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1 Introduction
Pages 6-10

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From page 6...
... nology will augment not only defensive measures but also A decade ago, experts both inside and outside government offensive biological warfare (BW) agent development and argued for a strategic, collaborative, and integrated approach allow the creation of advanced biological agents designed to to risk assessment and risk management among federal, state, target specific systems -- human, animal, or crop" (National and local governments, law enforcement, the military, the Intelligence Council, 2004, p.
From page 7...
... House Homeland Security Council, the Department of To address its charge, the committee carried out the folHealth and Human Services, various offices of the Depart- lowing activities: ment of Homeland Security, the Department of Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency -- the BTRA of • It held four 2-day meetings at the National Academies 2006 was designed to produce assessments in the form of in Washington, D.C., in August and November 2006 risk-prioritized groups of biological threat agents. These and in January and May 2007, used for information prioritized lists could then be used to identify gaps or vul- gathering and report organization and writing; nerabilities in the nation's biodefense posture and to make • It heard and discussed presentations from government, recommendations for rebalancing and refining investments academic, and medical experts; in overall U.S.
From page 8...
... The committee agreed that other major components of the existing methodology, proba- work planned by DHS for FY 2007, notably in improving bilistic risk analysis and multi-attribute risk analysis the elicitation of information from subject-matter experts and and which could guide DHS's future developments; improving the modeling of consequences, was of value, and • To assess the feasibility of incorporating models of so it did not believe that a wholesale course correction was second-order economic effects into the methodology needed in FY 2007. during FY 2007; • To identify better methods, if any, for handling the high OVERVIEW OF THE FINAL REPORT degrees of uncertainty associated with the risk analyses AND OF ITS RECOMMENDED of biological agents; METHODOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS • To recommend near-term improvements to enhance the transparency of the method and its usefulness to Structure of the BTRA of 2006 Examined decision-makers; • To discuss how the methodology could be extended As indicated above, it was only after the issuance of its to risks associated with classes of agents, including interim report that the committee was provided with a copy enhanced or engineered agents that have yet to be of the DHS (2006)
From page 9...
... This scenario, involving measures that are informed by risk analysis, including an aerosol anthrax attack in a highly populated U.S. city, be- assessment of social, psychological, direct, and indirect gins with a single aerosol anthrax attack delivered by a truck economic impacts, and should apply such measures in using a concealed improvised spraying device in one densely a manner that consciously seeks to avoid unintended populated urban city with a significant commuter workforce.
From page 10...
... Biological Threat Characterization Center of the National Biodeuncertainty analysis and use of expected values, and poorly fense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. Fort Detrick, Md.


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