C4ISR for Future Naval Strike Groups (2006) / Chapter Skim
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2 Principal Naval Missions and C4ISR Impact
2 Principal Naval Missions and C4ISR Impact
Pages 41-69
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From page 41... ...
To state findings and recommendations concerning the impact of the C4ISR capabilities of naval strike groups on naval end-to-end missions. 2.2 C4ISR DRIVERS TO NAVAL MISSIONS 2.2.1 Key Measures for Mission Capabilities The time required and the ability to handle large-scale, distributed operations are key measures of effectiveness for C4ISR systems.
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From page 42... ...
, but also within the mission threads. A mission thread is defined as a sequence of activities and events beginning with an opportunity to detect a threat or element that ought to be attacked and ending with a commander's assessment of damage after an attack.
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From page 43... ...
In the case of Sea Shield missions, this is accomplished by earlier target detection and identification and faster decisions. For Sea Strike missions, shortened time to detect and fix potential targets and shortened damage-assessment time brought about through enhanced information sharing and collaboration increase the number and effectiveness of force components that can participate in engagements for a variable-force content and disposition.
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From page 44... ...
ISR timeliness, however, is less of an issue. 2.2.2 Mission Threads Missions within Sea Shield differ from those in Sea Strike, but within each of these pillars of Sea Power 21, missions have time lines with similar elements, are driven by the same factors, and often share common C4ISR assets.
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From page 45... ...
45 and llance survei Time persistent ) for Damage assessment needs the Engagement(s are effects missions on event updates Strike implementation Sea target Decisions and Continual for or requirements of C4ISR nature, of of location or and target or Drivers potential event of neutralized line.
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From page 46... ...
Figure 2.3 illustrates the mission-cycle time line for Sea Shield missions, including Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) , Undersea Warfare, Surface Warfare, and Force Protection.
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47 threats of on detecti Time early the ) for assessments needs the Engagement(s Kill are and/or depth missions tracking and target Shield on pairing Sea Continual for fire Decisions system of requirements of threat C4ISR as threats.
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From page 48... ...
2.3 SEA STRIKE MISSIONS 2.3.1 Driving Scenarios To gain a perspective on capabilities that C4ISR systems must provide for Sea Strike, the committee identified some example driving cases in which time to respond is inherently short; these examples are presented in Table 2.1. Mission-cycle times are reduced by detecting at the earliest time possible-a burden on the ISR -- and by deciding quickly -- a burden on command, control, communications, and computers (C4)
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From page 49... ...
49 and connectivity connectivity missile. Communications Computers Assured Latency Assured Latency Control surface-to-air and weapon blue Missions Case SAM, and time and per red Strike Command Target pairing No ambiguity Launcher; Sea Measures for Erector revisit identification persistence, identification Performance time persistence, time, Measures Transportable Critical ISR Coverage, accuracy, response Coverage, accuracy, response rate TEL, Performance Strike; Cases mobile target; opposing against TCS Critical Critical Example Driving TCS TEL; against SAMs Moving mobile forces Time 2.1 and TCS, Fire TABLE Mission Area Strike Naval Support Maneuver NOTE:
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From page 50... ...
Calvin H Craig, USN, Sea Strike Team Lead, Assessment Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments, N812D, "Overview of Operational Net Assessment; C4ISR for Time Critical Strike (U)
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From page 51... ...
Hight, USN, Director, Command, Control, Communications, Computing, and Space, OPNAV N71, "C4ISR Requirements for Future Naval Strike Groups (U) ," classified presentation to the committee, December 15, 2004.
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From page 52... ...
It seems to the committee, however, that providing persistent and survivable coverage, reliable detection, and accurate identification may require additional approaches. It is noted that both the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
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From page 53... ...
a weapon launched from a platform over the horizon guiding to within its lethality radius of the target using only the ISR tracking data.10 Solving the moving target attack problem will require strikes to be addressed in the same integrated manner as for air defense, which will likely require the following: · The integration of sensor platforms, weapons, communications, command and control, and weapons launch platforms; · The development of concepts of operation and networking concepts based on trade-off studies to balance the burden of performance and risk among these elements against a wide range of potential targets; and 10 Naval Studies Board, National Research Council.
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From page 54... ...
Although various agencies and commands are exploring these technologies, it is recommended that the Navy determine what organic embedded capabilities are needed to support special operations and time-sensitive actions, for example, for Marine Corps operations. Information Operations Also identified in the Defense Science Board Task Force study cited above was the need for the ability to make a near-real-time assessment of the effects of a network attack on an adversary.
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From page 55... ...
