Assessment of Planetary Protection Requirements for Mars Sample Return Missions (2009) / Chapter Skim
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7 Sample-Receiving Facility and Program Oversight
7 Sample-Receiving Facility and Program Oversight
Pages 58-72
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From page 58... ...
1,2 In the past decade, discussions about Mars sample return missions have advanced considerably, generating a wealth of valuable information that has been applied to problems of sample handling, life detection, and biohazard testing. Initial thinking about Mars sample return, and about an SRF for housing samples, borrowed heavily from lessons learned during the Apollo missions by the Lunar Receiving Laboratory.
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From page 59... ...
and international experts on biosafety, biocontainment, and risk assessment have participated in many of the past discussions of a Mars sample return mission and an SRF. TIMESCALE FOR ESTABLISHING A SAMPLE-RECEIVING FACILITY Although there still is no facility in existence anywhere that combines the requisite biocontainment levels, cleanliness conditions, instrumentation, and other features needed for the characterization and testing of returned martian samples, there is an increasingly clear understanding of what will be required and how it can be accomplished.
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From page 60... ...
If containment not verified en route, must Not discussed sterilize or not return to Earth Containment integrity maintained throughout Not discussed; report focuses on samples re-entry and transfer to SRF after arrival at SRF Planetary Protection Measures Planetary protection controls should not be Not applicable (Missions) relaxed for future missions without review by an independent scientific body Assumptions About Martian Life Extraterrestrial Life Martian life might exist and could be Possibility that samples from returned in samples, but martian organisms Mars will contain viable martian unlikely to pose a risk of pathogenic or microorganismswhich requires that ecological effects on Earth samples be handled in ways that will protect both terrestrial environments and martian samples from any cross-contamination Biohazards Samples should be contained and treated as Agrees with the need to contain and test potentially hazardous until proven otherwise; samples before release; raises concerns that potential biohazards viewed as replicating returned samples could include replicating entities; martian life deemed unlikely to organisms that are self-reliant and able cause infectious, pathogenic, or ecological to proliferate in an alien terrestrial world effects, although the probability is not zero.
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From page 61... ...
may be important to consider in protecting laboratory workers exposed to returned samples. Levels of containment and handling in the SRF should be based on perceived risks from biohazards; other potential hazards are dealt with accordingly Continued
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From page 62... ...
. In the interim, no releases, unless warranted for biological testing and only if samples sterilized If initial tests are unable to rule out evidence of martian life, or fossilized biosignatures, promptly sterilize aliquots and move samples from SRF to other laboratories for additional biological and geological testing Decision Making About Decision making for sample release will be Decision to release samples will be based Release based on data from sample characterization, on the results of protocol and biohazard advice of a science advisory committee, and assessments completed in SRF; science other more specific criteria to be determined advisory committee to provide guiding recommendations Sample-Receiving Facility Rationale for a Sample- SRF needed to contain and process returned In agreement that an SRF is needed; SRF Receiving Facility (SRF)
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From page 63... ...
, or life detection tests, all samples should undergo complete biohazards testing before release from containment, unless first sterilized Samples containing any active martian life form, whether hazardous or not, should be kept under appropriate containment, or sterilized before release Samples with life-related molecules require more extensive testing, including biohazards testing, before their release If biohazards tests yield no evidence for living, self replicating entities, or harmful effects on terrestrial life under Earth conditions, then samples may be released Decisions regarding sample release from quarantine to be Not applicable determined from observational data, and based on advice of a science advisory committee; specific criteria to be refined prior to operation of SRF Gradual reduction of containment level and removal from high containment is possible, depending on the results of biohazards and other tests; contingency plans needed regarding procedures if life is discovered, if test results are equivocal, or if containment is breeched SRF and protocol objectives: Must contain samples until it is SRF necessary; details to be determined by others determined whether samples are a threat to Earth's biosphere; SRF needed to implement NRC-recommended sample handling and testing under strict BSL-4 containment and any ambient conditions needed to maintain samples' integrity for scientific analysis; in addition to protocol testing at SRF, must consider environmental, health and safety issues, personnel training, regulatory reviews, and so on. Commissioning of SRF should occur ~3 years in advance of SRF construction and commissioning should be sample return.
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From page 64... ...
