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II. Findings
Pages 17-58

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From page 17...
... Finding 1 Designed for the Cold War when the United States had global dominance in most areas of science and technology, the current system of export controls now harms our national and homeland security, as well as our ability to compete economically. A. In almost all cases, the technology base that supports our national security also supports the high-technology sector of the civilian economy.
From page 18...
... 17-18. Deemed export controls refer to controlling the transfer of technical information to foreign nationals who are studying or working in the United States.
From page 19...
... The scientific establishments in Europe, Israel, Japan, and more recently, Russia, have realized a new vigor in the post-Cold War global economy. Several countries in the Middle East are now investing to advance their own scientific research capabilities.
From page 20...
... The Single Technology Base The technology base of a nation consists of all the elements that contribute to the ability of the nation to develop technology, to field advanced systems, and to compete in technology-based markets; it encompasses people, infrastructure, research laboratories, and manufacturing ­ capacity, as well as science and engineering education c ­ apacity. As conditions in the marketplace changed, the separate, and often secret, military technology base that in the 1970s supported the military market gradually merged with the much larger technology base that supported the commercial market.
From page 21...
... A key differentiating characteristic in the military market now was not the underlying scientific or technological information, components, or products, but the methods by which these were applied to specific military uses. With the evolution to a single technology base supporting both military and commercial demand came the opening of global markets through political means, such as the loosening of Russia's grip on its satellite states, the rise of state-controlled capitalism in China, and various world trade agreements.
From page 22...
... In addition, the bureaucracy's attention to "deemed exports" became more focused.11 Foreign scientists and students in the United States were barred from exposure to export-controlled items unless their host institutions obtained an export license. The Harms Caused by the Current Export Control System If appropriately construed and implemented, export controls (and the derivative "deemed export" controls)
From page 23...
... ­ Companies with significant commercial ­markets that continue to sell to the military may suboptimize military systems to minimize the impact of the export controls. As foreign companies and governments fill the competitive gaps left by U.S.-based companies that are not permitted -- or choose not -- to export, valuable technical developments occur outside the United States to which the U.S.
From page 24...
... export controls cannot prevent foreign militaries from acquiring them. Allowing foreign military services to buy such components from U.S.
From page 25...
... Resolution of comes from windows, not walls." 15 the root cause and corrective action needed to return the Atlas V fleet to flight status is Harm to homeland security. Many severely impeded by the export export controls have the poten- control regime that highly tial to damage homeland security c ­ onstrains U.S.
From page 26...
... fields rely for their creative success on broadly distributed, informal networks of individuals com­mitted to an unprecedented level of openness well beyond the control or economic leverage of the homeland security community. Both are examples of newly important areas in which current export controls may not work well.
From page 27...
... economic competitiveness. Similarly, export controls and "deemed export" rules make U.S.
From page 28...
... A. For most of the last 20 years, the executive and legislative branches of the federal government have failed to come to agreement -- either internally or with each other -- on dual-use export control policy. This failure has led to unnecessary vulnerabilities in our national security and in our economic competitiveness.
From page 29...
... The 1979 Act constitutes the basis of the current export control system. The Export Administration Act: Evolution, Provisions, and Debate, Updated January 9, 2008, Ian F
From page 30...
... 25The Departments of Homeland Security and Treasury, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation play lesser roles in this bureaucratic infighting. 26While not a licensing agency, the Department of Defense also plays a central role in export control policy decisions and in the determination of individual licensing cases, both munitions and dual use.
From page 31...
... One solution is for Congress to reform export control laws. Given the lack of decisive action for the last two decades, this may happen, but not without a significant push from the White House.
From page 32...
... These include: • The United States Munitions List, compiled by the Department of State, specifies the defense goods and services that require a license in order to be exported and implements the Arms Export Control Act. This list sets out 18 categories such as toxicological agents and equipment and radiological equipment (Category XIV)
From page 33...
