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Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment A Call for Change (2008) / Chapter Skim
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Summary
Pages 1-5

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From page 1...
... would concerns with the BTRA of 2006, ranging from mathematidramatically compound the effects. Bioengineering is no cal and statistical mistakes that have corrupted results, to unlonger the exclusive purview of state sponsors of terrorism; necessarily complicated probability models and models with this technology is now available to small terrorist groups and fidelity far exceeding existing data, to more basic questions even to deranged individuals.
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From page 2...
... It recommends against using this current BTRA agents, including enhanced or engineered agents that for bioterrorism risk assessment as presented in the BTRA have yet to be developed; and of 2006 or proposed for 2008. Instead, the committee offers • Discuss in more detail beyond the first report the feasi improvements that can significantly simplify and improve bility of extending the methodology to also serve as a future risk assessments.
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From page 3...
... This simplification would significantly reduce data reRecommendation: The Department of Homeland Se- quirements and accelerate computation. The BTRA software curity should use an explicit risk analysis lexicon for implementation seems to the committee to be cumbersome defining each technical term appearing in its reports and and slow and requires tending by its creators to produce risk presentations.
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From page 4...
... The committee suggests a rapid assessment tool and tack might be aggregated to the minimum number of stages proposes a template that suggests how to quickly estimate necessary to calculate probabilities and consequences, mak- the threat from emerging or suspected agents to determine ing data acquisition simpler without sacrificing fidelity. whether a more detailed exigent study is necessary.
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From page 5...
... Recommendation: While human mortality and the magnitude and duration of morbidity should remain the Regarding the Use of the BTRA in Its Present Form primary focus of DHS bioterrorism risk analysis, DHS should incorporate other measures of societal loss, in- For the reasons noted in this report's recommendations cluding the magnitude and duration of first- and second- and their justifying text, the committee believes that the order economic loss and environmental and agricultural BTRA in its present form should not be used to assess the effects. risk of bioterrorism threats.
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Key Terms

  • risk analysis
  • bioterrorism risk
  • decision support
  • biological threat
  • security presidential

  • presidential directive
  • rapid assessment
  • analysis lexicon
  • intelligent adversaries
  • probability distributions

  • threat risk
  • biological agent
  • threat agents
  • grave threat
  • represent adversarial

  • scientific peer
  • bioterrorist attack
  • terrorist decisions
  • support model
  • unnecessary complexity

  • biennial assessments
  • radioactive threats
  • outside experts
  • subsequent revision
  • explicit risk

  • responsive risk
  • risk reduction
  • effective risk
  • agent risk
  • consistent risk


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