Terrorism and the Chemical Infrastructure Protecting People and Reducing Vulnerabilities (2006) / Chapter Skim
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6. Science and Technology Investment to Protect the Nation's Chemical Infrastructure: Findings and Recommendations
6. Science and Technology Investment to Protect the Nation's Chemical Infrastructure: Findings and Recommendations
Pages 98-110
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From page 98... ...
6 Science and Technology Investment to Protect the Nation's Chemical Infrastructure: Findings and Recommendations I n any complex undertaking there is no such thing as zero vulnerability, but vulnerabilities can always be reduced -- often at increasing incre mental cost. Thus, any action must balance the cost of reducing vulnerabilities against the potential benefits from this action.
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From page 99... ...
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 threats to its safe operation. The actions outlined in this chapter are those most appropriate at this time.
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From page 100... ...
100 TERRORISM AND THE CHEMICAL INFRASTRUCTURE of the methyl isocyanate gas leak from the Union Carbide India Limited Bhopal plant in December 1984.1 Injuries have been estimated to range from 200,000 to 500,000 and contributed to an accumulation of 15,000 to 20,000 disaster-related deaths in subsequent years, based upon elevated mortality rates among those hundreds of thousands of injured people.2 In this country, an explosion involving 2,300 tons of ammonium nitrate in a Liberty ship at a loading dock in Texas City, Texas, on April 16, 1947 cascaded into widespread destruction of nearby petroleum refineries, chemical production facilities, and another fertilizer Liberty ship ultimately claiming nearly 600 lives and causing approximately 3,500 injuries -- America's worst chemical catastrophe.3 On September 21, 2001, a huge explosion tore through the AZF (Azote de France) fertilizer factory in Toulouse, France when nearly 400 tons of ammonium nitrate detonated causing extensive physical damage including a 50-meter-wide, 10-meter-deep crater; 500 uninhabitable homes; and more than 27,000 damaged buildings.4 Casualties from this incident include the loss of 30 lives and approximately 10,000 injuries, and resulted in the medical treatment of more than 14,000 persons for posttraumatic stress.
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From page 101... ...
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 101 The chemical industry is quite diverse, with redundancies that mitigate the effects of loss of production due to major shutdowns. Where stockpiles do not exist, market forces quickly compensate for loss of production by increased production at another facility of the same or a different company, or by temporary substitution in industrial processes of another chemical with similar properties.
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From page 102... ...
102 TERRORISM AND THE CHEMICAL INFRASTRUCTURE chological effects. Conversely, a well-informed general population that is adequately prepared for such events could decrease negative consequences and unnecessary casualties.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 103 offers an immediate means to mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack on the chemical infrastructure. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS DHS should support research directed toward enhancing emergency preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery.
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From page 104... ...
Research can support the development of specific guidelines for limiting, and even mitigating, consequences by stimulating a positive public response and preventing negative social amplification. Community members and end users should be actively engaged in identifying their vulnerabilities, disaster planning and management, development of technology, and the communication process.
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From page 105... ...
Due to the decentralized nature of many parts of the chemical supply chain, coordinating risk reduction measures across the system may prove difficult. To adequately integrate these risk reduction methods into such a decentralized industry, effort should be expended to identify those places within the chemical infrastructure where interdependencies exists and to understand the need to incorporate risk reduction techniques in these areas.
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From page 106... ...
106 TERRORISM AND THE CHEMICAL INFRASTRUCTURE The most desirable solution to preventing chemical releases is to reduce or eliminate the hazard where possible, not to control it. This can be achieved by modifying processes where possible to minimize the amount of hazardous material used, lower the temperatures and pressures required, replace a hazardous substance with a less hazardous substitute, or minimize the complexity of a chemical process.6 Many of the advances required to develop practical alternatives to today's chemicals and chemical processes are fundamental and pre-competitive.7 The economic incentives for industrial funding are frequently absent, which leads to the need for either a government investment in research or government-provided financial incentives for industrial investments.
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From page 107... ...
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 107 DHS should invest in S&T to enhance real-time monitoring of breaches in containment, the chemical infrastructure and any disruptions to it, and any resulting consequences of an event. The near-term objective of enhancing emergency response effectiveness can be furthered through efforts to develop reliable detection techniques that can be widely distributed, are easy to use, and would give accurate results quickly and clearly.
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From page 108... ...
The scenario should be processed through a series of tests to assess if it can be significantly disruptive or catastrophic. These tests should consider loss of life, economic impact, and the ability of state and local government to respond to the event and should also consider the impact of social amplification.
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From page 109... ...
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 109 needed to minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack and its effects or consequences. When confronting the potential for terrorist attack, it is essential to constantly reassess both the progress being made and the possibility of unintended consequences when implementing a technology "solution." The threat from terrorism is not static, and it is not unreasonable to assume that terrorist tactics will evolve with emerging technologies designed to defeat their threat.
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