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FORCEnet Implementation Strategy (2005) / Chapter Skim
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2 Defining FORCEnet
Pages 31-46

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From page 31...
... Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., September 19, p.
From page 32...
... They work at the Naval War College under the guidance of a retired four-star admiral and are assisted by associate fellows drawn from the classes of the War College and the Naval Postgraduate School and a staff of qualified analysts. 10 Naval Studies Board, National Research Council.
From page 33...
... To that end, this studies group drew heavily upon network-centric warfare concepts to increase and focus the flow of information to commanders and sea-based strike forces including Marines as part of a joint response.12 · SSG 19 carried these network-centric solutions another step, with proposals for fully networking the naval Services into what was termed FORCEnet, which was to be an integral part of a larger and also fully networked joint force. It also proposed extending this structure to include a responsive expeditionary sensor grid.13 · SSGs 20 and 21 then refined the concept and addressed how FORCEnet might be implemented, as well as how the Navy might select, educate, and train the 21st-century warriors who would operate the new networked Navy.14 · In parallel with these activities, the CNO asked the Naval Studies Board to specifically examine a transition strategy for enhancing the operational effectiveness of naval forces through the application of network-centric operations.
From page 34...
... Future ene mies will attempt to deny us access to critical areas of the world, threaten vital friends and interests overseas, and even try to conduct further attacks against the American homeland. These threats will pose increasingly complex chal lenges to national security and future warfighting.17 To provide the needed "Joint Capabilities"18 to deal with this new, stillchanging, and complex security environment, Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, proposed a Navy vision that rests on three pillars: Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield.
From page 35...
... The sea base is not a place or a unit but an assembly of capabilities that expands and contracts to match the requirements of the joint forces commander. Naval forces operating from dispersed locations using networked command-andcontrol structures will interface with naval shore facilities and set up strategic pipelines to support joint forces.
From page 36...
... Combining past experience with information age practices and systems, the Navy will streamline organizations and divest noncore functions so as to enhance current operations and increase the investment in future warfighting capabilities. 2.1.2.5 The Application Global Concept of Operations.
From page 37...
... It reinforces and expands concepts being pursued by other services -- long range strike; global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; expeditionary war fare; and light, agile ground forces -- to generate maximum combat power from the joint team.21 2.2 DEFINITION OF FORCENET 2.2.1 One Definition, Two Elements The FORCEnet concept clearly lies at the center of Sea Power 21 and the Marine Corps's EMW from two perspectives: that of providing the networking that the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield concepts require for success and that of enabling both the Navy and the Marine Corps to deal flexibly with new challenges and to introduce new ideas and technologies into a continuing process of adaptation. The definition of FORCEnet laid out by the CNO and a succession of SSGs and endorsed by the CMC is as follows: [FORCEnet is]
From page 38...
... 2.2.1.1 The Operational Construct The operational construct for FORCEnet is in essence the concept of employment of FORCEnet for realizing network-centric operations and applying that concept to "naval warfare in the information age."23 In this context, the operational construct is inseparable from the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield pillars of Sea Power 21 for which it is the critical enabler. Moreover, in this same context FORCEnet both supports and is supported by the concepts contained in the Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, and Sea Enterprise initiatives.
From page 39...
... Given these strategic and operational drivers, Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield will require a continuous process of operational innovation in order to meet the challenges of new circumstances and new threats -- sometimes on very short notice. The FORCEnet operational construct, therefore, will not be a fixed end state.
From page 40...
... The role of FORCEnet in the operational construct described above implies a set of deliverables necessary to govern and implement the operational concept spiral and to support increasingly rapid and accurate decision making. When these deliverables are mature enough to provide an operational capability of sufficient utility to the operational forces to justify the cost, the deliverables are integrated into mission and engagement packs.
From page 41...
... Instead, FORCEnet must reflect a coevolution of both the operational construct and the architecture. The concept of FORCEnet coevolution points to the need to integrate two different development spirals -- one centered on the Sea Basing, Sea Strike, and Sea Shield pillars of Sea Power 21 and on all of the operational or nonmateriel aspects of FORCEnet, and the other centered on the technology and architectural aspects.
From page 42...
... However, a security environment of "frequent crises, often with little warning" and threats that are "varied and deadly"27 underline the need for an additional kind of interaction: generating immediate options from existing capabilities and technologies to deal with urgent warfighter needs, that is, capability options packs. These interactions between the conceptual and technological spirals can occur on multiple levels, from the tactical operational concepts or specific program or system level to the level of broad conceptual development.
From page 43...
... These packs would absorb the impact of broad sets of new technologies, systems, and processes from the materiel spiral on the FORCEnet concept development; they would also encompass new requirements for FORCEnet produced by an evolving operational spiral upon which technologies are pursued and would help determine how they are prioritized in the technology spiral. The mission packs would, therefore, reflect both the evolution of the concepts of Sea Basing, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and EMW and their impact on the FORCEnet concept, together with the interaction between this evolution and the larger set of evolving joint operations concepts and strategies.
From page 44...
... For example, they might consider the impact of improved information displays or decision aids on air defense. Both of these kinds of engagement packs would appear to fit well into the current Sea Trial process, while the first might work into an expanded process that perhaps included elements of war gaming.
From page 45...
... -- The Sea Power 21 vision is the Navy's response to an altered world security environment, a response driven by a consistent, decade-long evolution of Navy­Marine Corps thinking that has transcended any one CNO, CMC, or administration. Since that altered security environment will continue to dictate joint and naval operational requirements for at least the next 20 to 30 years, Sea Power 21 and EMW or some close variants are likely to persist as the defining framework for naval operations.
From page 46...
... Accordingly, Sea Basing, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and FORCEnet are still evolving and must continue to evolve, as must the emerging joint concepts of operations. -- The technology base and infrastructure upon which the FnII will draw are likewise evolving as the ongoing, multifaceted technology revolution centered in civilian industry continues apace.


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