Defending the U.S. Air Transportation System Against Chemical and Biological Threats (2006) / Chapter Skim
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3 Defensive Strategies
3 Defensive Strategies
Pages 15-23
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From page 15... ...
detection systems may have a relatively rapid response time Three kinds of detection schemes are discussed here: compared with that of specific identification systems, but (1) continuous chemical sensors (Figure 3-1)
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From page 16... ...
SAMPLE REAGENT INTRODUCTION ADDITION INCUBATION MEASUREMENT DISCRETE STEPS TION EVALUATION READOUT INFORMA TIME FIGURE 3-2 Operational schematic of discontinuous biosensing system (assay)
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For ex DETECTION LIMIT ample, in a typical assay involving the binding of target DNA strands to complementary strands on a sensor surface, the CONCENTRATION incubation time to achieve a measurable signal is about 1 hour. In the case of both chemicals and biological agents, the FIGURE 3-3 Key characteristics of sensor systems (see discussion quality of the analysis is a function of agent type and conin text)
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From page 18... ...
bypasses many time-consuming steps required in a chemical/biological agent detector-based strategy, including the response decision step at the end. NOTE: While continuous air treatment (the non-detection-based paradigm)
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From page 19... ...
, and training are in ing, and so on, are likely to produce a significant and fluctu- place ahead of time.7 ating background of biological aerosol particles that could Of equal importance is that decision makers have a wellmimic the fluctuations likely to be seen in an attack with designed visual display of the information needed to make biological agents and therefore create false alarms. In the the appropriate decision and that they are well practiced in case of some threat agents (e.g., anthrax or plague)
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From page 20... ...
several days, an identification of the specific organisms inSoftware programs could be developed that could be trained volved and analysis of any factors that make them unique to recognize crowd behavior patterns that would be charac- can aid the medical treatment of victims, the restoration of teristic of an attack with a fast-acting chemical/biological affected areas, and the forensic investigation to find the peragent, and these could provide a rapid, continuous method of petrators.9 monitoring the surveillance data.8 The issue will be the op- It is likely that with continued investment in research and timum allocation of function between humans and algo- development, it will be possible in the future to reduce the rithms to maximize POD while minimizing PFA. Neither detection time for biological agent attacks below 1 hour, humans nor algorithms alone are completely effective for while maintaining or increasing the POD.10 A faster rethese purposes; hybrid systems typically produce better per- sponse time with high POD would increase the benefits of formance.
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From page 21... ...
The strategy of continuous air treatment would be aimed at providing "clean air" to all users of transportation spaces, both in airport terminals and aircraft. This approach would NON-DETECTION-BASED DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES be analogous to that of municipal water-treatment programs Defensive strategies that do not depend on the techno- that continuously treat water supplies so as to provide clean logical detection of a chemical/biological attack include water to city residents.
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From page 22... ...
ter -- the detection-based strategy and the non-detection In an attack involving a fast-acting agent, the occurrence based strategy -- has strengths and weaknesses in protecting of the attack per se would not be in doubt, and a strategy U.S. air transportation spaces from terrorist attack with using videocamera surveillance coupled with pattern-recog- chemical/biological agents.
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From page 23... ...
The committee's recommendations for the roles and The costs and benefits of both strategies could be evalu- responsibilities of government agencies in developing these ated more easily if models could be developed to simulate models and its recommendations for exploring these defenthe spread of chemical/biological agents released under vari- sive strategies are discussed in the next chapter.
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