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4 Conclusions and Recommendations: Reinforcing Russian Capabilities to Protect Ionizing Radiation Sources
Pages 81-92

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From page 81...
... Groups that have experience in assembling and detonating conventional bombs should be able to readily acquire the skill to handle radioactive material used in IRSs and incorporate such material in dirty bombs. The disruption attendant to an RDD detonation could be widespread, particularly if it occurs outdoors in a densely populated urban area.
From page 82...
... At the same time, terrorist groups might try to smuggle IRSs or their radioactive components into the United States even though a variety of homeland security programs are in place to restrict penetration of U.S. borders.
From page 83...
... The task of securing even the most dangerous IRSs in Russia is daunting. For example, hundreds of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)
From page 84...
... All the while, DOE should evaluate the effectiveness of approaches that are being used and modify them, if appropriate, to help ensure that the greatest amount of threat reduction is being achieved for the money spent. Of particular concern to the committee is the end-of-lifecycle management of IRSs that are no longer wanted, including many that have been simply abandoned.
From page 85...
... 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THE NEED FOR AN OVERALL PLAN FOR THE COOPERATIVE PROGRAM The committee is deeply concerned about the continuing decline in DOE resources being allocated to the cooperative program. However, the committee is not in a position to recommend expansion of current activities or initiation of new activities in the absence of an overall DOE plan that clarifies how the cooperative program can be most effective in reducing risks attendant to inadequately protected IRSs.
From page 86...
... The Nuclear Regulatory Commission could be very helpful to the Russian government 1Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force.
From page 87...
... 2004. Radiation Protection in the Aftermath of a Terrorist Attack Involving Exposure to Ionizing Radiation.
From page 88...
... • The DOE cooperative program is an important asset, and in some cases DOE's efforts have encouraged parallel Russian activities beyond the cooperative program. • Both DOE and Rosatom have relied on the Nuclear Safety Institute (IBRAE)
From page 89...
... In conclusion, the United States is not the only country vitally concerned with developments in Russia. The Scandinavian countries have long had interests in replacing the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)
From page 90...
... Nevertheless, some IRSs may fall into the hands of terrorists, but security upgrades together with preparations for responding to inevitable incidents can greatly reduce the risks associated with radiological terrorism.
From page 91...
... Appendixes


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