Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering A Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air Force Systems Acquisition (2008) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
2 Relationship Between Systems Engineering and Program Outcome
2 Relationship Between Systems Engineering and Program Outcome
Pages 26-51
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 26... ...
This chapter discusses the development h istory of a variety of past and ongoing programs, emphasizing the role of SE during pre-Milestone A and Milestone A-to-Milestone B time frames and deriving key lessons from the program outcomes. The committee observed that programs which were successful in constructing a sound requirements baseline and financial/acquisition plan through the pre-Milestone A and Milestone A-to-Milestone B phase, using sound systems engineering processes, could succeed or fail.
|
From page 27... ...
It does not guarantee successful acquisition if poor decisions are made in source selection or during system design and development (SDD)
|
From page 28... ...
, • Future Combat Systems (FCS) , • F-16 Fighting Falcon, • Turbine engine development: fighter jet engine, • Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM)
|
From page 29... ...
Since that time, numerous schedule slips and cost overruns have been announced, and the first launch is now scheduled for 2009. During the SBIRS briefing to the committee, the presenter said that the program's minimum goal is to produce a first flight article that is "at least somewhat better" than DSP. The SBIRS program has received much attention due to program execution issues.
|
From page 30... ...
However, since the issues of technology readiness, acquisition process, and requirements stability have been dealt with thoroughly in prior reviews of the SBIRS Program, the committee focuses here on the software issues, which have been overlooked elsewhere. The SBIRS Program represented a several-fold increase in the scope and scale of flight software relative to earlier Air Force programs and a manyfold increase over legacy systems in the SBIRS mission area.
|
From page 31... ...
This increased contact between the disciplines of systems engineering and software engineering will allow early input into the requirements allocation process and trade space analysis by informed software specialists, thereby avoiding the later program execution pitfalls that result from having expected all of the hard problems to be handled by the software. Specifically, the lessons learned from the SBIRS Program are being taken to heart in several more recent programs.
|
From page 32... ...
A symptom of the flawed acquisition approach was the abrogation of government accountability for many of the pre-Milestone A systems engineering processes and products. Some acquisition reform initiatives (many in the Air Force directed under the heading of "Lightning Bolts")
|
From page 33... ...
Ingols and L Brem, 1998, Implementing Acquisition Reform: A Case Study on Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)
|
From page 34... ...
It is literally a "system of systems of systems." Figure 2-2, from an Army briefing on FCS to the National Defense Industries Association, illustrates this complexity. The overarching objective of the program is to develop a lighter, more lethal force that could be deployed far more rapidly than the heavy forces that are a major proportion of the Army force structure today.
|
From page 35... ...
Bassett, and M Schnaidt, "The Net-Centric Foxhole: Perspectives from Army Future Combat Systems," presentation, October 25, 2006.
|
From page 36... ...
As a result, the Secretary of the Army ordered that the program be restructured into the DOD-approved milestone process. Systems Engineering Lessons The FCS Program violates many of the precepts that the committee believes are important to success in the conventional system-development process.
|
From page 37... ...
It is an LSI-managed procurement in which an LSI contractor (distinct from the development contractors) oversees the entire system engineering process.
|
From page 38... ...
It is worth noting that going beyond the original air superiority intentions of its parents, the Air Force acquired the F-16 as a dual-role air-to air and air-to-ground fighter-bomber. By acquiring it, the Air Force intended to *
|
From page 39... ...
Systems Engineering Lessons The F-16 featured many innovations in the application of engineering and management concepts, but fundamentally the advantages that this aircraft p ossesses reflect the shrewd application of available technology. Planners with extensive domain expertise were able to anticipate future warfighting environments, understand the systems acquisition process, and comprehend the state of technology to meet the needs.
|
From page 40... ...
, on case studies conducted on a series of Air Force fighter jet engine systems. Consistent with the bilateral agreement between the major American aerospace manufacturer and MIT, the manufacturer is anonymous and the engine systems studied are given the aliases "EG10‑1," "EG10-2," and so on, collectively called the EG10 engine family.
|
From page 41... ...
These tools were captured in the transition from sequential engineering to concurrent engineering in the design and manufacture of jet engines. The history of the fighter engine development programs shows that designing early for sustainment and performance results in more affordable and agile life cycle options, and a greater flexibility for technical upgrades throughout the operational lifetime of a system.
|
From page 42... ...
Each of the satellite systems, while being headquartered at the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center, had its own user community, its own program director, program office, budget, schedule, and so on. In recent years, a combination of increasing integration of military operations and a dramatic Air Force drawdown of technical and program management
|
From page 43... ...
. The MJPO has taken several measures to reduce program risks and increase the probability of success in delivering MILSATCOM capabilities.
|
From page 44... ...
When the commercial S ATCOM demand did not continue to grow, and in fact declined precipitously, the WGS prime contractor suffered substantial overruns on its FFP contract. System Engineering Lessons For the MILSATCOM Program to have been helped early by better systems engineering, each of the component elements would have needed to have been conceived in response to requirements from a consistent and coordinated set of users, advocated and funded by the same organization, and acquired, tested, and fielded in a coordinated way by an integrated program office.
|
From page 45... ...
By employing traditional systems engineering processes at the system of systems level, MJPO is able to reduce surprises and limit unintended consequences of individual program decisions and at the same time to gain an integrated view of gaps and overlaps among the product lines. The implementation and successful execution of such a systems-of-systems approach require leadership, experienced personnel, communication, and the willingness to make difficult trade-off decisions that affect individual program optimization.
|
From page 46... ...
During the source selection, the Air Force convinced Lockheed to put the aircraft weight empty into its specification as a performance requirement equivalent to range and payload and other performance parameters. Then the Air Force put a financial penalty into the contract in the event that the contractor's aircraft weight exceeded the specification value, and Lockheed signed this contract.
|
From page 47... ...
The point of failure on the C-5A Program occurred during source selection and was the result of poor application of the systems engineering process by both Lockheed and the Air Force during source selection after Milestone B Because of the actions taken by the program participants, the program was doomed to failure from the first day of the contract.
|
From page 48... ...
The design review showed that the aircraft had insufficient control power and structural rigidity to damp structural loads while providing the required maneuvering margins in the presence of turbulence. The integrated design team, led by Northrop Grumman and including the major subcontractors, Boeing and Vought, and the Air Force customer, completed the redesign in 4 months and received approval for the new changes through the company and the Air Force management structure in 3 months.
|
From page 49... ...
Systems Engineering Lessons The B-2 case study illustrates that even when the early systems engineering process is done well, the acquisition process is fraught with peril because of the unknowns and complications that arise in any program. However, from the case studies and from listening to the testimony of the briefers, it is clear that program offices and industry teams staffed with domain experts equipped to handle technical and programmatic difficulties are best suited to respond quickly and effectively to the problems when they arise.
|
From page 50... ...
A typical program execution team has a program manager (PM) -level SE integration team (SEIT)
|
From page 51... ...
It is crucial for programs currently being formulated or beginning the acquisition process, TSAT and Space Radar being cases in point, that these lessons be applied early. It is incumbent on senior operational and acquisition leadership to enforce the discipline implied by these findings and shared lessons.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.