Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

9 Discussion of Protecting Nuclear Facilities
Pages 77-84

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 77...
... It went through a phase of very rapid growth, followed by one of concerns about safety, and then a phase in which proliferation was the major concern; now it has entered a phase dominated by security concerns rising from terrorist threats. The nuclear industry has addressed these issues in various degrees at various times; perhaps it is the only industry where this is done, but Ramamurthy reminded the group that all new technologies go through these phases.
From page 78...
... Security considerations should be included from the beginning -- they cannot be retrofitted -- and security-related training is critical; the nuclear industry is a knowledgedriven industry and safe operation requires training. Nuclear safety-related training would be strengthened by international cooperation and an exchange of experience.
From page 79...
... Instead, we have found that a pilot project approach is useful, focusing on a single facility to begin with, building up mutual confidence in the cooperation, and then perhaps in the future, on the basis of mutually arrived at decisions, expanding into a wider array of facilities. Finally, the use of indigenous manufacturers and construction firms can speed cooperative projects and help sustain them.
From page 80...
... Rajagopal was not sure that a terrorist who looks for spectacular results and wants to create instantaneous panic and human loss would resort to a dirty bomb. As for a terrorist attack on a nuclear plant, what is important is a well-rehearsed emergency preparedness plan that considers the worst-case scenario, looking at wind direction, the radioactive transport mechanism, and so forth.
From page 81...
... Regarding the Sellafield facility in the United Kingdom, there are more than a thousand cubic meters of liquid fission products, containing 30 times as much cesium137 as did reactor number 4 at Chernobyl. Furthermore, although there is much less thermal driving force than in the fresh spent fuel within the reactor, if it is struck down, there is plenty of power generated to boil those tanks and to burst them or to evaporate the cesium-137.
From page 82...
... Finally, on the question of armed intruders versus other threats to nuclear reactors, Holdren elaborated that the threats involve permutations of combinations of intruders and insiders -- some might be entirely intruders and some might be entirely insiders. A case where there is someone already inside the reactor as part of the staff or as part of a maintenance contingent could very well do a great deal of damage if such a person were able to smuggle in explosives or were particularly knowledgeable about the plant.
From page 83...
... Rama Rao noted that rules can be as effective as laws, and in the current situation the loss of nuclear material would be treated as would a theft of any other material, punishable under law. Regarding defense research, threat perceptions are analyzed in depth and we have not had a grave incident, but this was not so for civilian facilities.
From page 84...
... Kumar Patel concluded the discussion by observing that while there are broad differences of opinion on the real threats to nuclear power plants and nuclear facilities, one significant incident could have enormous social and physical consequences; there would be nuclear fallout, but also societal fallout, which may make nuclear power plants undesirable all over the world. This is a very significant issue and requires greater thought.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.