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INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND NON-PROLIFERATION
Pages 113-124

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From page 113...
... This paper gives a brief overview of recent proposals for fuel assurance mechanisms put forward by various governments and other stake holders in this regard, with a focus on the initiative of the President of the Russian Federation of January 25, 2006, to establish a network of international nuclear fuel cycle centers as a means to ensure the secure supply of NFC products and services and the non-proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies.142 140 Sergei Ruchkin is currently a Russian representative at the World Nuclear Association in London and is also affiliated with the Federal Agency on Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Rosatom) , TENEX (Tekhsnabexport, Joint Stock Company)
From page 114...
... 2. Creation of a System of International Russian Federation January 2006 Centers Providing Nuclear Fuel Cycle Services, Including Enrichment 3.
From page 115...
... 147 For further information on this proposal, see http://www.nti.org/c_press/fuel_bank_122707.pdf; accessed on April 6, 2008. 148 "Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle," World Nuclear Association, May 2006, available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/reference/pdf/security.pdf; accessed July 13, 2008.
From page 116...
... of February 2006,155 is a long-term project intending, in particular, to jointly develop technologies for closing the fuel cycle. One of the key GNEP elements is a fuel services program to enable consumer nations to acquire nuclear energy economically while limiting proliferation risks.
From page 117...
... indigenous enrichment or reprocessing capabilities • be solely a back-up mechanism to the current normally-functioning market • not ask or expect from any country to give up or abridge any of their rights provided under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 158 PRELIMINARY FEEDBACK FROM POTENTIAL CONSUMER COUNTRIES Following the IAEA Special Event, the Agency secretariat and the countries originating the proposals have been actively seeking feedback from potential users (consumer states)
From page 118...
... The G8 leaders reiterated that participation in any mechanism dealing with multilateral approaches should be carried out on a voluntary basis and should not preclude any state from purchasing nuclear fuel cycle services on the existing market beyond the frameworks of multilateral mechanisms. The G8 also noted that they were looking forward to the suggestions that the IAEA DG would present to the IAEA BOG in June 2007.
From page 119...
... . The IUEC has three primary objectives: • to promote the wider use of nuclear energy worldwide, particularly in emerging nuclear energy countries • to reduce the nuclear proliferation risk by encouraging consumer countries to use the benefits of nuclear energy by relying on international routes for the supply of NFC products and services rather than by acquiring sensitive indigenous NFC capabilities • to provide additional assurances of nuclear fuel supply to the IUEC member states, which may voluntarily choose to rely on international routes of nuclear fuel supply In the last year, some important milestones have been achieved in the realization of the IUEC initiative.
From page 120...
... . A decision was made by the Russian government to set up a commercial joint stock company "IUEC" on the site of the Russian uranium enrichment plant in Angarsk; the plant has been added to the list of Russian nuclear facilities to be put under IAEA safeguards.
From page 121...
... and the profits. Since transformation of the existing enrichment plant in Angarsk from a state federal unitary enterprise into a joint stock company will take some time, initially the IUEC will not have enrichment capacities of its own, but will have to place orders for enrichment services at the existing plant.
From page 122...
... o producing at the IUEC and exporting from Russia LEU is only for fuel fabrication for NPPs o providing incentives together with last resort LEU fuel reserves, to participating countries to rely on international routes of LEU fuel supply rather than on developing domestic capabilities Since non-proliferation is one of the main objectives of the IUEC, it will not be able to operate effectively without IAEA support and involvement, which may materialize in various ways, including: • implementation of IAEA safeguards over IUEC nuclear materials and/or facilities • assistance in gaining international recognition and involvement of new countries • certification of participating countries' non-proliferation records against predefined criteria • provision of a framework and trigger mechanism for back-up supplies (should the IUEC have this role)
From page 123...
... CONCLUSION Global perspectives on the expanded use of nuclear energy raise concerns about the security of the nuclear fuel supply and increased risks of the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies. In recent years, there have been various initiatives put forward by governments and other stakeholders to address this issue.


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