Assessment of the Bureau of Reclamation's Security Program (2008) / Chapter Skim
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3 Assessment of Reclamation's Security-Related Processes
3 Assessment of Reclamation's Security-Related Processes
Pages 50-70
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From page 50... ...
The committee members' experience and expertise in security, law enforcement, risk assessment, and engineering were important to the formulation of their findings. Chapter 3 first presents the committee's observations and findings about Reclamation's processes and functions for security assessments and risk management, personnel security, facility security, incident response, exercises and training, and intelligence gathering and dissemination.
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From page 51... ...
, Maritime Security Risk Analysis Method, and the Critical Infrastructure Common Risk Model. It is not yet clear whether a crosssectoral approach can be effective or whether a generalized methodology will have to be customized for dams or supplemented by an alternative.
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From page 52... ...
An example of how this method might be used for dams is included in Appendix C Finding: The risk management process that Reclamation has developed to assign priority for conducting threat and vulnerability assessments, security improvements, and resource allocation is appropriate.
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From page 53... ...
The level of resources required for effective security is greater at Folsom than elsewhere. Development of Threat Scenarios The information provided to the committee indicates that only a handful of standard threat scenarios (e.g., truck bombs, an airplane hitting a dam, the use of underwater explosives)
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From page 54... ...
Cycle for Security Assessments The importance of conducting recurring security assessments is well understood by SSLE staff and most of the field personnel with whom the committee spoke. Reclamation plans to pattern the frequency of security assessments on the cycle used in the safety of dams program.
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From page 55... ...
It would be better to have a less prescriptive approach that would allow security managers to conduct out-of-cycle assessments for special reasons or specific facilities. Finding: Reclamation plans to conduct security assessments on a 3- to 6-year cycle even though security threats are continually emerging and must be continuously monitored.
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From page 56... ...
FACILITY SECURITY PLANS A robust facility security plan should include an integrated system with obstacles that restrict access, surveillance and intrusion detection systems, and a rapid-response force. Typically, a plan will provide defense in depth by layering security zones.
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Some plans also incorporate on-site security guards or law enforcement per sonnel who could respond to an incident. With few exceptions, however, such as the Hoover and Grand Coulee dams, Reclamation relies on local law enforcement entities to respond to incidents.
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Reclamation depends heavily on a variety of local, state, and non-BOR law enforcement entities, as well as private security guards, for both routine security and as first responders to a malicious act.
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From page 59... ...
Thus the interface between initial responders and the local law enforcement entities that provide follow-up to a security-related incident may differ substantially from site to site. When developing response plans for its facilities, Reclamation should therefore take into account differences in federal, state, and local laws, including those relating to the use of deadly force.
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From page 60... ...
The committee observed that some communication equipment and technologies used by Reclamation personnel and contractors were not interoperable with those used by local law enforcement and other responders and that different radio frequencies and channels were used. This situation suggests that BOR should
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From page 61... ...
The committee observed that some communication equipment and technologies used by Reclamation and other federal, state, and local law enforcement and security organizations were not interoperable and would hinder communication among responders. Finding: Certain communication technologies used in rural and remote areas are subject to failure caused by weather and related events and may not be reliable during a security-related incident.
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From page 62... ...
law enforcement policies for the use of deadly force essentially limit federal officers to the defense-of-life rule. Discussions with Reclamation law enforcement officers and contract security personnel indicated that the individuals who are authorized to carry firearms have a sound understanding of the defense-of-life rule.
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From page 63... ...
Discussions with selected SSLE personnel indicated that the use of standard ammunition in specific portions of a facility could substantially compromise the integrity of critical equipment. It was not clear, however, that this was common knowledge throughout the SSLE or among the various on-site security and law enforcement entities at BOR facilities.
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From page 64... ...
If an arrangement cannot be worked out, the reasons for this should be clearly communicated to field staff. The various security and law enforcement entities at each critical f acility should also train appropriately for the specific challenges they would be likely to face in the event of a malicious act.
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From page 65... ...
The rationale for restricting the dissemination of classified information is clear: Some area offices are not equipped to receive or handle classified information and some operating personnel do not have the appropriate security clearances. However, much of the information on suspicious activities or incidents is not classified; rather, it is deemed "sensitive," a more ambiguous characterization.
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From page 66... ...
This attitude, which is due to the lack of feedback, could mean that a threat to Reclamation facilities is not identified in time to take preventive action. Finding: An inflexible commitment to the need-to-know doctrine inhibits the sharing of intelligence-based information among SSLE staff in Denver, the regional special agents, and the area office personnel who might be in the best position to deter some threats and who would be the first responders to an incident.
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From page 67... ...
Some directors and managers at the regional and area offices resist surrendering their delegated authority, which collides with efforts to implement Reclamation-wide security policies, plans, and programs. The tension between SSLE and the field organizations obstructs the development of a more robust security program and culture.
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From page 68... ...
Imposing a centralized security program on a culture that is accustomed to distributed program management and authority has resulted in tensions and ineffective working relationships between the SSLE staff in Denver and the staff of regional and area offices. Finding: Sound working relationships are based on effective communications and trust.
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From page 69... ...
Because Reclamation relies on good working relationships with internal staff and outside partners for effective operations, SSLE staff in particular need good communication, negotiation, and team-building skills. Training current staff in these skills could help to improve internal and external working relationships and the overall effectiveness of the security program.
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70 ASSESSMENT OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S SECURITY PROGRAM REFERENCES American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
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