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3 Considerations Regarding the BR Process
Pages 60-72

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From page 60...
... for many years, and specific activities related to the development of a roadmap began in the early 1990s. The process of risk identification that resulted in the BR commenced in 1997, in brainstorming sessions involving NASA, the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI)
From page 61...
... . The current set of risks and related research and technology questions were identified through an iterative process that included input from the discipline teams, the Bioastronautics Science Management Team, the Chief Health and Medical Officer, the Astronaut Office, flight surgeons, and NASA research management.
From page 62...
... combined with the effectiveness of the current state of countermeasures. In this model, a "severe" risk to the crew -- such as loss of breathable atmosphere -- would be represented as being minimal if the state of life support technology readiness or life support capability readiness to mitigate the risk was high.
From page 63...
... For example, the risk of high "g's" for a fighter pilot can be mitigated adequately by a "g-suit" system that is inflated by air pressure, and disaggregation of the mitigation from the risk helps ensure that system designers are aware that any changes that may affect the ability of the system to inflate the g-suit could affect the mitigation of the risk of ginduced incapacity. The committee observes that this disaggregation will also help maintain a clear understanding that the notion of "retiring risks" due to the availability of effective countermeasures is seldom an accurate depiction of the state of operational readiness, since the underlying health and safety issues (e.g., loss of breathable atmosphere)
From page 64...
... However, ongoing discussions among the Bioastronautics Science Management Team, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, the Astronaut Office, flight surgeons, and research management have led to views of the risks of space flight that are generally similar, but not identical, within and outside NASA. For example, the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2001)
From page 65...
... Representatives of the Astronaut Office, Space Medicine Office, and the Bioastronautics Science Management Team (BSMT) met to review the BR and assess its suitability for reducing the risk of human space travel to Mars.
From page 66...
... This will help contrib ute to the subsequent definition of operating bands. The operating bands and exposure limits coming from the BR can be used as the basis for integrating bioastronautics risks into full-scope risk analyses for each of the reference missions.
From page 67...
... , 1 month on the lunar surface, and a 30-month mission to Mars and back-will have different detailed risk management requirements in each risk category. A risk currently considered unacceptable for the Mars mission may very well be acceptable for the ISS mission.
From page 68...
... , and the committee encourages its continued use because it is widely recognized and understood throughout NASA. NASA developed the Continuous Risk Management Program in 1996 to help project managers continuously identify, analyze, and manage risk throughout the life cycle of a project and for use as a proactive tool for managers to monitor resource allocation and ensure that critical project milestones are
From page 69...
... This information could be used to plan mitigation measures indicating that all risks have been reduced to acceptable levels by the projected launch date, to inform cost­benefit analyses and prioritization efforts, and to help NASA obtain adequate resources (funding, time, expertise) to carry out these measures.
From page 70...
... , whose mission includes the following: developing and maintaining technical standards; serving as the sole waiver-granting authority for technical standards; conducting risk analyses; serving as owner of the failure mode, effects analysis, and hazard reporting systems; deciding what is and is not an anomalous event; and independently verifying launch readiness. The committee finds that the decisions that will have to be made with respect to health and human safety aspects of the Design Reference Missions are similar in complexity to those relating to the Shuttle as a system of systems.
From page 71...
... 02-E015. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
From page 72...
... 2005. Bioastronautics Roadmap -- a risk reduction strategy for human space exploration.


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