropriate 235U content, and fabricated into fresh fuel.
From page 12...
... levels suitable for use as fuel in civilian nuclear energy programs. The United States then purchases the LEU, which is shipped to the United States for processing into fresh fuel for nuclear reactors.
From page 13...
... Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggested that the mechanisms that have been devised for cooperative threat reduction efforts between the United States and former Soviet states might be useful models for addressing other international challenges. Gottemoeller cautioned that what works in one situation will not work automatically in another, and that none of the existing programs is perfect.
From page 14...
... In his view, the nonproliferation regime must leave its Cold War roots behind and adapt in response to evolving threats from non-state actors, RDDs, and clandestine programs to develop nuclear weapons. The safeguards system was initially designed to address the situation as it was when the nonproliferation regime was first created.


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