Improving Democracy Assistance Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research (2008) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix C: Measuring Democracy
Appendix C: Measuring Democracy
Pages 259-284
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From page 259... ...
The second section contains the agenda and participants list for a committee workshop, "Democracy Indicators for Democracy Assistance," held at Boston University in January 2007. The last section is an "Outline for a Disaggregated Meso-level Democracy Index" by John Gerring, which contains additional material related to the index proposed in Chapter 3.
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From page 260... ...
Correlation of First Differences The average correlation coefficients for the first differences in the group of "Partially Free" countries are low for the Former Soviet Union and the Middle East (Table C-1)
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From page 261... ...
TABLE C-1 "Partially Free" Countries (Polity Scores -5 to +7) -- Correlations with FH Scores Spearman Correlation Pearson Rank Coefficient Number of Correlation Order for First Country Observations Years Coefficient Coefficient Differences Asia Cambodia 21 1972-1978; 0.32810 0.3453*
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From page 262... ...
262 APPENDIX C TABLE C-1 Continued Spearman Correlation Pearson Rank Coefficient Number of Correlation Order for First Country Observations Years Coefficient Coefficient Differences Russia 11 1992-2002 –0.77130 -0.7287 -0.5188 Tajikistan 11 1992-2002 0.75710 0.7944 0.1320 Ukraine 11 1992-2002 –0.33440 –0.3015* 0.0891 Average 0.29550 0.347211 0.148 Variance 0.34806 0.317729 0.16145 Standard deviation 0.58997 0.563674 0.40181 Middle East Afghanistan 24 1972-2002 0.18320 0.2388*
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From page 263... ...
APPENDIX C 263 TABLE C-1 Continued Spearman Correlation Pearson Rank Coefficient Number of Correlation Order for First Country Observations Years Coefficient Coefficient Differences Nicaragua 31 1972-2002 0.69900 0.7018 0.7508 Panama 31 1972-2002 0.78820 0.8845 –0.2525 Paraguay 31 1972-2002 0.93820 0.8731 0.8007 Peru 31 1972-2002 0.90660 0.8867 0.6885 Average 0.74430 0.656363 0.5409211 Variance 0.04356 0.046605 0.08946278 Standard deviation 0.20870 0.215881 0.2991033 European Union Turkey 31 1972-2002 0.45220 0.6856 0.5807 Spain 31 1972-2002 0.97670 0.8546 0.5638 Greece 31 1972-2002 0.89570 0.1609* 0.6981 Macedonia 11 1992-2002 0.37300 0.3924*
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From page 264... ...
Coefficient is not significant at 5 percent significance level.
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From page 265... ...
-- Correlations with FH Scores Number of Correlation Correlation for Country Observations Years Coefficient First Differences China 31 1972-2002 0.34910 –0.0113 Burma 31 1972-2002 0.53420 0.3216 USSR 20 1972-1991 0.84570 0.7358 Bahrain 31 1972-2002 –0.12800 0.3623 Iraq 31 1972-2002 –0.06930 0.4152 Kuwait 30 1972-1989; 0.39630 0.8575 1991-2002 Morocco 31 1972-2002 –0.18060 0.4120 Oman 31 1972-2002 0.57210 –0.0496 Syria 31 1972-2002 –0.25580 0.0000 Yemen South 18 1972-1989 –0.78260 –0.4123 Eritrea 10 1993-2002 0.77170 0.3500 Mauritania 31 1972-2002 0.33160 –0.0197 Swaziland 31 1972-2002 0.78380 0.8647 Congo Kinshasa 20 1972-1991 0.66670 0.3294 Average 0.27392 0.296829 Variance 0.234796 0.136285 Standard deviation 0.484558 0.369168
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From page 266... ...
Particular focus on Polity, Freedom House (with its newly released subcomponents) , and the new (somewhat disaggregated)
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From page 267... ...
Agency for International Notre Dame University Development John Gerring Frederic Schaffer Boston University Harvard University Andrew Green Richard Snyder Georgetown University Brown University Rita Guenther Paul Stern National Academies National Academies Jo Husbands Nicolas van de Walle National Academies Cornell University
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From page 268... ...
10. Leadership Turnover: Is there regular turnover in the top political leadership?
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From page 269... ...
, or interval. In certain cases, it may be possible to combine separate components into more aggregated nominal scales without losing information (Coppedge and Reinicke 1990)
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From page 270... ...
public perceptions are not the most valid test of a country's level of democracy, even where civil liberties are ensured. (On the latter point, one might consider Mexico's recent election, which many members of the public thought was highly flawed, but which outside observers seem to think was conducted with considerable fairness.)
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From page 271... ...
As noted, contemporary codings are likely to be associated with lower levels of uncertainty than the analogous historical codings, and countries about which much is known (e.g., France) will be associated with lower levels of uncertainty than countries about which very little is known (e.g., Central African Republic)
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From page 272... ...
For all these reasons, we think it unlikely that any new index would displace Freedom House, Polity, and ACLP unless it can match the historical coverage of these well-established indices. Summary Scores For each dimension, a summary score will be suggested.
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From page 273... ...
Extensive discussion and cross-validation will be conducted at all levels, including intercoder reliability tests. We strongly advise an open and transparent system of commentary on the scores that are proposed for each country, after initial questionnaires are completed by country experts but before results are finalized.
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From page 274... ...
One of the principal claims of this index is that greater intercoder reliability will be achieved when the concept of democracy is disaggregated. This claim may be probed through intercoder reliability tests across the leading democracy indices.
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From page 275... ...
10. Leadership Turnover: Is there regular turnover in the top political leadership?
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From page 276... ...
Note: Civil liberties issues pertaining specifically to elections are covered in later sections. Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the major media (print, broadcast, Internet)
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From page 277... ...
Note: this section pertains to the polity as a whole, while some other questions listed below pertain to particular sections of the polity (e.g., election administration)
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From page 278... ...
? The legislature Is the executive able to control the legislature by undemocratic means (e.g., by manipulating legislative elections, by proroguing the legislature, by buying votes in the legislature)
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From page 279... ...
? Integrity of the vote Are all viable political parties and candidates granted access to the ballot (without unduly burdensome qualification requirements)
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How many polling stations (percent) were attended by election monitors (other than those representing the ruling party or clique)
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From page 281... ...
10. Leadership Turnover General question: Is there regular turnover in the top political leadership?
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From page 282... ...
What percent of citizens regularly listen to or read the national news? Are civil society organizations generally independent of direct government influence (or are they manipulated by the government and its allies such that they do not exercise an independent voice)
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From page 283... ...
? Do parties hold regular conventions and, if so, are these conventions sovereign (in the sense of making final decisions on party polity and procedure)
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From page 284... ...
2006. Standards for Evaluating Electoral Processes by OAS Election Observa tion Missions.
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