; advisory committee will also participate in the design of mission elements to address concerns over biological contamination; advisory committee should be established at the earliest stage of Mars sample return planning Oversight and Related Items Intergovernmental Oversight Committee of experts needed to coordinate Not specifically mentioned; report focuses on (Planetary Protection Policies regulatory responsibilities and advise NASA SRF oversight and Overall Compliance) on planetary protection measures; committee should be in place 1 year prior to the establishment of SRF and 3 years prior to launch NASA Administrative Need to establish a NASA administrative Not specified Structure structure to verify and certify adherence to planetary protection requirements at each stage of mission planning Public Communication Must keep the public openly informed of all Not specified plans, activities, scientific results, and any associated issues
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From page 65... ...
will maintain multidisciplinary science teams; biosafety operations with cooperative agreements with existing BSL-3 officer likely to come from host country and BSL-4 laboratories for personnel training and experience Continuing oversight of SRF planning and implementation SRF will require an IBC-type oversight committee; oversight by science advisory committee; anticipated that real-time needs to be in place several years in advance of the SRF target adjustments to the protocol will be required by scientific date for operations; special attention should be given to including findings; oversight committee should be established as much international management of the SRF; details to be determined as 10 years in advance of Mars sample return; subcommittees needed include a science working group, design committee, and SRF oversight committee Review of final protocol should be conducted at the Oversight needed; details will depend on the legal framework highest scientific levels (e.g., NRC and its international provided by the host country where SRF is sited; assumes equivalents) ; oversight should also involve the NASA involvement of both U.S.
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From page 66... ...
Other Issues Associated with Mars Sample Return In the years since publication of the NRC's 1997 report Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations,22 there have been numerous proposals for alternative approaches to handling sample return. For example, there has been debate about whether there should be multiple sample-receiving laboratories, rather than a single SRF; the advisability of transporting pristine subsamples to facilities outside the SRF to use special instruments or expertise for testing and sample characterization (see Chapter 6)
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From page 67... ...
to sample surfaces; must define testing; need for regular updates of biohazard testing methods, end-to-end requirements and analyses for controlling sample containment issues, toxicogenomics, refinement of planetary cross-contamination; need refinements in the ways that protection and containment guidelines, with exploration of science interfaces with engineering throughout missions; need containment options and potential retrofitting of existing technological developments that include methods for aseptic containment facilities; need to explore self-contained robotic- sample transfer, redundant containment of flight system hardware, handling devices and potential for the miniaturization of and methods for biohazard testing of samples on Earth analytical instruments; need to develop methods for the reinterrogation of samples at precise locations within samples for diverse testing; need for subsampling procedures and methods for validation/determination of statistical relevance of representative samples selected from heterogeneous materials; need to develop model systems and microcosms for testing of analog and returned sample materials; need to develop robust methods for cell culturing; need life detection methods that can be carried out under simulated martian conditions dInternational Mars Architecture for the Return of Samples Working Group, Preliminary Planning for an International Mars Sample Re turn Mission: Report of the International Mars Architecture for the Return of Samples (iMARS) Working Group, NASA, Washington, D.C., and European Space Agency, Paris, France, 2008.
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From page 68... ...
The first part concerned the need for such a facility: "A research facility for receiving, containing, and processing returned samples should be established as soon as possible after serious planning for a Mars sample-return mission has begun" (p.
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From page 69... ...
In addition to a science and technical advisory committee for the SRF, the NRC's 1997 Mars report saw a need for a higher-level group charged with oversight of all planetary protection requirements associated with Mars sample return: "A panel of experts, including representatives of relevant governmental and scientific bodies, should be established as soon as possible once serious planning for a Mars sample-return mission has begun, to coordinate regulatory responsibilities and to advise NASA on the implementation of planetary protection measures for sample-return missions. The panel should be in place at least 1 year prior to the establishment of the samplereceiving facility ([i.e.,]
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From page 70... ...
Mission: Revised Science Considerations in Light of the 2004 MER Results," unpublished white paper, 2005, available as Appendix III of Science Priorities for Mars Sample Return, posted March 2008 by the Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group at http://mepag.jpl.nasa.gov/reports/ND-SAG_Appendix_IIIpost1.doc. 11 International Mars Architecture for the Return of Samples (iMARS)
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From page 71... ...
International Mars Sample Return Mission: Report of the International Mars Architecture for the Return of Samples (iMARS) Working Group, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., and European Space Agency, Paris, France, 2008.
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