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1 The Electric Transmission and Distribution System as a Terrorist Targetwith
Pages 7-19

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From page 7...
... have briefly raised pub- began to connect individual high-voltage systems together lic concern about potential vulnerabilities, but to date such so that power could be moved from region to region, both to concerns have rapidly disappeared once power is restored. promote economic efficiency and to increase reliability by Power outages caused by damage to the distribution system, making it possible to move power into regions suffering from the lower voltage lines that carry power to customers, are temporary shortages.
From page 8...
... demands on limited locations, outages may stretch on for weeks. As the the system to move power between sellers and buyers in new duration and geographic extent of an outage increase, people competitive power markets in greater volume and in ways in become seriously inconvenienced, and economic and other which the system was not designed to operate.2 costs rise, but people generally do not experience "terror." Figures 1.1a and 1.1b show the trend in two common Keeping power flowing to customers is a continuous pro- measures of power supply disruption in the United States cess of control, recovery, and repair.
From page 9...
... in other parts of Most problematic are terrorist groups with significant the system, which in turn cause additional problems that may technical capabilities and resources who want to kill large ultimately result in a cascading power failure. The fact that numbers of people or cause widespread societal or economic the power system uses alternating current (AC)
From page 10...
... Hackers and Other Nonterrorist Individuals and Groups Terrorist attacks probably would involve physical destruction of key system facilities. However, a combined cyber Terrorist attacks are the main focus of this report, but other attack and physical attack could be especially serious, par- types of attackers are also relevant.
From page 11...
... The solid line is a power law fit to the FIGURE 1.5 Annual number of transmission loading relief events NERC data over 500 MW loss. SOURCE: Data compiled by NERC since 1997.
From page 12...
... that move power from generators to loads, AC power transmission and distribution systems are more accurately thought of in terms of a series of coil springs of varying stiffness through which power is transmitted by twisting (below)
From page 13...
... 1998 to 2001 Western and midwestern United Rotating blackouts in several markets because of summer prices States December 1998 San Francisco Power to 0.5 million affected 1999 Brazil 24.5 GW of load lost short-circuit 440 KV Busbar 1999 Denmark Power to 100,000 customers interrupted by a hurricane 1999 France Power to 3.6 million customers interrupted by storms 1999 Taiwan Entire country affected by transmission tower collapse due to earthquake July 1999 New York City Power to 300,000 customers interrupted for 19 hours 2000 Portugal Power to 5 million customers interrupted by failure of protection system 2001 Nigeria Power to 20 million to 50 million customers affected 2002 Argentina Power to 2 million customers interrupted by damaged cables 2002 Colombia One-third of country affected by rebel attacks continued
From page 14...
... 2004 Florida, Alabama Power to 5 million customers interrupted by Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne over a 6-week period 2004 Kyushu, Japan Power to 1 million customers interrupted by typhoon July 12, 2004 Southern Greece Voltage instability as a result of high power transfers into Greece; operator initiated load shedding unable to prevent voltage collapse; blackout a cause of additional concern due to proximity to 2004 Olympic games 2005 Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Power to 2.2 million customers interrupted by Hurricane Katrina Mississippi 2005 Moscow Power to 1.5 million to 2 million customers interrupted by explosion and fire at substation May 24, 2005 Moscow Power to 4 million customers (2,500 MW) interrupted September 12, 2005 Los Angeles Large portion of city lost power because error in substation tripped several circuit breakers tive generators to trip off the system, or perhaps even cause In a few cases, such as in Baghdad, successful attacks physical damage.
From page 15...
... Individual power companies, facilities as part of a broader campaign to bring down the as well as reliability organizations and trade and research central government in Bangkok. Many parts of Africa have organizations, have also conducted detailed power system also witnessed such attacks.
From page 16...
... Since those disruptions have Loss of power can have profound impacts on other criti entailed economic impacts approaching 10 billion dollars, cal infrastructures, as illustrated in an analysis by Chang et it appears possible that terrorist attacks could lead to costs al.
From page 17...
... includes provisions to strengthen the system the Electric Reliability Organization to develop and enforce and make temporary improvements permanent. Under autho- reliability standards for the bulk transmission system.
From page 18...
... In ignore the possibility of an attack that turns off the addition, EPAct includes measures that should encourage the power before staging a large conventional terrorist construction of new transmission lines and the development event, thus amplifying the latter's consequences. Nor of new technologies to improve the efficiency and reliability should the possibility of a series of attacks designed of the power grid, steps that should also provide increased to do major damage to the economy and to the pubresistance to terrorist attacks.
From page 19...
... 2005. "Regional Economic Impacts "Short and Intermediate Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Initiated Loss of Terrorist Attacks on the Electric Power System of Los Angeles: A of Electric Power: Case Study of New Jersey." Energy Policy 35(1)


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