Terrorism and the Chemical Infrastructure Protecting People and Reducing Vulnerabilities (2006) / Chapter Skim
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3. Methodological Approach to Determining Vulnerabilities
3. Methodological Approach to Determining Vulnerabilities
Pages 29-37
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From page 29... ...
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office for a worst-case accident involving a flammable substance give a median population within the vulnerable zone1 of 15, and for toxic inhalation risk give a 1The area of the vulnerable zone impacted by an actual event depends upon the quantity and toxicity of the chemical released, as well as meteorological conditions such as wind 29
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From page 30... ...
2001. Chemical accident risks in US Industry -- A preliminary analysis of accident risk data from US hazardous chemical facilities.
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From page 31... ...
DHS therefore could make investments in science and technology development that are specific to the methyl isocyanate risk, or it can make investments that mitigate the methyl isocyanate risk while also reducing risks from other highly toxic materials. In the absence of specific threat information, it will be most appropriate at this time for DHS to invest its research efforts, including technology development, for general classes of vulnerabilities.
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From page 32... ...
Amplification is most likely to affect economic consequences rather than casualties since, contrary to popular belief, people rarely panic in the face of disasters.4 Societal response and emergency planning are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.5 PRIMARY ANALYSIS OF VULNERABILITIES Using the six categories of chemicals discussed in Chapter 2 and the supply chain characteristics and chemical properties of concern, it is possible to construct a matrix representing the primary vulnerabilities posed within each category (Figure 3.1)
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From page 33... ...
33 Fuels and X X X X X Fossil Petrochemicals X Consumer Products X X X Specialty Chemicals X X X X Gases Industrial CATEGORIES X X Pharmaceuticals CHEMICAL y. X X X X X Inorganic categor Chemicals or chemical by Node Dominant Control Concerns Between Single Time Substitution Volume Replacement or of Production of Materials High Path Supplier/Limited Siting Lack Long Lack DominantNode Nodes/Transportation yvulnerabilities CHARACTERISTIC CHAIN SUPPLY Primar 3.1 FIGURE
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From page 34... ...
Similarly, the interdependencies that were identified were not of a high level of concern. Previous analysis based on records of terrorist attacks against the chemical infrastructure reached a similar conclusion: To do significant damage that truly impacts the U.S.
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35 Priority Priority Low Vulnerability Low Yes No Social Social Amplification Amplification? Vulnerability No Yes to to Important Important Public Public Proximity Proximity Other Infrastructure?
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From page 36... ...
36 Priority Vulnerability Low Yes No Social Social Vulnerability Amplification? No Yes Be Be Can Rapidly Can Rapidly Vulnerability Developed?
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From page 37... ...
37 Priority Vulnerability Low Yes No Priority Social Social Low Vulnerability Amplification? Vulnerability No Yes No No Yes Priority Large Large Low Quantity?
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