U.S.-Russian Collaboration in Combating Radiological Terrorism (2007) / Chapter Skim
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The agency also reports numerous incidents of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials, including ionizing radiation sources (IRSs) used in medical, agricultural, and industrial applications.
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To guard against attacks in the United States, preventive measures are focused on securing inadequately controlled IRSs that are currently in the country. Unfortunately, hundreds of unwanted IRSs have not been under adequate control, but DOE, with the assistance of other federal and state agencies, has mounted an aggressive program to find, collect, and secure these orphan sources, and many have been brought under much better control.
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Additional IRSs are being manufactured at the Mayak Production Association and elsewhere in Russia for use in the country and for export. The task of adequately securing even the most dangerous IRSs in Russia is daunting.
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It could have global repercussions in terms of the safety and public acceptance of nuclear technologies, just as the Chernobyl accident affected the acceptance of nuclear power. An RDD attack in Russia or elsewhere could also undermine the credibility of the IAEA as an effective international organization for ensuring nuclear safety and security, at a time when the United States is firmly committed to strengthening this organization to deal with nuclear security and nonproliferation issues worldwide.
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However, the committee is not in a position to recommend expansion of current activities or initiation of new activities in the absence of an overall DOE plan that clarifies how the cooperative program can be most effective in reducing risks attendant to inadequately protected IRSs. Thus, a primary recommendation of the committee is that DOE develop a comprehensive plan to work with Russian counterparts to reduce the overall risk and consequences of radiological terrorism.
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In summary, only the Russian government can strengthen the many weaknesses in the security system for IRSs and in dealing with the overall threat of radiological terrorism in Russia. However, the committee believes that technical cooperation by DOE and other external partners, along with carefully selected financial investments in such cooperation, will help the Russian government focus on developing a more comprehensive approach to ensure adequate life-cycle management of IRSs than currently exists.
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Such leadership is highly significant in reducing the likelihood of radioactive materials in Russia finding their way into RDDs that are detonated in Russia or elsewhere. Expeditious implementation of the current cooperative program of quick security fixes, strong encouragement of the Russian government to carry out a comprehensive program for enhancing the security of IRSs, and development and implementation of an overall plan for U.S.-Russian cooperation that supports critical aspects of a comprehensive Russian program should be the hallmarks of U.S leadership.
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