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Appendix D: Bioterrorism Risk Analysis with Decision Trees
Pages 85-89

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From page 85...
... its own software instead of usually commercially available software to perform the event tree analysis. Due to the MANY BTRA MODELING ALTERNATIVES EXIST complexity, the BTRA model runs in days and requires special software and specially trained analysts to perform Several risk analysis modeling decisions must be made the analysis.
From page 86...
... FIGURE D.1  BTRA modeling alternatives. This figure provides a bioterrorism risk assessment modeling alternative generation table (Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson, 2008)
From page 87...
... validated models Black box with Multiple attacks Probability Combined with unvalidated, un Weeks in an unspeci- Game theory models distributions on Psychological multiattribute verified, and unac fied time period probabilities utility function credited models Distributed mod eling using best Months Not applicable Attacker-defender models Not applicable Environmental Not applicable available national models FIGURE D.2  BTRA modeling using decision analysis. This figure provides an alternative generation table developed in Figure D.1.
From page 88...
... we added the consequence model to the decision tree as THE BIOTERRORIST DECISION MODEL CAN the end node. In decision analysis software, this would be PROVIDE RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS implemented using an equation in the end node that uses AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS scenario parameters common to all agents and parameters The decision analysis model that we have described (agent decision and chance node outcomes)
From page 89...
... Value THE BIOTERRORIST DECISION MODEL of information calculations can be performed to find out what EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSES THE FUNDAMENTAL uncertainties have the most impact on the agent risk. CONCERNS OF THE BTRA OF 2006 In the introduction we listed the most fundamental conTHE BIOTERRORIST DECISION MODEL ALSO cerns with the 2006 BTRA methodology: not considering SUPPORTS RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING intelligent adversary decision making, huge data demands, So far we have focused on the use of decision analysis as more complexity than the available data support, lack of a modeling framework to support bioterrorism risk assess- transparency for decision makers/stakeholders (see Chapter ments.


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