A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (2009) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 11-42
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From page 11... ...
. Meselson and others were worried about biological weapons programs, such as those of the former Soviet Union, and what those programs could do with advanced molecular biology to make biological weapons.
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From page 12... ...
Advances in biotechnology have been increasingly seen as a dangerous and powerful new way to produce biological weapons. Regulations were put in place to control the transfer of select microbial pathogens and toxins in 1996, but knowledge generated by fundamental biological research was not viewed with concern.
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From page 13... ...
Slowing research in the life sciences, however, would harm the nation, global health, and the advancement of science, and so whatever policies might be developed to enhance security needed to be crafted very carefully. Given this tension, it is not surprising that 7 years later the debates continue over what to do about the dual use dilemma for research and communication in the life sciences. Clearly, during the past 50 years, rapidly expanding knowledge in the life sciences has brought great benefits to society.
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From page 14... ...
A National Academy of Sciences report, Scientific Communication and National Security, issued in 1982 and commonly known as the Corson report after its chair Dale Corson, ignored the life sciences when it considered the national security risks associated with research in the United States (NAS/NAE/IOM 1982)
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From page 15... ...
189 in 1985, which stated that to the maximum extent possible, fundamental research results should remain unrestricted, and that the appropriate mechanism for controlling information produced by federally funded research is the classification process. Nevertheless, by the 1990s the issue again arose -- this time for the field of cryptography. Recognizing the threat to national security that could arise from advances in cryptography, cryptographers agreed to submit articles on a voluntary basis for government review simultaneously with submission to journals and to consider requests to restrict publication of details that could harm national security (Dam and Lin 1996:417; Diffie 1996:2)
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From page 16... ...
Then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed the government policy embodied in NSDD-189 in November 2001.10 The Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget consulted with the scientific and academic communities in several meetings conducted in 2002 about potential policies to define and constrain unclassified information in the life sciences that could be used for bioterrorism (Check 2002a, b)
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From page 17... ...
. The following day, a group of scientists, journal editors, and security experts met and drafted a "Statement on Scientific Publication and Security," the crux of which was that many of the leading journals in the life sciences would accept responsibility for screening manuscripts to reduce the risk of misuse of scientific information (see Box 1-1)
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From page 18... ...
SOURCE: Journal Editors and Authors Group (2003a,b,c)
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From page 19... ...
Prior to the statements by the Journal Editors and Authors Group, Ron Jackson and his colleagues brought the potential dual use issues of their work on IL-4 insertion into mousepox virus to the attention of the Australian government officials before going ahead with the publication (Cohen 2002; Federation of American Scientists 2008a)
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From page 20... ...
Decisions to provide accompanying editorials to explain and endorse the scientific importance of the research reflected the perceived need to make the strongest case possible for the value of such potentially controversial research.13 The Fink Committee Beyond the ad hoc actions by the Journal Editors and Authors Group and individual journals, a continuing need remained for broader consensus building within the life sciences community regarding issues of dual use research and the potential misuse of the life sciences for bioterrorism. In June 2001, the National Academies began planning a project that led to the formation of the Committee on Improving Research Standards and Practices to Prevent Destructive Application of Advanced Biotechnology.
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From page 21... ...
Recommendation: A Role for the Life Sciences in Efforts to Prevent Bioter rorism and Biowarfare We recommend that the national security and law enforcement communities de velop new channels of sustained communication with the life sciences community about how to mitigate the risks of bioterrorism. SOURCE: National Research Council (2004a)
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From page 22... ...
The report proposed a system that would establish stages from proposal to publication at which scientists would review experiments and their results to provide public assurance that advances in biotechnology with potential applications for bioterrorism or biological weapons development were receiving responsible oversight. Where conducting research posed an immediate risk (i.e., the presence of imminent danger)
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From page 23... ...
In 2004, NSABB was established under the auspices of the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities, which also oversees RAC. The advisory committee's charge included providing guidance for the development of: • A system of institutional and federal research review that allows for fulfillment of important research objectives while addressing national security concerns; • Guidelines for the identification and conduct of research that may require special attention and security surveillance; • Professional codes of conduct for scientists and laboratory workers that can be adopted by professional organizations and institutions en gaged in life science research; • Materials and resources to educate the research community about ef fective biosecurity; and • Strategies for fostering international collaboration for the effective oversight of dual use biological research (NSABB 2004)
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From page 24... ...
The NSABB education committee is considering methods to educate scientists about DURC, and its international committee has been engaging intergovernmental organizations, international scientific organizations, individual scientists, journal editors, and policy makers from other nations on oversight of dual use BOX 1-3 NSABB Criteria for Dual Use Research of Concern 1. Is it likely that the research could: a.
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From page 25... ...
Note that, while many in the biosecurity community would agree that practicing life scientists should be educated about the risks of misuse of biotechnology and that there is value in building norms and a taboo against biological weapons, there are real philosophical differences regarding the value of a Hippocratic-type oath for scientists. Proponents believe that swearing an oath against the misuse of the life sciences would contribute to the creation of an effective "web of prevention" against biological weapons (Revill and Dando 2006)
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From page 26... ...
. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, passed in 2004, adds a further binding international commitment against support for nonstate actors seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction or the means of their delivery.19 In addition, in response to a report from UN Secretary General misuse as part of overall ethical training for life scientists.
