The 2nd International Forum on Biosecurity Summary of an International Meeting (2009) / Chapter Skim
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1 Background
1 Background
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, the InterAcademy Medical Panel (IAMP) , the International Union of Microbiological Societies (IUMS)
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The participants came from all over the world because the life sciences are a genuinely global enterprise, and thus any policies must include international as well as national measures. As described later in this chapter, the Forum in Budapest was the second international meeting organized by international scientific bodies to address these issues.
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. A frequently quoted warning about the potential risks came in 2000 from Matthew Meselson, a leading figure in the life sciences on issues related to biological weapons: Every major technology -- metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy -- has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones.
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President Yeltsin's admission in early 1992, following years of accusations, that the Soviet Union had maintained a huge clandestine biological weapons program, in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) , came as the revelations of Iraq's efforts to create biological weapons were unfolding in the wake of the first Gulf War. The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo with chemical agents, spurred increasing concern with "catastrophic" terrorism. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent Meselson,M.
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response to the perceived threats of bioterrorism included a massive increase in funding for activities of the type most likely to raise concerns, and led some to question whether "defensive" work was becoming increasingly problematic in terms of compliance with the BWC.10 In addition to increased concerns about terrorism and state BW programs, a number of articles in scientific journals sparked controversy about whether some research that might be misused should not be conducted, or if conducted, should not be published. Critics charged such publications could provide a "blueprint" or "roadmap" for terrorists or countries seeking to carry out bioterrorism or to acquire biological weapons.11 Gerald Epstein of the Center for Strategic and International Studies labeled such studies "contentious"; his article was an early review of the issues and policy options then under discussion.12 Before proceeding further, it is important to acknowledge that the potential risks of the misuse of advances in the life sciences are not universally accepted.
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Capacity in the life sciences is diffusing around the world, and thus a meaningful response must include global approaches 14 A detailed and skeptical assessment of this phenomenon related to biological issues may be found in Leitenberg, M
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Princeton University, December 18. as well as national.18 The failure to undertake compatible international efforts risks, among other things, disrupting the international collaboration that is so much a part of the modern scientific enterprise; scientists sometimes point to the example of the barriers raised by legislation in the United States after September 11 as an example of what should be avoided.19 Lack of care in the design and implementation of measures to address dual use concerns risks denying access to knowledge and technology in the name of security, or risks driving work into areas where there is less oversight.
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After the Biological Weapons Convention was signed in 1972, most life scientists had little experience with the issues of biological weapons or bioterrorism; national programs related to biological weapons permitted under the BWC are confined to "prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful" measures. Thus without conscious personal effort or systematic education, very few life scientists working today would have reason to know the details of past offensive weapons programs or have knowledge of the BWC and their responsibilities under that treaty.
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This may be especially true in developing countries where improved biosafety comes as part of building capacity in the life sciences. The distinction between biosafety and biosecurity is primarily that the latter term, as used here, includes the additional consideration of measures to prevent deliberate misuse; biosecurity represents broader societal and ethical issues that are not always included in discussions of laboratory practices to ensure biosafety.
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. The fundamental commitment not to use disease as a weapon is embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which was signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.23 As Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, president of the treaty's sixth review conference, stated: The BWC has had marked success in defining a clear and unambiguous global norm, completely prohibiting the acquisition and use of biologi cal and toxin weapons under any circumstances.
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In addition to a number of proposals for national and international legal measures to support the implementation of the BWC, the initiative recommended including education about risks, rules, and responsibilities as part of the overall ethical training for life scientists. 28 In January 2003, in response to the controversy over scientific publications mentioned above, a group of editors and authors from some of the leading scientific journals met in Washington, DC, along with experts in security policy and biological weapons.
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National Research Council released a prepublication version of a report that focused specifically on the potential risks of dual use research, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, often called the "Fink report," after the study's chair, Gerald Fink of MIT.31 Planning for the project had begun prior to the events of September 11, and prior to the anthrax mailings; but those events gave the report much greater visibility. The report made a series of recommendations, largely focused on enhancing self-governance by the scientific community, but also with a role for federal guidelines and an advisory body modeled on the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee of the National Institutes of Health.
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These include but are not limited to the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project at the University of Maryland, educational seminars conducted by Malcolm Dando and Brian Rappert through the University of Bradford, the International Council for the Life Sciences, and the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.33 Each had a slightly different focus and a more or less explicit policy agenda, but all were concerned in large measure with the issues surrounding what the OECD called "responsible stewardship of the biosciences."34 2005 as a Turning Point One of the challenges for those interested in engaging the international scientific community is the wide array and variety of organizations. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of international scientific meetings every year in all parts of the globe, and a multitude of national and regional groups and groupings.
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, the IAP, or the IAMP, as described in Box 1-1 -- had been engaged in issues of science and security beyond the questions of the openness of scientific research and the human rights of science, engineering, and health professionals. As mentioned above, the topic for the 2005 BWC intersessional meetings was "content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists." The choice of codes provided an excellent opportunity to encourage scientific organizations to pay attention to biosecurity issues.
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IAMP activities focus on "institutional collaboration to strengthen the role of all academies to alleviate the health burdens of the world's poorest people; build scientific capacity for health; and provide independent scientific advice on promoting health science and health care policy to national governments and global organizations." aThe ICSU Web site is: http://www.icsu.org/index.php. bThe IAP Web site is: http://www.interacademies.net.
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The 3rd Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention took place in Geneva, Switzerland in June 2005. As already mentioned, the meeting's focus on codes of conduct had provided an opportunity to encourage scientific organizations to pay attention to biosecurity issues.
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convened a working group, which created a code of ethics for the IUBMB; among the obligations to the public, members "will not engage knowingly in research that is intended for the production of agents of biological warfare or bioterrorism, nor promote such agents."40 The International Union of Microbiological Societies also created a brief code and has urged national affiliates to adopt it, and to craft their own, more extensive codes relevant to local conditions.41 The final IAP statement was released on December 1st, just in time for the 2005 States Parties meeting. A copy of the statement, which was formally endorsed by 69 of the then 93 IAP member academies, can be found in Appendix D
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The WHO continued to engage on biosecurity issues by creating a working group and holding a small international workshop in October 2006 on "Life Science Research and Global Health Security." The workshop report recommends the creation of a standing scientific advisory group to counsel the WHO Director-General on biosecurity, including both improved biosafety and responsible oversight of research.44 WHO has also undertaken a number of collaborative activities, including regional workshops that address both biosafety and biosecurity issues. In April 2006 the UN Secretary General issued a report calling for a global strategy to counter terrorism.
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Although the transition to a new Secretary General slowed progress, the Secretary General's office is currently developing plans for a major new initiative. The 6th Review Conference for the BWC held in late 2006 offered an opportunity for some of the international scientific organizations to provide input to the review of the implications of trends in the life sciences for the implementation and operation of the treaty.
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• Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention. 51 The choice of topics for the 2008 meetings provided another opportunity to encourage further engagement by national and international scientific organizations in convening a meeting directly relevant to their interests.
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Taken together they underscore the increasing opportunities for scientists and scientific organizations to engage with policy makers to develop ways to address biosecurity issues and to provide expert advice about trends in the life sciences, so that policies are based on realistic assumptions. It is important to recognize that these growing opportunities also pose challenges.
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