The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships (2007) / Chapter Skim
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1 Security Context for the Biological Threat Reduction Program
1 Security Context for the Biological Threat Reduction Program
Pages 15-26
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From page 15... ...
The following recent incidents suggest that these warnings and preparations must be taken seriously: • Anthrax letters disseminated in the United States in 2001 • Plans for bioterrorism set forth in documents recovered from al Qaeda training camps in 20011 • The discovery of "makeshift ricin laboratories" in the Pankisi Gorge adjacent to Chechnya and a "do-it-yourself guidance sheet" on how to make ricin found in the possession of a killed Chechen insurgent in 20032 • An investigation launched in 2007 by the Procurator's office in Moscow of alleged unsuccessful efforts to attack a large suburban chicken marketplace by introducing chickens affected with avian influenza virus, which would cause the market to close and business to shift to a competing marketplace3 • An attempted theft targeted at the pathogen collection at the central reference laboratory for animal health in Indonesia in May 2007 that was thwarted by security systems installed by the U.S. government4 As indicated in these examples, the infrastructure required to support a biological terrorism attack is strikingly smaller than the facilities and personnel resources that were developed to support biological warfare capabilities during the Cold War.
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From page 16... ...
One way to understand -- and perhaps even alter -- nefarious intentions regarding the misuse of biological agents is through development of close personal working relationships between American and counterpart scientists abroad, which introduce considerable transparency into scientific activities. Also, international projects can improve our understanding of foreign environments that might attract irresponsible groups seeking to misuse biological assets.
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From page 17... ...
In particular, adjusting former Soviet defense activities to meet Russian regulatory requirements for the development of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics -- the most likely products that would come from redirected activities in the biological weapons sector -- was inhibited by a tradition of secrecy and exemption of defense activities from civilian oversight. In time, leaders of Biopreparat facilities and some of their Russian partners within the civilian sector became interested in cooperative activities with American counterparts.
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From page 18... ...
Since that time, a great deal of transparency has been introduced at facilities of the former Soviet weapons program through collaborative projects. More than a dozen key laboratories and production facilities of the Biopreparat complex that participated in BTRP are now largely open and redirected to peaceful purposes.
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From page 19... ...
The Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology has established several competitive grants programs that support research on infectious diseases as well as on other topics. The Russian Academy of Sciences, despite harsh criticism by the government for failure to use its resources wisely, contends that it has retained its status as a strong advocate of increased funding for research.9 Overall, collaborative efforts have contributed significantly to upgrading biological research and biotechnology development in Russia and to building scientist-toscientist relationships across the oceans.
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From page 20... ...
In Kazakhstan and in a number of other regions, a network of anti-plague stations had been established that provided support for research on locally occurring disease agents that were considered relevant to developing biological weapons as well as being of local public health interest. These stations are still operating with civilian-oriented research and surveillance agendas.10 In addition, a number of civilian-oriented biological research institutes throughout the USSR carried out special biological research projects under contract with the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and most if not all of these institutes are believed to have also redirected such efforts to peaceful pursuits.
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From page 21... ...
In short, the scientific infrastructures in all of the countries need upgrading.11 Biological Risk in Other Countries of Concern While this study did not address in depth facilities outside the FSU, committee members are aware of poor security conditions at some facilities in other regions of the world that handle dangerous pathogens. Their impressions concerning the lack of adequate security at facilities throughout South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are consistent with reports to the committee by U.S.
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From page 22... ...
Nevertheless, serious security deficiencies remain in many facilities where dangerous pathogens are used or stored. Thus, national security considerations for international scientific engagement remain strong even as the economies slowly recover.
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From page 23... ...
Of course, the selection of facilities that should receive priority attention for cooperative activities should and will be greatly influenced by the views of partner governments, which will have their own criteria for establishing priorities. In any event, considerable care should be given to the selection of organizations, facilities, and specialists.
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From page 24... ...
For example, interactions with political leaders that usually characterize high profile biological engagement activities may set an important tone for subsequent national and international dialogues on the prevention of proliferation of biological weapons. Also, cooperative activities usually build good will among important segments of societies, particularly if they enable partner countries to use high-technology achievements (see, for example, Box 1-5)
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From page 25... ...
Achieving this objective can be enhanced by establishing modern disease detection, surveillance, and information systems; improving capabilities to respond to disease outbreaks; and establishing biological forensic capabilities. Improving capabilities to counter threats of biological terrorism will also enhance public health and animal disease prevention and control programs in dealing with naturally occurring diseases.
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From page 26... ...
The U.S. government has done much good in supporting science, improving scientific methods in the region, providing a wide breadth of training, improving communication networks from telephones and computers to highspeed Internet access and subscriptions to international journals.
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