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From page 27... ...
and for reducing the risks of misuse of dual use research (McLeish and Nightingale 2005) were important considerations of the 2005 BWC Meeting of Experts and Meeting of States Parties.20 The states parties discussed not only codes of conduct for scientists, but also relevant codes by sector, including government, academia, and professional societies; weaknesses in relying on just codes of conduct to prevent creation of biological weapons; and relevant national policies or legislation that overlap with codes of responsible conduct.
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From page 28... ...
, a network of 100 of the world's academies of science, created a Biosecurity Working Group, and issued a Statement on Biosecurity in December 2005 that offers principles to guide any scientific body that wants to develop a code of conduct to protect against the misuse of information in the life sciences.23 The IAP, through its Working Group on Biosecurity, is continuing its work on education and awareness-raising efforts including two international forums in collaboration with other international scientific organizations.24 AAAS addressed the 2008 intercessional meeting of states parties on development and implementation of education programs on dual use research discussing their recent workshop documenting existing education programs on dual use research, discussing the design of similar education programs, and highlighting challenges for implementing such programs.25 Another nonprofit organization with a particular emphasis on engaging industry, the International Council for the Life Sciences (ICLS) , is seeking to enhance global 22 The database can be found at http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/ (httpPages)
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From page 29... ...
The first was held in February 2007 with scientists and policy makers from 17 nations and several intergovernmental organizations, the second was held in October 2007 with members of U.S. and international professional scientific organizations and societies, and the third was held in November 2008 with 130 participants from approximately 40 countries as well as international organizations and scientific bodies.28 The participants in the first dialogue highlighted the importance of life science research and the need to protect advancement in the life sciences while minimizing any risks to international or national security.
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From page 30... ...
are at one end of the spectrum while voluntary responsible conduct within the life sciences community 29 Dual use research, as defined by the NSABB, deals with the knowledge, tools, and techniques produced by research rather than biological materials. The implementation of the select agent regulations, which affects aspects of how research is conducted, has tended to foster policy discussions in which dual use research and select agents are conflated.
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From page 31... ...
Regulations on Possession of Potentially Dangerous Pathogens and the American Life Sciences Community On November 25, 1969, President Nixon issued National Security Decision Memorandum 35, which renounced the "use of lethal methods of bacteriological/biological warfare. The United States bacteriological/ biological programs will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes (immunization, safety measures, et cetera)
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From page 32... ...
. The act established the "select agent" program to control the transfer of certain biological agents that were considered especially dangerous.32 The program was created to prevent bioterrorism and protect public safety while not unduly hindering research using select agents.
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From page 33... ...
The clinical laboratories, however, are required to destroy any select agents or transfer them to a registered laboratory that is permitted to possess that select agent within a few days, and they must also notify public health authorities whenever a select agent has been isolated and identified. 35 The approved list of biological agents established by an Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens is available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/misc208.pdf.
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From page 34... ...
37 Although there are differing views within the scientific community regarding the consequences of the select agent regulations, several in the scientific community consider that increased restrictions on foreign students and scholars through measures such as more stringent visas pose a far greater threat to the conduct of life sciences research.38 As the presidents of the National Academies have stated: "Our visa processing system not only must provide genuine security against those who might do us harm, but also keep our borders open to the stream of scientific and technical talent that fuels our progress .
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From page 35... ...
As mentioned earlier, in June 2007 the NSABB released its Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research, which it hopes will lead to common oversight standards across all federal agencies funding such research (NSABB 2007)
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From page 36... ...
LIFE SCIENTISTS' ATTITUDES AND AWARENESS OF DUAL USE ISSUES Since responsible conduct is considered key to the success of selfgovernance measures to protect against the misuse of the life sciences, there is concern that life scientists are insufficiently aware of and engaged in discussions about biosecurity and dual use issues. Most life scientists have little experience with the issues of biological weapons.
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From page 37... ...
, there was extensive discussion about the harmful uses of recombinant DNA, but the concerns of biotechnology and offensive biological weapons programs did not propagate that interest or awareness of science policy to the broader life sciences community. 42 See, for example, NRC (2004a,b, 2006a)
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From page 38... ...
There have been numerous surveys of scientists on other topics related to professional responsibility, such as ethics, responsible conduct, and financial conflicts of interest.46 Several small-scale studies using interviews or surveys with practicing scientists in the United States and the http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/bio/educationportal.html. The SERCEB Policy, Ethics and Law Core has developed an online module to assist those involved with the biological sciences to better understand the dual use dilemma of some life science research.
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From page 39... ...
A series of about 100 information exchange seminars have served as focus groups to gauge awareness of dual use issues, ascertain attitudes about potential oversight mechanisms, and raise awareness of the potential misuse of the life sciences for bioweapons development. As a result, Rappert and Dando have compiled substantial qualitative information.
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From page 40... ...
Concerns about potential misuse of dual use research relate to questions of whether advanced research could facilitate biological weapons development by states and nonstate actors. The introductory material in this chapter has covered both issues.
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From page 41... ...
Phase 3: • Based on the analysis of the findings of the survey, recommend ap proaches for engaging members of the life sciences community on bios ecurity issues. NRC appointed a committee to provide oversight for the Academies' participation in the project.
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