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4 Considerations Regarding the BR Context
Pages 73-86

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From page 73...
... ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND RISK The risks identified in the BR occur in the context of a larger set of risks to the human space flight program and to NASA as an organization. Highly visible failures, such as the loss of the Space Shuttles Challenger and Columbia, have the potential to erode public confidence in -- and congressional support for -- human space flight and NASA as an agency.
From page 74...
... Furthermore, differences in the organizational culture, and thus the safety culture, of the international space agencies participating in the International Space Station (ISS) or any of the future Design Reference Missions may exacerbate conflict both within crews and between crews and mission control, increasing the risk of human performance failure (NRC, 1998; Kanas et al., 2000)
From page 75...
... Each of these communities feels, to some extent, that the other communities do not adequately appreciate their concerns or viewpoints, but this results in a creative tension that is highly appropriate because it brings advocacy to views that need to be represented in the risk analysis and mitigation approaches that make up the BR specifically, and the overall NASA bioastronautics program in general. The committee concludes that these organizational and cultural factors can have important consequences for crew safety and mission success and thus represent risks that should be considered in the BR.
From page 76...
... Furthermore, the committee is concerned that the planned ISS life span may not be sufficient to accommodate the necessary research or technology development and validation that will be necessary to enable the exploration vision. Finally, even if ISS support is extended and the crew size is augmented, it still may not fully meet the demands for the research that will be needed to support the Design Reference Missions.
From page 77...
... It is not clear to the committee that select-in and select-out criteria could be successfully derived, validated, and implemented by the time human exploration beyond LEO commences. Another example of a long-lead-time project concerns the question of whether an artificial gravity environment will be necessary to maintain crew health during a 30-month Mars mission.
From page 78...
... How to provide support for a microgravity research plat form that will have the resources (crew time, up-mass, facili ties, and power) for the large amount of work necessary to validate countermeasures; achieve Technology Readiness Level 7 for life support systems sufficiently early in the design phase to allow their integration into the overall vehicle; and demon strate the utility of medical procedures in microgravity.
From page 79...
... The goal would be to develop a sequence of posterior distributions about the 1By way of example, managers of NASA's bioastronautics program have tried to determine whether sufficient astronaut subjects will be available to conduct the forward research needed to successfully mitigate the risks imposed by the Design Reference Missions. A workshop was convened in Houston, Texas, in May 2004 to estimate the requirements for human subjects in exploration research.
From page 80...
... develop technologies that make human space flight safe and productive." In this context, it is inappropriate to have the BR address any other aspect of technology development that is not directly tied to crew exposure to the hazardous environments of space. The committee concludes that evaluating "efficiency risks" is relevant to the BR only when it relates specifically to crew exposure to the hazardous environments of space.
From page 81...
... , and safety risk management principles typically drive the development of hardware and infrastructure in which and with which humans will interact. The committee does not support the notion that risks associated with crew exposure to the hazardous environments of space and resource risks and constraints can credibly be addressed in parallel in the same management process.
From page 82...
... engineering technology and system per formance risk, defined as the conditional probability of an adverse event resulting from the space flight supersystem that affects crew health or mission success. THE CASE OF ADVANCED HUMAN LIFE SUPPORT The engineering and system technology risks found in the advanced human life support category are linked clearly to human health risks.
From page 83...
... . The committee found neither sufficient analysis of the research required to fully determine the operational characteristics for advanced life support system technologies for the Design Reference Missions nor evidence within the BR that justifies the use of terrestrial parameters for these missions.
From page 84...
... 2005. Bioastronautics Roadmap -- a risk reduction strategy for human space exploration.
From page 85...
... 2004. President Bush announces new vision for space exploration program.


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