Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities (2007) / Chapter Skim
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IV. Biosecurity and Dual-Use Research in the Life Sciences
IV. Biosecurity and Dual-Use Research in the Life Sciences
Pages 57-68
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From page 57... ...
The dual-use research dilemma in the life sciences refers to the conundrum of producing and publishing research within the life sciences that is directed toward or intended to improve public health, animal health, or agricultural productivity, but that in the hands of a rogue state, terrorist group, or individual, could be used to impair public health. As early as the 18th century, greater understanding of the smallpox virus led to the first viral vaccine, as well as use of the virus as a bioweapon.66 In the wake of the anthrax attacks of 2001 and heightened concerns regarding terrorism, the more tangible possibility of bioterrorism has increased fears and concerns regarding the performance and publication of dual-use research.
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From page 58... ...
In addition, life sciences research occurs in an increasingly interdisciplinary and international environment. As George Church, Director of the Center for Computational Genetics at the Harvard Medical Center, pointed out at the May 2006 regional meeting, "Biology has a thousand journals and the Internet allows rapid information dispersion."70 Just as computing and other technological innovations have created new industries and sectors toward the end of the 20th century and during the early part of the 21st, technology also has pushed the boundaries of the life sciences.
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From page 59... ...
Discussions of oversight for dual-use life sciences research have centered on the same components as those considered 30 years ago for recombinant DNA. In 2003 the National Academies published Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, also referred to as the "Fink Report," after the committee chair, Gerald Fink.
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was chartered by the Executive Office of the President "to provide advice, guidance and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual-use research, defined as biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national security."72 The board was formed to serve in an advisory capacity to the "secretary of HHS, the director of NIH, and the heads of all federal agencies and departments that conduct or support life sciences research."73 In addition to the voting members, the board includes ex officio representatives from each of the 71 National Research Council.
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From page 61... ...
education of institutions and individuals regarding dualuse research. Nearly all presenters addressing the dual-use dilemma at the regional meetings stressed that life sciences research is now nearly borderless and is a global collaborative activity.
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For example, at the May 2006 regional meeting, George Church proposed surveillance measures, in synthetic biology, "of the whole stream of chemicals from precursors, which are unique to oligonucleotides, to synthetic genes to instruments that employ these, to even experts in the field."79 At their 2006 meeting, Synthetic Biology 2.0, synthetic biologists were offered a draft "community declaration" regarding the ethical use of synthetic biology and the governance of synthetic biology research as it relates to the threat of bioterrorism. This proposal for self-governance would have been consistent with the "culture of responsibility" that NSABB is urging the life sciences community to develop, and it also might have had the effect of staving off "attempts to set controls or limits on the field."80 Draft Joint BBSRC, MRC and Wellcome Trust policy statement," September 2005; InterAcademy Panel.
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2006. Remarks made at the Committee on a New Government-University Partnership for Science and Security Southeast Regional Meeting at the Georgia Institute of Technology.
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In June 2005, an article appeared in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that modeled a bioterrorist attack on the milk supply of the United States.83 In October 2005, Science published the reconstructed genome of the 1918 pandemic human influenza virus.84 While some argued that publishing these data was irresponsible, the prevailing view among many scientists appearing before the committee was that, generally, the risk of bioterrorism is far outweighed by the benefit of further scientific work based upon openly disseminated information and also that open dissemination, in virtually all cases, is best for national security as well.85 The reasoning is that the ability to further the scientific frontier is based upon knowledge of where the frontier lies. Obscuring the scientific frontier could limit the progress of the scientific enterprise as a whole and perhaps would limit the abilities of terrorists very little, if at all.86 It has been acknowledged, however, that there may be cases in which open publication of research would not be in the best interest of national security and, therefore, some form of restriction would be needed.
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From page 65... ...
The Fink Report suggested that the IBCs also should monitor institutional biosecurity issues. Critics have argued that IBCs are not properly trained to oversee biosecurity issues and are already overburdened with tasks.
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The history of U.S. biosafety oversight of life sciences and biotechnology research hinges on self-governance by researchers and on local risk-based oversight.
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Summary and Recommendations The international nature of science, scientific talent, and possible security threats requires a common international approach to overseeing policies pertaining to dual-use life sciences research. As recommended in the 2004 NAS report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, a mechanism is needed to "develop and promote harmonized national, regional, and international measures."93 Recommendation 8: Taking full advantage of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's international work, as well as that being undertaken by other Department of Health and Human Services agencies, the U.S.
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the research to be funded has been reviewed by the committee prior to commencement of the experiments. This is not dissimilar to the process for ensuring local review of research involving animals or human subjects.
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