... The Commerce Control List (CCL) is not in fact an explicit list of commercial items to be controlled and is instead a list of technology descriptions that may qualify a product for export.
From page 34...
... In addition, emerging research in very new fields will typically not appear on any government-generated list until considerable time has passed, by which point the technology is no longer new or emerging and may be well known in commercial markets or in the international research environment. This is not to suggest that only new, emerging technologies should be subject to controls.
From page 35...
... peak performance above The fundamental structure of today's 0.75 weighted TeraFlops lists produces export controls that (speed rating) in aggregation are not only out of date, but also are controlled.
From page 36...
... companies from exporting the item into the foreign market -- precisely the effect desired by the foreign competitor. 29See United States Export Controls by William A
From page 37...
... Lack of International Agreement over "Dual-Use" Export Controls During the Cold War, the NATO allies and Japan shared a multi­ lateral consensus on the need for effective and relatively uniform con 31Examples of how federal controls affect research choices can be found in the 2007 NRC Report, Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World. See Box 2-B on the effects of classification on research into wireless sensor networks on p.33 and the testimony of Rachel Claus and Michael Nacht on p.36.
From page 38...
... Munitions List and the Commerce Control List to determine which items, services, or technologies require a license for export. These lists, in turn, inform and are informed by the lists that support the multilateral export control regimes in which the United States participates.
From page 39...
... Its purpose is to harmonize the interpretation of nuclear export control policies for States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Zangger Committee maintains a Trigger List (triggering safeguards as a condition of supply)
From page 40...
... 35 The members of the Wassenaar Arrangement also foster suspicion toward one another. The United States, for example, is concerned that other m ­ embers do not take national security threats -- and hence, export c ­ ontrols -- ­seriously enough, while several of the other members think that the United States is seeking to use export controls to maintain a competitive advantage in high-technology goods.
From page 41...
... One key objective of these treaties is to enhance foreign participation in the production of the Joint Strike Fighter, a ­project with close and traditional allies of the United States that was threatened by U.S. export controls.37 The Royal United Services Because the majority of mili- Institute asserts that "the International Traffic in Arms tarily sensitive technologies and Regulations is the biggest products today are dual-use in obstacle to trans-Atlantic R&D nature, and many of those that are collaboration in the defence not multi­laterally controlled are field, and possibly in other available in global commerce from fields as well" in its 2007 multiple sources, unilateral restric- study, Defence Research and Development in the Atlantic tions can be effective only for the Nations.
From page 42...
... C.  The best practices that underpin successful competition in research and technology advancement are undermined by government regulation that restricts the flow of information and people participating in fundamental research. 38Some contend that research on pathogenic organisms warrants unilateral controls.
From page 43...
... During the period immediately following World War II, the United States became a champion in supporting and funding research as the nation responded to the national imperatives generated by the Cold War and the launch of ­Sputnik. The National Science Foundation was started, scholarships were created to attract young people to science and engineering programs, the national laboratories were created, and scientific think tanks were developed.
From page 44...
... Today, the interaction of U.S. and foreign scientists has global reach and occurs on several levels.
From page 45...
... The acceleration and globalization of science and technology, along with the progressive 41Although some contend that the large number of foreign nationals in U.S. science and engi neering graduate programs inhibits Americans from enrolling, evidence suggests that low student interest is the stronger explanation.
From page 46...
... A new scientific breakthrough, or a newly developed technological capability, can stimulate additional research in laboratories around the world. Although science does depend on the ability of researchers to validate previously published results, the scientific reward system–and the allocation of competitively awarded resources–strongly favors the first to publish.
From page 47...
... There is really no alternative strategy in the current competition for knowledge, technology advancement, and economic competitive advantage except to engage on a global level, and to "run faster." Best Practices that Enable Success in Fundamental Research Science in the United States has been effective because, for the most part, the following practices governing the conduct of scientific research have been recognized and honored. Maintaining these practices would naturally allow us to become more aware of advancements in science and technology and how they relate to our national security, including how our advancements could be countered by others.
