Critical Technology Accessibility (2006) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Pages 1-10
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To gain an improved perspective on the issue of dependence on foreign source suppliers, the Technology Warning Division (TWD) of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
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Nor did the committee assess, for each foreign component, the impact of denial on operational capability or try to understand the particular mitigation opportunities and consequences. Finally, it did not develop a collective assessment of the technological and industrial trajectories of emerging technologies that promise to be key to our nation's security.
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Some of the reasons for this conclusion include the following: · Over the last 60 years, the United States has created an industrial base for the domestic supply for every major strategic and critical military capability that requires specialized and expensive facilities. In particular, it has retained the industrial capabilities to produce nuclear weapons; missile defense systems; space systems and space control capabilities; armored vehicles; submarines and ships; air craft; aircraft stealth and counterstealth; and underwater detection, classification, and targeting as well as underwater stealth and counterstealth.
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The often-cited example of the potential vulnerability to denial of foreign components -- the case where a Swiss manufac turer stopped the shipment of guidance components for the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb during Operation Iraqi Freedom -- is actually proof of the opposite: namely, robustness of the global supply chain.
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. Design choices that favor improved system performance must allow using products from the global commercial marketplace, and many useful products will be available only from these
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Foreign components are but one source of a broader assurance concern. Obliging these officials to regularly report on all significant sources of product assurance and supply chain risk, impact assessment, and mitigation consequences could well be considered a reasonable part of their normal duties.
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Without this broader context, warning cannot be properly evaluated. While this issue of warning is partly an intelligence function, it must also comprehend technical details at the system level and at the level of lower tier suppliers to the systems as well as the operational significance of the risks of supply availability.
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should direct the ser vices and defense agencies to annually prepare a product and supply chain assurance report that identifies important vulnerabilities, po tentially significant operational consequences, and recommended mitigation actions. This will require supporting assessments by sub ordinate organizations for each service and agency.
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industrial capabilities identified earlier justify the investment of large DIA TWD resources to monitor for and analyze major changes in global capabilities. These capabilities include network creation and management and information management; the integration of IT components; and systems integration.
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Finally, the DIA TWD should focus its management resources on tracking global capabilities in nuclear weapons; missile defense systems; space systems and space control; submarine construction; aircraft stealth and counterstealth; underwater detection/classification/targeting and underwater stealth and counterstealth; and electronic intelligence acquisition and analysis. Recommendation 3.
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