Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System (2012) / Chapter Skim
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3 Physical Security Considerations for Electric Power Systems
3 Physical Security Considerations for Electric Power Systems
Pages 32-37
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From page 32... ...
locations of many transmission power lines, substations, Potential terrorist attacks against electric power systems communications facilities, or natural gas supplies to geninclude sabotage; physical assault; disruption of sensors, erating facilities allow attackers to conduct their operations information systems, and computer networks; tampering with little or no risk of detection. Selecting points for attack with process safety; disruption of fail-safe systems; and and estimating the consequences are within the capability indirect attacks such as disruption of water, fuel, or key of technically trained individuals in the terrorist community.
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From page 33... ...
However, the power industry is not capable of reliable performance if major components are severely damaged on a widespread basis by deliberately planned terrorist acts or natural phenomena. Transmission Substations Virtually no utilities are equipped or staffed to mitigate the consequences of multiple attacks against major critical com- Bulk Transmission Substations have unique security ponents or from widespread impacts of natural phenomena concerns in that they are relatively soft targets; they are vullike Hurricane Katrina.
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From page 34... ...
measures and conditions to the control center staff. Major Contingency plans, security awareness training, and disturbances often require quick decisions and reactions on timely threat briefings for key personnel have proven the part of the staff to prevent widespread outages.
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From page 35... ...
components has eroded and moved offshore over the past 30 Highly critical facilities require perimeter protection years, and is not likely to return without government action systems -- including cameras, sensors, intrusion devices, to bring manufacture of critical equipment back to the United access controls, lighting, fencing, buffer zone security, and States. Chapter 8 elaborates further on system restoration so on -- that are specifically tailored to the substation environ- and the need for a critical parts inventory, particularly power ment described in Box 3.1.
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From page 36... ...
Planners must realize that no matter Provide Protection Against Current how well protection plans for critical infrastructure perform, Terrorist Threats when the day of emergency arrives, all of those infrastructure · U tility coordination and information exchange assets are dependent on electric energy. programs in place at the North American Electric A new dimension of "national security reliability" is being Reliability Council and the Edison Electric Institute used in the planning for reliability of the electric power · Development of new risk assessment methodologies industry.
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From page 37... ...
· Planning for exercise/implementation of defensive · Substations are the most critical choke points, fol operations during heightened alert periods lowed by control centers. For these facilities there is a need to develop specific physical security equipment such as cameras, sensors, intrusion devices, access controls, improved lighting and perimeter security CONCLUSIONS fencing, buffer zone security, and surveillance of approaches, as well as a greater human presence and · While the electric power transmission and distri- upgrades in protection force training and response, bution systems are resilient and are designed for all of which would be used to decrease vulnerability.
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