If the Navy becomes involved in boost-phase interception of ballistic missiles, a time line similar to that for low-flying cruise missiles would be required. When the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA)
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From page 56... ...
, and CEC by extending the umbrella of cruise missile defense ashore. The committee also notes, however, that there is no technical activity under way for developing target identification to ensure that a cruise missile -- and not, for example, a civilian aircraft -- is being engaged.
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From page 57... ...
57 and connectivity connectivity connectivity Communications Computers Assured Latency Assured Latency Assured Latency Latency Areas Control and weapon weapon weapon Mission Case identification identification identification and and and per track track track Shield ambiguity pairing ambiguity pairing ambiguity pairing Command No Latency Target No Latency Target No Latency Target Latency Sea Measures for rate rate rate rate detection detection detection detection revisit rate revisit rate revisit rate revisit rate for Performance of for of for of for of Measures identification latency identification latency identification latency identification latency search search search search and and and and and and and and Critical ISR Coverage Tracking Area Coverage Tracking Area Coverage Tracking Area Coverage Tracking Area Performance and Cases against defense missile Critical Example Driving Low-altitude supersonic cruise Quiet submarines mines Defense small-boat swarm Rocket-propelled grenade 2.2 Air Missile TABLE Mission Areas Theater and Defense Undersea Warfare Surface Warfare Force Protection xxx
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From page 58... ...
and its primary program components. FORCEnet must be designed to meet a host of information requirements in areas as diverse as logistics and general intelligence, but many of its features will be driven by the need to execute Sea Strike and Sea Shield missions.
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From page 59... ...
, comprise an important component of C4ISR.16 As the Navy requires access to both organic and national ISR assets via the TCA, a major concern is to ensure that the ships have adequate connectivity, including antenna coverage and bandwidth. 15Andrew Cox, Executive Director, Program Executive Office C4I and Space, "Program Executive Office C41 and Space Information Brief," presentation to the committee, September 21, 2004.
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From page 60... ...
The committee agrees with the conclusion of the report of the DSB Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces17 that offensive information operations need to evolve further so that their effects can be better observed and predicted. It also agrees with the recent NSB FORCEnet study18 that information assurance will be critical to protect vital C2 and ISR information in the planned open architecture of TCA (see Chapter 6, "Communications")
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From page 61... ...
, the carrier strike aircraft, especially with the future F-35, can provide close air support. The primary limiting factor for CSG Sea Strike operations is persistent ISR (which may be organic or may come from access to joint and/or national assets)
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These shortfalls are evidenced in their inadequate organic ISR and inadequate access to nonorganic ISR. Similarly, in Sea Shield, both the CSG and the ESG will have adequate air defense capability with the fielding of CEC and other DDG improvements, but shortfalls in USW and SUW will remain.
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2005. FORCEnet Implementation Strategy, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., Chapter 5.
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From page 64... ...
This artificial division between combat systems and C4ISR has resulted in many situations of outright confusion in naval ship combat information centers, as the commanding officer is left to sort out the ambiguous and oftentimes conflicting data between the two sources of the tactical picture. What is sorely needed is an integrated-system solution that meets the warfighter's command-and-control needs.
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From page 65... ...
Given that official visions of future warfighting capabilities rely more and more on the achievement of networkcentric operations and the integration of C4ISR into combat systems, those shortfalls could very seriously limit future naval force capabilities, possibly affecting
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From page 66... ...
It is observed that ISR is not treated as part of the kill chain in all mission areas. The air defense and ballistic missile defense missions are positive examples -- the C4ISR for these systems is built as an integral element of the fire-control loop, in Aegis, Aegis with CEC, and the SSDS.
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From page 67... ...
Finding: Future naval strike group capabilities in major combat operations can be significantly improved through network-centric operations that draw C4ISR systems more prominently into the kill chain. The value of C4ISR to naval strike groups is best measured in terms of its contribution to warfighting, and C4ISR is becoming central to naval strike groups' combat capabilities.
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From page 68... ...
22These studies include the following: Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, Na
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From page 69... ...
Recommendation: The CNO and CMC should consider implementing the recommendations of this report as a managed program, with milestones that must be met for such things as the development of time-budget allocations for timecritical mission threads, the identification of the system capabilities that are required to meet those time budgets, the establishment of funded development programs for systems to provide those capabilities, and the identification of dates by which the capabilities enabled by those systems will be operational. tional Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, 1999, Realizing the Potential of C4I: Fundamental Challenges, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 1997, Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force, Volume 3: Information in Warfare, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; some 10 years ago regarding information security: Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 1994, Information Warfare (U)
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