From page 48...
... . in which the free exchange of ideas is a vital component."44 It then goes 44CSIS Commission on Scientific Communication and National Security, "Security Controls on Scientific Information and the Conduct of Scientific Research," June 2005, p.
From page 49...
... A number of recent reports have addressed the effect that "sensitive but unclassified" information controls, contractual clauses, and "deemed export" controls have had on fundamental university research in the United States, particularly that involving foreign nationals.46 The Need for Scientific Talent from Outside the United States Three parallel developments have increased U.S. dependence on foreign scientific talent.
From page 50...
... However, two research teams within the same corporation, one in the United States and one in a foreign country, may not be able to collaborate, even on a project involving rather old technology, due to export control regulations. These situations are independent of whether the company has proprietary protections for its research results that would protect the technology from possible diversion outside the company.
From page 51...
... 47 Access to foreign scientific talent is controlled by U.S. visa policy, which is based on a statute enacted in 1952 (with major amendments in 1965, 1986, and 1990)
From page 52...
... 52 TABLE International STEM Scholars by Specialization in the United States Major Field of Specialization 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Growth 2001/07 Health Sciences 23,568 21,070 17,244 19,630 19,590 23,872 1.3% Biological and Biomedical Sciences 12,558 14,749 19,234 19,271 22,500 19,353 54.1% Engineering 9,806 9,945 8,871 10,398 11,056 11,789 20.2% Physical Sciences 12,042 12,052 10,943 11,832 11,735 11,494 -4.6% Agriculture 2,925 3,287 2,570 3,316 3,006 3,930 34.4% Social Sciences and History 3,871 3,456 2,736 3,585 3,491 3,635 -6.1% Computer and Information Sciences 2,838 2,697 3,067 2,779 3,200 2,947 3.8% Mathematics 2,236 2,276 1,990 2,151 2,231 2,161 -3.4% Psychology 860 843 995 1,076 1,164 1,474 71.3% TOTAL  70,704 70,375 67,650 74,038 77,973 80,654 14.1% SOURCE: Institute of International Education, Open Doors report, 2007.
From page 53...
... Formerly, visa restrictions focused on nation-states and defined the risk of admitting a particular person to the United States with reference to that person's country of origin or current residence.49 Like the export control system, the visa system as it affects visitors who come to the United States for scientific or technological work or study is based on lists. • The Technology Alert List implements the Immigration and Nationality Act and was created during the Cold War to help consular officers identify areas of science and technology in which exports of technology or information might be controlled.
From page 54...
... 53 51For example, the U.S. Embassy located in the country where the researcher has applied for a visa, the CIA, FBI, the Departments of Commerce and Homeland Security, and the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
From page 55...
... For most categories of prospective student or scholar, anyone who admits that he or she might want to stay in the United States and contribute to this country's technological competitiveness must -- by law -- be denied entry. Re-examining and re-calibrating visa restrictions would be an important step toward assuring that the United States is the destination of choice for foreign scientists and students, as well as the leading producer of cutting-edge scientific research.
From page 56...
... Finding 4 A new system of export controls can be more agile and effective, recognizing that, under current global conditions, risks to national security can be mitigated but not eliminated. An important caveat attaches to any discussion of changes in the current system of export controls: there is no "risk-free" solution.
From page 57...
... National Security Decision Directive 189, in effect since 1985, is an example of this approach and provides an essential building block for a new export control policy. A 1982 study sponsored by the National Academies concluded that government controls on the publication of results from federally funded research were intruding into the conduct of research to a degree that could adversely affect important advances in science in the United States.54 By Executive 54The Corson Report.
From page 58...
... The committee finds that a final, competent, neutral decisionm ­ aking body, external to the competing agencies, can also be a useful means of resolving these vexing conflicts inherent in the current system of export controls. This kind of decision-making body can be adapted for the export control system so that both sides, the would-be exporters and the export controllers (or other interested government agencies)


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