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2 Cooperative Threat Reduction in the 21st Century: Objectives, Opportunities, and Lessons
Pages 39-68

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From page 39...
... . A new, equally creative set of integrated and coordinated global security engagement programs is now required to address a broader range of WMD and terrorist threats on a global scale -- CTR 2.0.
From page 40...
... National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) , the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
From page 41...
... Libya also agreed to destroy their chemical weapons stocks and dismantle their production capability. More than 23 tons of mustard blister agent along with 600 tons of precursor chemicals had to be destroyed. The DOD CTR program and NDF were both asked to submit time and cost estimates. NDF proposed a significantly lower budget and a shorter time line, and it was therefore selected to carry out the task.
From page 42...
... The report of the Review Panel on Future Directions for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 2008 (hereafter referred to as the CarterJoseph Report) concluded that the DOD CTR program should expand its focus on counterproliferation activities, including threat awareness, equipment, and consequence management training and exercises, aimed at building national and regional capacities. These should become major program themes in future cooperative threat reduction efforts.
From page 43...
... This topic is explored in more detail in Chapter 4. Finding 2-3: CTR 2.0 should include long-term relationship and capacity building that can be the basis for future cooperative threat reduction activities, through defense and military-to-military engagement and other peer-to-peer engagement, such as in science.
From page 44...
... national security in the future, USG CTR programs must be less cumbersome and less bureaucratic in order to provide agile and timely contributions. They must take greater consideration of the needs and wants of reluctant partners even as we keep focused on core U.S.
From page 45...
... Traditional, "hard" metrics are important program indicators, but do not necessarily capture some of the important high-value "soft" program results. An essential issue in developing and using program metrics to understand and assess the success of USG CTR programs is to pair the specific metrics employed with the stated program goals and objectives.
From page 46...
... The DOD CTR Biological Threat Reduction Program ran an exercise in the fall of 2008 to test the biological detection and surveillance system in Georgia that has resulted from a USG CTR program. The conclusions of that test should be reviewed as a possible model for future metrics design.
From page 47...
... It has grown in sophistication and application over the past several decades and may be a useful tool for identifying tangible benefits of the relationships developed under cooperative threat reduction programs. In addition, more attention needs to be paid to how metrics are linked to criteria for determining program priorities and program success.
From page 48...
... Employing relevant techniques of impact evaluations may better position USG CTR 2.0 to assess its successes, particularly when program goals and objectives are not easily quantifiable and do not translate easily onto a scorecard. Finding 2-6: The traditional metrics of DOD (and USG)
From page 49...
... Even where military-to-military relations or other peer engagements are conducted, it is difficult to gauge how much they support USG CTR objectives, but they often do. • Chemical Weapons Challenges  In addition to countries with known or suspected chemical weapons programs, any country with a reasonably advanced chemical or petrochemical industrial sector has the latent capability to develop chemical weapons.
From page 50...
... The issue has gained worldwide attention, and the threat of attack has served to drive the security and life science communities closer together, engaging experts in both human and agricultural health. USG CTR programs can enhance biosecurity by supporting a network of experts who are sensitive to international norms and national laws and who can bring their expertise even to troubled regions.
From page 51...
... 2008. Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.
From page 52...
... The Failed State Index19 presents a sober picture of potential future risk. In 2008, 177 countries were listed, 35 of which were considered to be "alert" states, including some that were mentioned to the committee by various experts as possible partner countries for future CTR 2.0 security engagement programs: Afghanistan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria.
From page 53...
... Chemical weapons programs and dual-use chemical industrial capabilities have physical signatures that may also allow identification, at a minimum, and possibly coordinated responses by the international community. Exploitation of toxic industrial chemicals and toxic industrial materials by terrorist groups or even lone actors requires a much different set of tools, best implemented by individual states (e.g., UNSCR 1540)
From page 54...
... Each nation or region has a slightly different perception of the WMD proliferation threat; thus, there is a need for a graded degree of responses and broad potential for collaboration. Traditionally, the USG CTR programs have focused on WMD.
From page 55...
... Clearly, the United States and others should be prepared to respond rapidly to events and opportunities, but investing in relationships for global security must be viewed as a long-term commitment and one in which the process of engagement may sometimes be more important―and yield more tangible results―than the actual project. Finding 2-9: Relationships on multiple levels with allies, threat-reduction partners, academe, NGOs, and others are necessary for effective engagement with countries and regions on nonproliferation activities.
From page 56...
... Although the DOD CTR program has been successful in many environments, it is viewed with suspicion and distrust in others. DOD's attempts to engage directly with the Russian Ministry of Health, for example, were not successful, whereas it was able to engage successfully beyond the counterpart ministries of defense in Georgia and Uzbekistan.
From page 57...
... The academic community also may have much to offer. Since USG CTR began, many universities, academic institutions, and individual professors from many fields have had some role or contact with cooperative threat reduction programs.
From page 58...
... WMD scientist redirection program based in Moscow. Because there were compelling reasons to keep Ukraine involved in broad CTR efforts, the United States agreed, but did not consult, with its ISTC partners before announcing its commitment to a new center -- the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine.
From page 59...
... This will require diplomatic effort, but the existing bilateral, multilateral, and international channels of communication should provide ample opportunity for this. CTR in the 21st Century: Lessons The Shchuch'ye Example The development, design, and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye in western Siberia is a good example of what is described above.
From page 60...
... NGOs may not have the same level of accountability as the government, may not have the necessary technical expertise, or may even work at cross purposes with the government. 28 Nuclear Threat Initiative.
From page 61...
... NGOs, especially those with a demonstrated track record, can work with USG CTR programs in different ways that need to be explored more systematically. • Pioneers, or "wedge strategies" – NGOs can take risks that governments may not be ready to take.
From page 62...
... First, no systematic mechanism was ever developed that adequately reflects the contributions that Russia (and other former Soviet states engaged in USG CTR activities) have made.
From page 63...
... In April 2007, the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration announced that it had reached a nonbinding agreement with Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) on a plan for Russia to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear material sites after DOE ceases its financial support.31 Separate discussions have reportedly taken place with regard to Russia sustaining U.S.-funded work performed at sites with nuclear warheads and at nuclear material sites controlled by other agencies.
From page 64...
... Agency for International Development, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other nongovernmental organizations -- have developed their own mechanisms for promoting sustainability after the conclusion of donor funding. Reaching out to such foreign assistance providers in order to identify and, where appropriate, replicate their best practices would contribute to DOD and other USG CTR program effectiveness and may offer new opportunities for program leveraging.
From page 65...
... Finding 2-2: CTR 2.0 efforts will likely be smaller and distributed across a larger number of countries carefully targeted on the sources of new threats rather than the large, physical infrastructure dismantlement or construction projects that were the hallmarks of the programs in the former Soviet Union. Finding 2-3: CTR 2.0 should include long-term relationship and capacity building that can be the basis for future cooperative threat reduction activities, 32 National Nuclear Security Administration.
From page 66...
... Finding 2-5: As the lessons learned from the Libyan experience make clear, to make cost-effective contributions to U.S. national security in the future, USG CTR programs must be less cumbersome and less bureaucratic in order to provide agile and timely contributions.
From page 67...
... Recommendation 2-1: The White House, working across the executive branch and with Congress, should engage a broader range of partners in a variety of roles to enable CTR 2.0 to enhance global security. At a minimum this will require • Becoming more agile, flexible, and responsive • Cultivating additional domestic and global partners to help meet our goals • Building mutually beneficial relationships that foster sustained cooperation Finding 2-13: There needs to be a distinct transition plan to move between the current cooperative threat reduction programs and CTR 2.0.


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