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1 The Global Context for Preventing Radiological Terrorism
Pages 17-42

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From page 17...
... The IAEA report underscores the importance of governments actively "managing" the entire life cycles of many classes of radioactive material contained in ionizing radiation sources (IRSs)
From page 18...
... overview of the risks posed by RDDs and discusses global approaches to deal with those risks. The focus is on inadequately secured IRSs that could provide radioactive material.
From page 19...
... Should an event involving fissile or radioactive material occur, appropriately trained specialists that understand in detail the differences between nuclear and radiation attacks should promptly become involved in response and consequence management activities. Radioactive material dispersed by an RDD may cause serious radiation health effects for a limited number of exposed people and, indeed, may result in some deaths.
From page 20...
... As to the psychological impact, the IAEA reported as follows: The accident in Goiânia had a great psychological impact on the Brazilian population owing to its association with the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the USSR in 1986. Many people feared con tamination, irradiation, and damage to health; worse still, they feared incurable and fatal diseases.5 The wider the dispersion of radioactive material by explosive devices or by other means such as injection of material into ventilation systems 4ElBaradei, M
From page 21...
... Pp. 27-53 in Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material.
From page 22...
... Geneva: World Health Organization. Available online at http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/.
From page 23...
... When considering radioactivity levels, half-life, portability, and dispersibility potential of IRSs known to be in use or in storage, only a small fraction of the millions of existing IRSs pose a high radiation risk. Still, there are estimates that tens of thousands of high-risk IRSs exist throughout the world, and as previously noted, even low-risk IRSs have the potential to frighten populations.11 A number of countries including the United States are beginning to develop comprehensive national IRS inventories.
From page 24...
... , for some hours. It could possibly -- although it is unlikely -- be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks." These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high-activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges, and spinning pipe gauges)
From page 25...
... Originally these values differed slightly from IAEA values, but they have since been made consistent with the IAEA values when applied in DOE's international programs to upgrade the security of IRSs. DOE's guidelines also address many aspects of assessing the adequacy of security conditions at facilities where IRSs are located.
From page 26...
... Plutonium-238 280 Sterilization and food Cobalt-60 Up to 4,000,000 irradiation Cesium-137 Up to 3,000,000 Self-contained and blood Cobalt-60 2,400-25,000 irradiators Cesium-137 7,000-15,000 Single-beam teletherapy Cobalt-60 4,000 Cesium-137 500 Multibeam teletherapy Cobalt-60 7,000 Industrial radiography Cobalt-60 60 Iridium-192 100 Calibration Cobalt-60 20 Cesium-137 60 Americium-241 10 High- and medium-dose-rate Cobalt-60 10 brachytherapy Cesium-137 3 Iridium-192 6 Well logging Cesium-137 2 Americium-241/Beryllium 20 Californium-252 0.03 Level and conveyor gauges Cobalt-60 5 Cesium-137 3-5 SOURCE: Copyright 2005 from The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism by C
From page 27...
... 2004. A Basic Guide to RTR Radioactive Materials.
From page 28...
... About 11 percent of the reported incidents involved dangerous IRSs, namely IAEA Categories 1, 2, and 3. The number of such incidents was rising in 2004.15 14Informal communication from DOE to project staff, January 13, 2006.
From page 29...
... Heroin, opium, and hashish are omnipresent. There are occasional reports of smuggling of radioactive material from the states of the former Soviet Union through the country.
From page 30...
... Available online at http://lugar. senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf.
From page 31...
... 2. A Specific License is issued to an organization possessing a significant amount of radioactive material, typically IRSs in IAEA Categories 1, 2, 3, and 4 as discussed earlier.
From page 32...
... . IMPORT OR EXPORT OF SOURCES On July 1, 2005, the USNRC published new regulations that require specific licenses for the export or import of radioactive materials that could possibly be used in weapons, making the United States the first country to implement comprehensive export controls on these materials in compliance with the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactie Sources.
From page 33...
... The 2006 target was to recover and secure an additional 2,000 sources. These efforts clearly lower the probability that radiological material will fall into the hands of terrorists within the United States, and this experience should be instructive in helping to address security weaknesses in Russia and other countries.
From page 34...
... just prior to the Super Bowl in Houston in 2004, about 500 sources in a complex single operation, and a number of plutonium-239 and cesium-137 sources. SOURCE: DOE presentation at the first meeting of the NRC Committee on Inter national Efforts to Counter Radiological Terrorism, Washington, D.C., January 4-5, 2006; DOE communication via e-mail, August 16, 2006.
From page 35...
... Also, the exporting state should satisfy itself to the extent practicable that the importing state has the appropriate technical and administrative capability, resources, and regulatory structure needed to manage the resources in a responsible manner. The Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactie Sources calls for importing states to consider the following factors with respect to imports: • Whether the recipient has been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement of sources, • Whether an import or export authorization for sources has been denied to the recipient or importing state, or whether the recipient has diverted for purposes inconsistent with the IAEA code any import or export of sources that was previously authorized, and • The risk of diversion or malicious acts involving sources.
From page 36...
... Available online at http://www.cna.ca/english/Nuclear_Facts/Nuclear_ Quickfacts_Jul-0_EN.pdf. Accessed November 29, 2006.
From page 37...
... With transportation of radioactive material nationally and internationally reaching 10 million packages per year, the catalog may prove to be a very important tool in combating radiological terrorism.29 A final topic of great interest to the U.S. government is the gradual phasing-out internationally of IRSs containing highly potent radionuclides that can easily be dispersed into the environment.
From page 38...
... The convention requires that any seized nuclear or radiological material be held in accordance with IAEA safeguards and handled as prescribed in the IAEA's health, safety, and physical protection standards.31 In addition, during 2005 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540, which criminalizes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and calls for states to enact and enforce strict export controls and to secure sensitive materials within their borders. Finally, in June 2002 the United States, Russia, and the IAEA signed a Tripartite Agreement at the ministerial level to cooperate in securing sources in the former Soviet Union beyond Russia.
From page 39...
... In Russia, the program has installed equipment at 39 sites. According to DOE, Russian customs officials have reported that 200 attempts to smuggle materials were uncovered in 2004.33 • The Megaports Initiative involves outfitting foreign seaports with detection equipment capable of identifying nuclear and radiological material in metal shipping containers in the absence of extensive shielding.
From page 40...
... Research to enhance detection techniques continues to be a thrust of several DOE national laboratories, and industry as well, and is expected to continue for the indefinite future.35 DOE'S GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative has two radiological components -- one directed to activities in the United States and one directed to international activities. However, the domestic component is also called on to support a limited number of international activities.
From page 41...
... 2006. Presentation at the first meeting of the Committee on International Efforts to Counter Radiological Terrorism, Washington, D.C., January 4-5.
From page 42...
... and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening.


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