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2 Security of Ionizing Radiation Sources in Russia
Pages 43-68

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From page 43...
... why it is in the U.S. interest to cooperate with Russia to counter this threat and other aspects of radiological terrorism that could have roots in Russia.
From page 44...
... As shown in Boxes 2-1 and 2-2, theft has become a more serious concern in Russia in recent years. According to press reports, the interest of Chechen insurgents and criminal elements in Russia in malevolent uses of radioactive material, particularly IRSs, is substantial.
From page 45...
... 2004. Radiological consequences of the unauthorized application of ionizing radiation sources: Response and prevention.
From page 46...
... IBRAE reports that IRSs are used widely in various industries in Russia today. As previously noted, IBRAE estimates that more than 500,000 IRSs are located in Russia.
From page 47...
... Khakimov was thought to be capable of perpetrating a radiological attack, and he was thought to be in a particular suburb of Moscow. The search for stolen IRSs began in that suburb.
From page 48...
... 2005. Preventing Radiological Terrorism: Problems of Radiation Safety.
From page 49...
... In recent times, the Federal Medical Biological Agency has become important in monitoring hazardous activities at selected facilities, while the recently reorganized Sanitary Epidemiological Service issues sanitary passports that authorize activities involving radioactive materials. Also in Soviet times, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
From page 50...
... Presentation at the U.S. Russian Workshop on Safety and Security of Ionizing Radiation Sources by Rosatom, Moscow, March 14-15; see Appendix D
From page 51...
... PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SOURCES AT RUSSIAN FACILITIES The following key laws and regulations concerning physical protection of IRSs have been enacted in recent years: • Federal Law of the Russian Federation "On the Use of Atomic Energy," No. 170-FZ, enacted November 21, 1995, and amended March 28, 2002;6 • Rules for the Physical Security of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Facilities, and Nuclear Material Storage Sites, Russian Government Resolution No.
From page 52...
... For example, in 2004 a spokesman for the Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Rosatom, pronounced "that all radioactive material and waste in Russia were under full control." Whereas, at the same meeting a spokesman for the regulatory service Rostekhnadzor said that "a state system of accounting for radioactive materials and radioactive waste has not factually been created in any full sense."11 Similarly with regard to protection of powerful RTGs with Sr-90 activity levels ranging from 40,000 to 150,000 curies each, there are conflicting views as to their future. In 2003, officials of the Russian National Technical Physics and Automation Research Institute stated that "[RTGs]
From page 53...
... P 17 in Opportunities for U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Combating Radiological Terrorism.
From page 54...
... Each of the five sites has the classical problem of excess and unwanted IRSs with no disposal pathways. Clearly, physical security at sites such as these needs upgrading, but unwanted IRSs have no value, and the issue is whether to secure them or to spend scarce security funds to dispose of them.
From page 55...
... A number of Russian commercial companies and government organizations are certified for transporting IRSs to appropriate disposition destinations. According to Russian specialists, the following aspects of transportation require attention, particularly when transportation of highly dangerous IRSs is involved: • Communications between vehicles and dispatchers, • Well-developed alarm and response procedures for use during shipments, and • Specially equipped vehicles and escort cars.
From page 56...
... Prepared for the NRC Committee on Opportunities for U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Combating Radiological Terrorism.
From page 57...
... As noted above, a central component of the control and accounting procedures is the network of IACs. The following difficulties confronting IACs, particularly regional IACs, have been noted in various reports available to the committee, with almost all of the problems linked to insufficient funds: • Inadequate means of communication; • Obsolete computers and computer software; • Poor physical protection of the premises; • Staff deficiencies and inadequate training opportunities; and • Lack of standardized documents that govern the activities of the IACs and their interactions with other organizations, including recommended approaches for determining possible threats of unauthorized use of IRSs.16 Although the Russian government has begun to put some of the key building blocks in place, the system of accounting and control should be strengthened.
From page 58...
... The Russian government is taking a number of steps to prepare for such emergencies, ranging from the development of sophisticated technical analyses of the possible spread of radioactive clouds to assessments of potential consequences of an RDD detonation. Many relevant capabilities were developed at IBRAE following the Chernobyl accident.
From page 59...
... Presentation at the U.S.-Russian Workshop on Safety and Security of Ionizing Radiation Sources by Rosatom, Moscow, March 14-15; see Appendix D
From page 60...
... Other producers of IRSs for both international and domestic markets include the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk and the Radium Institute in St. Petersburg.20 20Information presented at U.S.-Russian Workshop on Safety and Security of Ionizing Radiation Sources, Moscow, March 14-15, 2005.
From page 61...
... 2005. Production of Ionizing Radiation Sources at the Mayak Production Association and Efforts to Ensure Their Safe Use and Disposal.
From page 62...
... Mayak Production Association Mayak began producing IRSs based on Cs-137 in 1957 and in 1962 built its first radionuclide production plant. It is the largest producer of radioisotopes in Russia using as raw materials radionuclides from spent nuclear fuel and isotopes obtained from target substances irradiated in 22Aspect products are described on the Aspect Scientific Production Web site at: http://www.
From page 63...
... Highly active IRSs that have exceeded their lifetimes or are unwanted for other reasons are processed and disposed at Mayak, while low-level IRSs may be buried at Radon sites. IRSs that are exported may not be returned to Russia for disposal, but they may be returned for recycling as previously noted.
From page 64...
... However, the committee noted that the complex procedures in preparing RTGs for disposal differ signifi 23St. Petersburg Federal State Unitary Enterprise Izotop.
From page 65...
... The Radon sites manage many types of radioactive wastes: • IRSs from 0.1 to 100,000 curies are placed in bunkers of various designs capable of housing 5 to 10,000 units per bunker. • Unwanted instruments and large pieces of waste material are placed in concrete canyons.
From page 66...
... Russia was fortunate to progress through the most difficult transition years in the 1990s without a major radiological incident despite serious vulnerabilities. During the past few years, many significant security enhancements have been made -- some through the DOE cooperative program.
From page 67...
... • An RDD attack in Russia or elsewhere could undermine the credibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an effective international organization, at a time when the United States is firmly committed to strengthening this organization to deal with nuclear security and nonproliferation issues worldwide. Since the IAEA has been in the forefront in setting standards, developing guidelines, and analyzing threats and consequences concerning radiological terrorism, a detonation
From page 68...
... A serious radiological incident would undermine the significance of such political commitments that encompass many areas of great importance to the United States. • The Russian government has significant experience in dealing with major nuclear accidents, such as those at Chernobyl, Mayak, and Tomsk.


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