The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships (2007) / Chapter Skim
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4 Overcoming Obstacles Confronting the Biological Threat Reduction Program
4 Overcoming Obstacles Confronting the Biological Threat Reduction Program
Pages 57-66
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From page 57... ...
DOD's mistrust of dual-use activities of former Soviet weapon scientists, hesitancy of the Russian government to make special arrangements for American project monitors to have continuing access to sensitive high-hazard areas, and difficulties in recruiting wellqualified American collaborators willing to spend extended periods of time in Russia have all contributed to a sense of unease within DOD over the potential risks of Russian misuse of research results. This unease has led to bureaucratic delays within DOD in processing and reviewing research applications, with spans of many months and even years passing before BTRP has provided feedback to important Russian and American scientists who have prepared proposals with the encouragement of BTRP.
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From page 58... ...
Commercialization programs are an important approach to this end, but other strategies for long-term support of basic research also deserve high priority. Box 4-1 From Redirection to Sustainability in Russia "The job of redirecting former weapon scientists to peaceful pursuits is completed, and new cooperative efforts should focus on sustainability and commercialization strategies." Russian government spokesman, March 2007.
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From page 59... ...
Designing surveillance systems and establishing research projects that reflect priority interests of both partner governments and BTRP may not be an easy task, but in the long term common priorities will be the key to sustainability. Unfortunately, this reality has not guided the preparation of BTRP's country science plans, the design of the TADR network, or the content of the Cooperative Biological Research program.
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From page 60... ...
Indeed, greater involvement of local universities and particularly graduate students would also be a healthy development, particularly since many will have dual-use skills that could become a future concern unless they are committed to peaceful and transparent activities. Use of the Field Epidemiology Training Program of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or an analogous program for new entrants into the field should be considered.
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From page 61... ...
, but the primary criteria in selecting scientists for engagement should be two-fold: their potential dual-use capabilities and/or their contributions in strengthening the scientific, public health, and agriculture infrastructures for addressing infectious diseases in their countries. Box 4-4 Importance of Weapon Scientists "Scientists with many years of experience working with the most dangerous pathogens can certainly create greater problems if they were to decide, or were forced, to use this experience elsewhere, say in countries governed by regimes with questionable track records.
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From page 62... ...
Among the metrics that have been used by BTRP in the past are • number of weapon scientists involved, including the number trained • number of sustainable jobs created • level of matching contributions by cooperating governments or other partners • follow-on contracts resulting from research projects • number of publications in internationally recognized journals • number of patents that have been awarded • number of research products that have reached the market • number of companies that have been spawned These indicators are important but do not go to the essence of the program, namely, "To what extent has the likelihood of outbreaks of endemic and emerging diseases and the associated terrorist aspects been reduced? " A related concern is the timeliness, adequacy, and quality of responses to outbreaks should they occur.
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From page 63... ...
The lengthy separation between the policy officials who designed the tasks in the first instance and the implementers has caused difficult program situations. Instructions and decisions from senior DOD officials are often delayed as they go through the lengthy internal process.
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From page 64... ...
A related concern is the inadequate cultural sensitivity of specialists sent abroad under BTRP. In order to improve this sensitivity, BTRP should have a program of staff training and training for contractors and American collaborators that emphasizes the unique challenges of operating in the former Soviet Union or in other areas where BTRP becomes active.
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From page 65... ...
Civilian Research & Development Foundation have stronger scientific reputations and considerable experience in providing technical advice and establishing well-accepted mechanisms for transferring funding to partner institutions and to specialists for salaries, laboratory supplies, and research equipment in the former Soviet Union. Also, a number of research components of DOD are highly respected internationally for their scientific expertise, in contrast to integrating contractors, who do not have comparable scientific credentials.
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